Nuclear Weapons

1. South Asian Nuclear Programs

Nuclear Weapons

Shaun Gregory, a lecturer at the Department of Peace Studies at the University of Bradford in the UK, discusses command and control systems for nuclear program in South Asia in a report funded by the United States Institute for Peace (USIP). Gregory states that, given the current perceptions of conditions in India and Pakistan, it is difficult to see how a stable bilateral deterrent relationship can emerge. However, Gregory states that the robust command and control arrangements needed to meet the requirements of stable deterrence are in the process of being put in place. Gregory cites both countries' long experience with civil nuclear programs, the fact that public threats and ambiguity obscures the true extent of bilateral political and military dialogue in place, that they benefited directly and indirectly from the experiences of the acknowledged nuclear power's programs, and that both states have fashioned nuclear posture and command and control arrangements in line with the limits of their national circumstances. Gregory also cites a number of issues that he argues add up to a challenge to India and Pakistan and to the international community hamstrung by the provisions of the NPT and the need to avoid being seen to legitimize nuclear proliferation.
"A Formidable Challenge: Nuclear Command and Control in South Asia"

Missile Defense

George W. Bush is to hold talks with PRC Vice-Premier Qian Qichen in which the main topic is expected to be Taiwan. However, they are also expected to discuss US plans for missile defense, which the PRC argues will lead to an arms race in Asia and destabilize arms control agreements.
"Bush, Qian to Discuss Taiwan, Arms, Human Rights"

Tomas Valasek, Senior Analyst at the Center for Defense Information, writes in an essay that National Missile Defense (NMD) is harder for the US to sell to its allies than a Theater Missile Defense (TMD), because they fear NMD will isolate the US from Europe, weaken US military commitments abroad, and cause new arms races. Valasek states that many European states are in the middle of joint-development of TMD systems with the US and that NATO is seeking to develop an alliance-wide missile defense system. Anderson cites an Atlantic Council report ("European Views of National Missile Defense") in his argument that Europe sees NMD at isolating rather than engaging potential adversaries and as less compliant with international arms control regimes than TMD is believed to be.
"Missile Dealers at the Gates of Europe"
"European Views of National Missile Defense"
"A Cool Eye on the U.S. Missile Umbrella: No European Government Backs the Plan for a Robust Weapon Shield"

James Lindsay and Michael O'Hanlon, Senior Fellows at the Brookings Institution, argue in a Los Angeles Times editorial that the increasing ballistic missile threat facing the US justifies the development of missile defense as long as it works against an adversary trying to defeat it, is affordable given the competing demands on the Pentagon budget, and it must protect the allies of the US. However, they also argue that while the US should not allow Russia and China a veto over our deployment of missile defenses, any deployment must anticipate their likely responses and accept that the US and its allies could likely become less secure. They conclude that it makes sense to only deploy a limited missile defense system targeted on small, extremist states, and not a system designed to defeat Russia or the PRC.
"Do a Missile Defense, But Do It Right"
"Do a Missile Defense, But Do It Right"

In an op-ed column in the New York Times, William Safire stated that one of the least publicized issues discussed by US President George Bush and Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon during Sharon's visit to the US was that of Israel's proposed participation in the US missile defense program. Safire states that Israel's Arrow anti-missile missile may be coupled with the US Aegis phased-array radar missile-tracking systems aboard US naval vessels to counter threats from weapons of mass destruction now being built in Iraq and Iran.
"Arik and George"

Proliferation

Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, arguing that Iran and Iraq are building up missile arsenals that endanger Israel and the rest of the region, is appealed for a bigger role in US missile defense planning in his first meeting with President Bush. Sharon stated that Iran's ballistic missile technology comes predominantly from the DPRK, but it also is emanating from Russia.
"Sharon Appeals for Cooperation"

Justin Anderson, Junior Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, published a report on the state of ballistic missile proliferation in the Middle East. Anderson reports that Iraq is aggressively pursuing foreign technology in an attempt to develop the medium-range Shehab III (1,300 km), based on the DPRK's No-Dong and designed with substantial Russian assistance. Anderson also reports that while most countries only have short-range missiles, Israel has the medium-range Jericho II (1,500 km) missiles, though Israel's successful satellite launches suggest that it could quickly develop missiles with much longer ranges, and Saudi Arabia purchased several dozen medium-range CSS-2 (2,600 km) missiles in 1987 from the PRC.
"Ballistic Missile Arsenals in the Middle East"

An editorial published in the Bangkok Post reported that a conference was recently held in Japan with countries from the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), at which Japan attempted to lay out the current facts about ballistic missiles and their development, and to enlist support for a common policy against further proliferation of these weapons systems. The editorial argued that ballistic missile proliferation, such as that by the DPRK, threatens the security of all countries in Asia. It further argued that conferences such as these can improve the security of the participating countries and that there is a role for all countries in combating missile technology proliferation.
"Battling to stop dangerous weapons"

