More than forty years have passed since Albert Wohlstetter wrote his famous "Delicate Balance of Terror" in Foreign Affairs in 1959 and thus kicked off the worldwide debate about strategic nuclear forces and their balances and possible imbalances. Theories of nuclear deterrence dominated the nuclear disarmament and arms control debate for decades until the START treaties in the 1990s, and probably even after these treaties. During these past forty years, the problem changed phases, appearances, and most of all in the number and capabilities of long-range nuclear missiles, which have expanded beyond imagination. The problem reached its peak during the period of Mutual and Assured Destruction (MAD), which, after the 1990's, gradually sledded into the arena of rogue states missile attack with nuclear, biological and chemical (all together called weapons of mass destruction WMD) warheads, not between legitimate (?) nuclear weapon states under the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) but as out of the blue attack from unexpected and illegitimate (?) rogue countries.  Instead of Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM) of earlier days or more sophisticated and nuclear pumped SDI (Strategic Defense Initiative), smaller, more manageable non-nuclear Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) or Theater Missile Defense (TMD) became the topic of conversation. The ballistic missile defense is another side of nuclear coin. 

This article is a new version of my paper at the Workshop and attempts to discuss that the fundamental balance of terror remains as delicate as ever between smaller number of WMD missiles and similarly smaller number of ground based direct hit-and-kill vehicles of TMD or NMD.  The level of terror may be less because people are talking about smaller scale nuclear and other attacks, but for those directly targeted it matters less whether they die as a part of the nuclear Third World War or a less noticed regional nuclear conflict. The definition of rogue states is becoming less clear with European and American major oil companies getting more interested in cutting deals with Iran, and with the sudden opening of dialogue between the North and South Korea in June, 2000. This paper is an expansion of the author's closing remark of the workshop.

TMD Workshop in UN University, Tokyo. 

About twenty experts form China, Japan and the US in UN University in Tokyo, and some very excited exchanges took place regarding roles of ballistic missile defense (TMD) for East Asia and the US national missile defense (NMD) of 100 interceptors to be based initially in Alaska and later to be expanded into North Dakota. Discussion was very lively and sometimes-heated exchanges took place. In the end it was realized that although the two days did not resolve any new positions, nevertheless problems were better sorted out, clarified and understood. In the discussion strategic and theatre nuclear weapons were very much brought up, creating sharp contrast of the three parties' approaches to nuclear weapons and nuclear proliferation. The US participants did not necessarily support the Clinton Administration's position, while the Chinese denounced NMD as poorly veiled threat against their country. The Japanese (including the author) were probably the most ambivalent either regarding technical feasibility, economic viability or military value of the proposed TMD cooperation.

Millennium NPT Review Conference in N.Y. 

Throughout the discussion, as BMD were very much the central topic, it became clear that the NPT review conference in New York a month earlier has avoided the most important of the non-proliferation issues, namely START treaties and ABMs. The New York review stayed away from clarification of ABM controversies, clarifying the START missile reduction schedule, and mapping the road toward the completely nuclear free world.  Compromise wordings such as "an unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear weapon states to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenal" without further indicating the process or time frame toward the target was discouraging since the discussion had already started outside of the official disarmament world.  Vague compromise wordings are the general products of the multilateral disarmament negotiations, in which sides "win" and "loose" by obtaining or giving away new expressions to cover up the worldwide lack of interest in complete disarmament procedures. The problem was clear just watching pages of the International Herald Tribune during the four weeks of the Review Conference in April and May to realize that the paper did not consider the conference newsworthy.  It was another contrast to the report of the Japanese delegation that satisfactory scores had been recorded in the accomplishments of nuclear disarmament diplomacy by Japan in successfully inserting a number of new expressions from Japanese proposal into the final declaration of the conference. It may be added that the review conference to take place at the turn of the century was also the first immediately after 1995 review which the NPT stipulated as the time to decide on the extension or not of the treaty itself, and a great deal of expectation to break the ice of no visible progress in nuclear disarmament surrounded the aura of the Millennium Review.

