CONTENTS

I. Introduction

II. Article by Mark J. Valencia

III. Nautilus invites your responses

I. Introduction

Mark J. Valencia, a maritime security analyst in Kaneohe, Hawaii, writes "emerging from one of the most conflict prone regions of the world is a conflict avoidance regime - in short, an expectation of self-restraint and sharing in such situations. But these regimes are not multilateral nor have they evolved in that direction despite the hopes and recommendations of policy analysts and practitioners. Nevertheless, they can be expanded and have a spillover effect on relations in general and maritime regime creation in particular."

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Nautilus Institute.  Readers should note that Nautilus seeks a diversity of views and opinions on contentious topics in order to identify common ground.

II. Article by Mark J. Valencia

- "A Maritime Security Regime for Northeast Asia"
By Mark J. Valencia

With progress in the Six-Party Talks regarding the Korea conundrum, analysts and politicians alike have again began to think and talk about a security architecture for Northeast Asia. At last year's ASEAN Regional Forum meeting in Kuala Lumpur, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice called for a "robust dialogue on Northeast Asian security" that could help overcome historical tensions, increase security and create a "better basis for enhanced prosperity throughout the region". The hope is that the process of managing transition on the Korean Peninsula can create new patterns of co-operation and thus lay the foundation for a 21st century security architecture. That dialogue and the architecture should begin with a focus on the maritime arena.

There are good reasons to focus on the maritime sphere in building mutual security. Much of Northeast Asia is essentially maritime encompassing peninsulas, archipelagos, disputed islands, strategic straits and sealanes. These features surround and are embedded in a series of semi-enclosed seas --- the Sea of Japan (East Sea), the Yellow Sea and the East China Sea.

For many years these seas were dangerous frontiers and Northeast Asian nations attempted to avoid escalating tension with their neighbors by either refraining from extending their maritime jurisdiction or foregoing provocative activities there. However, in the last two decades all Northeast Asian coastal countries have claimed 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) and continental shelves. This has resulted in a sea change in the maritime arena in which disputes between unfriendly nations have seriously exacerbated relations between them.

The resultant maritime military buildup is another good reason for a Northeast Asian security dialogue to focus initially on the maritime sphere. Indeed, given its geography and the plethora of maritime boundary and territorial disputes stimulated by this wave of extended maritime jurisdiction, it is not surprising that maritime issues have risen to the forefront of regional security concerns. Recent examples of serious maritime disputes include the Japan/China wrangle over East China Sea boundaries, the Senkaku/Diaoytai islands, and potential gas in their disputed area; the Japan/ South Korea dispute over Takeshima/Tok Do and fish; the Japan/Russia dispute over the Northern Territories/southern Kuriles and their maritime resources; and the North/South Korea dispute over their western maritime boundary and valuable crabs. There are other similar disputes that may soon surface. Maritime Northeast Asia has thus become an increasingly dangerous milieu where the building of trust and confidence is sorely needed.

The increasing prominence of these and other issues like environmental pollution and resource ownership, as well as illegal maritime activities, now including piracy and potential 'terrorism', dictates broader responsibilities and changing priorities for military force structure, operations and training. Together with the requirements of self-reliance and force modernization, these concerns are reflected in the significant maritime dimension of current arms acquisition programs. This includes maritime surveillance and intelligence collection systems, multi-role fighter aircraft with maritime attack capabilities, modern surface combatants, submarines, anti-ship missiles, naval electronic warfare systems, mine warfare capabilities, and now missile defense systems. Because some of these new systems are perceived to have offensive capabilities, they are seen as provocative, and thus destabilizing, particularly by those countries that do not have them and lack the means to acquire them. Moreover, possession of these systems undoubtedly increases the risk of inadvertent escalation in time of conflict.

A third reason is that there are already precedents and even an incipient foundation on which a regional maritime security regime can be built. Indeed these nations have quite pro-actively constructed a web of conflict avoidance mechanisms. Some are of direct security significance such as incidents at sea agreements between the US and Russia (1972), Russia and South Korea (1993), and Russia and Japan (1993) and a maritime consultative agreement between the US and China (1998). These agreements have varying degrees of effectiveness and are largely US influenced. Nevertheless they all aim to avoid unintended conflict during naval and air operations.

Other agreements implement the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea stipulation that pending agreement on EEZ and continental shelf boundaries, the parties concerned shall enter into 'provisional arrangements of a practical nature' for management of resources in areas of overlapping claims. Such provisional arrangements in Northeast Asia include agreements between China and Japan, China and South Korea and Japan and South Korea to share fish stocks in their respective disputed areas. North and South Korea are discussing a similar temporary solution to their imbraglio in the Western Sea. More significant, Japan and South Korea have agreed to joint development of hydrocarbons in their area of overlapping continental shelf claims in the northern East China Sea. And Japan and China have agreed in principle to do the same in the central East China Sea. Even more remarkable, in December 2005 North Korea and China forged a similar arrangement in West Korea Bay.

After several serious incidents, Japan and China have established a mutual 'prior notification' regime for scientific research in the East China Sea. And Japan and South Korea are discussing the same for the Sea of Japan/East Sea. Perhaps more important is that North Korea's tentative first steps toward rapprochement with the South included agreements on passage of its ships through South Korean waters and a joint commercial fisheries venture.

Thus emerging from one of the most conflict prone regions of the world is a conflict avoidance regime - in short, an expectation of self-restraint and sharing in such situations. But these regimes are not multilateral nor have they evolved in that direction despite the hopes and recommendations of policy analysts and practitioners. Nevertheless, they can be expanded and have a spillover effect on relations in general and maritime regime creation in particular.

Indeed, given this network of arrangements, a multilateral agreement on a 'code of conduct' for Northeast Asian seas would be a natural next step. Initially, multilateral arrangements should address common maritime problems like search and rescue, environmental protection, drug trafficking, and smuggling of arms and humans. Further out to sea, in time and space, a Northeast Asian ocean peacekeeping force might ensure safety and security of navigation, undertake air /sea rescue, protect fisheries from illegal fishers, and monitor the environment against polluters. The harder issues --- comprehensive fisheries management, and ultimately, common security would be next.

Such a trend, however would have to overlie and be affected by the larger security dilemma - a pre-existing pattern of suspicion and distrust based on fundamental political and ideological differences which extend like sensitive tentacles into the maritime sphere where these nations literally come face to face. And this fundamental fact is why the maritime frontier in Northeast Asia is a natural and perhaps necessary starting point for building confidence and common security.

III. Nautilus invites your responses

The Northeast Asia Peace and Security Network invites your responses to this essay. Please send responses to: bscott@nautilus.org. Responses will be considered for redistribution to the network only if they include the author's name, affiliation, and explicit consent.