Arms Control

Sean Howard, editor of Disarmament Diplomacy and Adjunct Professor at the University College of Cape Breton in Canada, published an essay comparing the assumptions and recommendations of NATO's December 2000 report ("Options for Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs), Verification, Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament"), with those contained in the disarmament plan of action unanimously agreed upon at the Sixth Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Howard concludes that a major political and practical disjunction exists between the NATO and NPT views of disarmament, a divide that the Alliance's review underscores but does nothing to bridge. Howard argued that NATO's review was inspired only by a minority desire to challenge a pro-nuclear policy and constitutes a setback to global disarmament efforts.
"Moderation in Excess: NATO's Arms Control Review and the NPT Action Plan"
"Text Only"

The Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Igor Ivanov conducted a press conference in which he stated that, for Russia, the "center of our recent diplomatic activity has been the whole complex of issues linked with START and ABM." In response to questions, he said, "We believe that the ABM Treaty of 1972 provides enough possibilities for solving existing problems and overcoming the threats, of which sometimes our Western partners speak today, and in particular those stemming from missile technologies." Ivanov refers to the ABM Treaty as "the cornerstone treaty in the field of security and disarmament at this stage," and argues that Russia proposed ABM-for-Europe plan complies with the ABM Treaty but is only a part of a package of proposals for the creation of a global missiles and missile technology control system.
"Russia's 'ABM-for-Europe' Plan: Remarks by Foreign Minister Ivanov"

Nonproliferation

Rose E. Gottemoeller, former director of nonproliferation and national security at the Energy Department, stated that she was told that the $1.2 billion proposed by the Clinton administration for Russian programs to reduce and safeguard its nuclear weapons and materials had been reduced by President Bush's Office of Management and Budget to $800 million, which is $73 million or 12 percent below the current year's figure. She also said this is 30 percent pf the 2002 budget proposed by the Clinton administration. The "Nuclear Cities" program to help former nuclear scientists get nonmilitary work would be cut to $6 million from $30 million and the Department of Energy's plutonium disposal program is set to rise from $200 million this year to $217 million under Bush, well below the $400 million proposed by Clinton. Republican US Senator Pete V. Domenici, chairman of the Senate Appropriations subcommittee that handles the Energy nonproliferation budget, said that the Russian programs "don't deserve to be cut as much as they are thinking."
"Bush Targets Russia Nuclear Programs for Cuts"
"Nonproliferation Programs Face Major Budget Cuts"

John Isaacs and Steve LaMontagne, of the Council for a Livable World, report that US President Bush expressed support for threat reduction programs during his campaign, stating on November 19, 1999, "I will ask the Congress to increase substantially our assistance to dismantle as many of Russia's weapons as possible as quickly as possible." Despite this statement and others during his campaign, Isaacs and LaMontagne report that Bush plans to cut funding to $800 million from $872 million, instead of the $1.2 billion the DOE nonproliferation programs were slated to reach in fiscal 2002.
"Bush Flip-Flops Again, Cuts Funding for Nonproliferation Programs"

Mark Smith, Research Fellow at the Mountbatten Centre for International Studies at the University of Southampton in the UK, writes that efforts to find new ways to tackle the problem of ballistic missile proliferation have been driven by a perception that the proliferation of such missiles has increased and that the existing international regime to promote the non-proliferation of ballistic missiles, the Missile Control Technology Regime (MCTR), has been ineffective. Smith argues that missile proliferation is a symptom of the incompleteness of the global missile non-proliferation regime, because the MCTR was never intended to halt missile proliferation, but to act as a cartel, slowing down proliferation until a more complete regime could be constructed. Smith also reviews a number of recent non-MCTR initiatives, including UN initiatives, a Russian proposal for a Global Control System (GCS), and a US-Russian Joint Data Exchange Center.
"The MTCR and the Future of Ballistic Missile Non-Proliferation"
"Text Only"

A ROK Foreign Affairs-Trade Ministry official said that the ROK will join the international Missile Technology Control Regime (MCTR) at a conference set for late this month in Paris. The ROK's entry into the MCTR came after it recently adopted new missile guidelines in negotiation with the US. The Korea Times reports that because the US holds a virtual veto over membership decisions, all countries wishing to join the MCTR need to conduct prior negotiations with the US.
"Korea to Join Missile Control Regime in March"

Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister John Manley announced that Canada will resume normal ties with India, ending a two-year freeze in relations over India's nuclear weapons testing. Manley said Canada believed that full ties were needed for an "effective dialogue" with India, but said Canada would continue to pressure India to "renounce its nuclear weapons program."
"Canada Will Resume Ties With India"

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Robert Brown: npp@nautilus.org
Berkeley, California, United States

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Berkeley, California, United States

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Berkeley, California, United States

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