Canberra Commission, Tokyo Forum

There certainly were justifications for Japanese negotiators to be proud of such accomplishments because many of these new expressions reflected the outcome of the Tokyo Forum.  The Tokyo Forum was sponsored by Japan with the backing of the Foreign Ministry, and gathered some twenty experts from around the world for four meetings during 1998/1999 to write a road map for the nuclear free world. The author had the privileges of being a member of both the Canberra Commission sponsored by the Australian Government (which also held four meeting sin 1995/1996) and which preceded the Tokyo Forum. He was thus familiar with the dedicated and hard works by young diplomats of both Australian and Japanese foreign ministries.  The original eight points proposal finding their ways into the review conference final document was prepared in Tokyo and was jointly sponsored by the two governments. As a former disarmament ambassador of Japan the author had special reasons to be proud of their accomplishments as well as to be disappointed by repetition of deja vu of the real world's lack of interest in such subject as the total elimination of nuclear weapons.   On a number of occasions the author proposed creation of a Framework Convention for Elimination of Nuclear Weapons which defines the principle, to be followed by various protocols that provides detailed process and numbers for such a work as products from continued negotiations. It would be the similar pattern of adopting The Framework Convention on Climatic Change in Rio de Janeiro, to be followed by Kyoto and other conventions with more concrete numerical limitations.  The Vienna Convention on ozone effects followed by the Montreal Protocol may be the other. The "unequivocal undertaking" in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT review conference describes the main spirit of such a convention, unfortunately without any practical vehicle for protocols to turn it into reality. Canberra, Tokyo and two or three more cities, the author hoped, could lead to such a convention.

Technical feasibility of missile defense

One of the major problems with the original ABM scheme was that it used nuclear explosion to intercept incoming missiles.  This probably was the last occasion that use of nuclear devices was proposed in a matter of fact ways.  After this period and into later 1970s people became more cautious in using nuclear device as a part of offensive or defensive weapons system. People believed less in scenarios of using nuclear weapons at conventional battlefields. The argument in the case of ABM was that only large explosive power of nuclear weapon could destroy incoming warhead considering the poor precision guidance in hitting supersonic reentry vehicles.  The problem was thus if interception is to take place in mid-course in the outer space, real missile warheads and decoys such as balloons and chaffs cannot be distinguished and intercepting party could not know which was his real target.  On the other hand if he waited till reentry into atmosphere and thus air resistance to distinguish heavy warhead from light decoys, nuclear interception may be too close to home and may bring about destruction of the very things that are to be defended.  By the time of SALT-I negotiation of 1972 the US and USSR had a choice of giving up ABM and keeping MIRV (Multiple Independently Targeted Reentry Vehicles) or vice-versa.  The treaty for prohibition of ABM to less than two sites was agreed, while MIRV was left free bringing about a tremendous increase in numbers of nuclear warheads out of proportion to numbers of missiles. When in 1983 SDI (Strategic Defense Initiative) or Star Wars site, so that the intense X-ray raiser will destroy the enemy missile while still at the ascending stage (therefore moving with slower speed).  This was much more sophisticated and ambitious technical undertaking and involved nuclear weapons detonation mechanism as well as focusing the intense laser. Only president Reagan and his advisor Edward Teller (and Michael Gorbachev for a while) were convinced, and the author remembers many negative comments he received when he made two weeks tour of Washington to collect personal impressions of the people involved in its development in and out of the US government.  These negative impressions were fed back to the Prime Minister in Tokyo.

