4. Nuclear Submarine Non-Proliferation
James Clay Moltz, associate director of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, reports that Brazil, India, Pakistan, and the PRC are all seeking to expand their nuclear submarine fleets because of the example created by the US and Russia. He argues that sub-manufacturing states should to a ban on the sale or transfer of nuclear subs and their propulsion technology, they should discuss an agreement to facilitate the exchange of information in the case of future accidents, and should include the enriched uranium fuel used in submarines in a global treaty to ban the production of fissile materials.
"The Kursk Was In Dangerous Company"
Jon B. Wolfsthal, writing in the Christian Science Monitor, argued that keeping US missile subs at sea in a Cold War posture forces Russia to keep its attack subs out there looking for US subs, and encourages Russia to keep as many strategic missile subs at sea as possible. The US and Russia should bilaterally decide that ballistic missile subs will no longer go on routine patrol and the US could help Russia dismantle its excess subs as an incentive for Russia to agree. The benefits to the US and Russian budgets would be significant, as would be the benefits to global security.
"The Message Implicit in Kursk Disaster"
Commenting on the Russian submarine disaster, Joshua Handler, a doctoral student in the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University, wrote that Russia is unsuccessfully trying to run a first-world navy on a third-world budget. US submarines spying in the middle of Russian naval exercises, and the Russia Navy's deployment of submarines for prestige and to counter the Western presence, must be curtailed and replaced by cooperative arrangements and exercises, Handler argued.
"Cold War Games, Dangerously Old"
Clifford Gaddy and Michael O'Hanlon of the Brookings Institution wrote in the San Diego Union-Tribune that most Americans don't realize how great Russian distrust is toward the US and its allies. They suggest that rather than calling for unilateral Russian disarmament, the US should cut its nuclear forces, unilaterally at first, down to levels envisioned by arms control treaties and which are already assumed in US military planning.
"The Kursk and its lessons for the next U.S. president"