Shooting a bullet with bullet

The latest proposal for missile defense consists of several portions.  First, there have to be new satellite/radar combination to track down ascending and then incoming missiles. Intercepting incoming warheads of SCUD class range and speed missiles with improved PATRIOT (PC-3) is expected to work, as the earlier version of the same Surface-to-Air missile worked in either hitting enemy warheads, or pushing them outside the flight trajectory through proximity fuse in the case of the Gulf War.  Similarly Navy interceptors in Aegis Cruiser are on the extension of existing technology.  What would be the most difficult is to intercept enemy warhead at high altitude with non-nuclear kinetic-kill device while in the mid air flight. This is somewhat like trying to intercept a bullet fired from rifle and moving with high supersonic speed with another supersonic bullet.  The device, as a category, is called THAAD for Theatre High Altitude Air Defense. So far three live tests to shoot down incoming ICBM warheads with ground launched kill vehicle fired from Kwajalen Atoll did not score good marks and final decision as to BMD deployment will be delayed till under the next presidency. Even if THAAD can hit the target, another difficulty is the problem of decoys in midair.  Somewhat similar to the case of nuclear detonated ABM it is suggested that balloon wrapped warhead, accompanied by many empty balloons will make the problems very complicated. In case of defending against non-nuclear WMD, namely chemical and/or biological weapons, if the warheads divide themselves into many sub-munitions at an earlier stage, there will be no effective defense.  Since Taepodong-I testing by North Korea (Democratic People's Republic of Korea, or DPRK) on August 31, 1998 the United States Congress passed legislation requiring the Secretary of Defense to conduct a study on the establishment and operation of a TMD system in the Asia-Pacific region to protect the US's "key regional allies"(supposed to include Japan and Taiwan). Not all Japanese are particularly impressed that the system would be technically feasible.  Also the huge cost of joint development and deployment of TMD system will have difficulties in keeping defense budget to less than (the national goal of) one percent of GNP. In 1994 US had proposed to Japan four TMD options, ranging from 4.5 billion to 16.3 billion dollars to be deployed by 2004 or 2005. It will also create organizational problems as to who should be in charge of command between air, land and sea self-defense forces.  Since the first sight of launching and movement of enemy missile has to be detected by US satellite and radar with information transmitted for interception outside of the territorial air space of Japan, some argue that it raises complications in interpretation of the Constitution. Problem of including Taiwan certainly touches the row nerve of China, no matter what explanation may be given to say that they are to counter DPRK attack and not Chinese.  In view of small number and less sophisticated status of DPRK Taepodong, whatever missile defense may be proposed is not cost-effective in a foreseeable future. Whatever the case may be, any missile defense directed toward the general direction of China seems to raise the issue of nuclear-armed Japan.

National Missile Defense in Alaska (and in North Dakota) will provide protection to the entire United States and this in itself is a violation of the ABM treaty of 1972.  But we shall not get into details of ABM except to note the Russian Duma would not bring START-II into operation without 1997 protocol, which the US Administration is still unable to present to the Senate for ratification.  As a concept, ABM dies hard in the US defense system.  SDI Office was turned into BMD Office and still occupies the same space in the Pentagon building.  With many criticism of NMD within the United States, and continued failure of THAAD test firing, it is not quite clear where the project stands. The US argument is that this is with increased DPRK missile capabilities in mind, and not to counter Chinese missile, which is supposed to contain more than twenty missiles of intercontinental range and some one hundred with 2,000 to 5,000 km range.  On one hand it is correct to say that US NMD is to deal with North Korean capabilities in five to ten years in future, while it is also a valid argument that 100 interceptors to be deployed in Alaska are looking at both DPRK (which is an excuse Chinese say) and Chinese invasion of Taiwan rather than intercontinental attack on the US mainland.

DPRK shot a Taepodong in August 1998, and you start the whole NMD program while Japan has been placing so many satellites in the space and people try to assure us that these are for peaceful purposes, a member of Chinese team bitterly complained.  If history teaches us anything, no matter what Japan says about its peaceful purposes, Japan with its economy and with its technology base looks certainly capable of nuclear arming itself, although more detailed examination proves that to be extremely incompatible.  With the sort of transparency of Japanese society and of the budgetary system, to hide a project that size will certainly be impossible. On the part of Japanese, there was an atmosphere that once arguments move into that direction, somehow we are incapable of convincing anybody that we have nothing but peaceful interests in development of nuclear energy.  It is possible to postulate that Japan will change its constitution, its atomic energy basic law, mobilize uranium enrichment and plutonium production program behind some peaceful screen, and go ahead, so that someday it can announce its nuclear weapons capabilities.  Unless Japanese people seriously realize that 120 million in island countries, speaking the same language and sharing the same tradition is a unique phenomenon in the world, with its technical and industrial capabilities, we may not find convincing and persuasive explanation that we are not interested in nuclear weapons.

That ABM/NMD issue was not taken up at the NPT review conference in New York was probably necessary in order to end the conference in the scheduled four weeks time limits without visible cracks in the wall.  It is possible to argue that New York NPT was not an appropriate place or time to raise the issue.  However, if people want to take a credit for successfully dealing with these bilateral (multilateral in case of 1997 protocol) deals, having Russia ratified both START-II and CTBT, one can certainly ask for more in-depth exploration of the issue. The 1997 protocol involve dividing line between ABM and non-ABM.  Clinton's announcement about NMD violates the 1997 demarcation between ABM, and BMD, and requires amendment to the ABM treaty.  What is more, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee will never ratify the 1997 Protocol as long as Jessie Helms is on the chair. So the decision at NPT Review not to take up ABM issue automatically closed possibilities of advancing the non-proliferation subject beyond SRATR-I. As to the East Asian TMD, it is possible to argue that a similarity exists between SS-20 vs. Pershing-II in 1979 to 1983 in Europe, with Taepodong and Chinese missile on the one hand and NMD on the other.  Both are the cases of theatre nuclear confrontation.  The major difference is while the Soviet Union was certainly the major counterpart, in the 2000, China (?), along with DPRK, or Iran or Iraq (what about Israel?) are rogue states that can be dealt with non-nuclear precision guided missiles? If one realizes that in 1986 there were close to 70,000 nuclear warheads around the world, which were reduced to about 30,000 by the year 2000, one can understand what serious step START treaties could accomplish by reducing them to less than 5,000 by 2010.  In order to deal with the issue of dismantling and disposing tens of thousands of nuclear warheads, the US and Russia are working together in the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program with more than 4 billion dollars budgeted for.  If one realize at the same time that 2,000 or 1,500 each under START-III are the numbers neither side intend to reduce any further, and think about the four and half billion dollar DOE projects to keep up the maintenance capabilities for these warheads (Trident and Minuteman,) even extending their design lives, the importance is clear of the START reduction agreements and CTR project as the most serious of non-proliferation agreement.  To avoid mentioning these subjects at the Review Conference is very serious especially since proposals were made in the eight points presented by Australia and Japan.

China in this sense introduces new problems. China's four hundred or so less sophisticated nuclear arsenal was not a serious consideration in the earlier phases of nuclear disarmament.  It was only in the context of India and Pakistan and regional disputes in South Asia, that they were given credit. While US and USSR were confronting with each other, three other nuclear weapon states did not matter very much.  China and France were not even members of the Non Proliferation Treaty until very recently.  Now that the East/West confrontation is an order of magnitude down in its intensity, so that many regional disputes are occupying newspaper headlines, Chinese nuclear weapons are becoming very serious matter.  When START process proceeds further and come to 2000/2000 or 1500/1500 warheads each in START-III, it is a couple more steps only before China's 500 has to be seriously considered. It is said that UK may give up being a nuclear power, while all France needs is recognition of her prestige in the European theatre. China is one country with a great economic development potential, population of 1.5 billion; not interested in promoting CTBT (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty) wishing very much to advance their nuclear weapons and submarine lunched missile technology. As China gains more confidence in dealing with the international diplomacy including those of nuclear disarmament, the subject greatly increases importance.  Somewhere a device must be found to include France, UK and China into the START process.  It will become important that something similar to the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program should be worked out with China as a party.  Unless such an arrangement was worked out, both the United States and Russia will refuse to further reduce their warheads from the START-III level.  The year 2000 NPT Review Conference has just proved that, and whatever else that were decorated with verbal niceties such as Fissile Material Production Cut Off, further strengthening of various arms control measures are only worth the price of paper these results are printed on. When the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva cannot even agree on the agenda of work, that is a very strong signal.  On the other hand, one possible consolation is that with more than sixty memberships, the CD has lost capabilities to effectively function.  The three party workshop in Tokyo at least gave the kind of consolation that reasonable people, if sufficiently patient, can work out an understanding.

Major Technical Systems have been proposed in the past and followed different paths.  The Manhattan Project was a success, so was the Apollo moon flight.  MX missile with race tracking deployment probably did not stand a chance.  One may have good discussion over B-2 bombers, or Super Conductive Super Collider (SCC) project.  One is still to see what happens to the joint international space station, or nuclear fusion prototype ITER reactor. National Ignition Facility at Lawrence Livermore seems to be running into unending cost overrun. Whether the NMD as a large-scale project will prove itself technically, financially and politically feasible is yet to be seen. At least it does not look easy.  NMD and Chinese missile may be another terror in a delicate balance.