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Korea-Japan NWFZ proposal - briefing paper

• English version
  
• Korean version
  
• Japanese version
  

Background

A Korea-Japan Nuclear Weapon Free Zone could help resolve a number of linked and intractable security issues in Northeast Asia. These include:

• The need to respond to North Korea’s nuclear breakout without undermining the nuclear abolition policy announced by President Obama;
  
• The need for Japan and Korea to deepen their non-nuclear commitments to more deeply ingrained "forever" status without hedging; and
  
• The need for Japan-Korean cooperation to lay the foundations for a comprehensive security mechanism and long-term regional security institution, including through a cooperative nuclear fuel cycle and space access activities. 

Requirements

The Korea-Japan Nuclear Weapon Free Zone must meet the standard and conventional requirements of a treaty-based nuclear weapon free zone. It would also need to address region-specific issues:

• The need to harmonize the different philosophies and principles that exist already in Japan and Korea with regard to nuclear transit and nuclear extended deterrence;
• The possibility of the entry of North Korea (DPRK) at a later stage into the zone as a denuclearized, non-nuclear state, and the need for regional energy security strategies to support this accession; and the possibility that the DPRK would try to co-exist as a nuclear weapon state or attempt to sign a protocol intended for a nuclear weapon state;
• Specific issues that may arise due to the impact of the zone on China’s perceived security interests and thereby on its security relationships with state parties to a Korea-Japan Nuclear Weapon Free Zone, especially with Japan and the United States of America.
  

More information on nuclear weapon free zones and on the requirements for this zone.

Benefits and outcomes

If realized, the Korea-Japan Nuclear Weapon Free Zone will:

• Increase the non-nuclear commitment of Japan and Korea beyond their status as non-nuclear weapon states under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to more deeply ingrained “forever” status without hedging;
• Devalue North Korea’s nuclear weapons, increase pressure on North Korea to disarm and dismantle its nuclear weapons, and leave the door open for a non-nuclear North Korea to join later; 
• Create confidence-building measures between traditional antagonists — Japan and Korea — and create forms of inter-dependence that increase cooperation in areas such as the nuclear fuel cycle and access to space; 
• Remove a major obstacle to President Obama's nuclear abolition policy by creating a constructive sustitute for nuclear extended deterrence, while retaining implicit "existential nuclear deterrence" as a backdrop to the Korea-Japan Nuclear Weapon Free Zone.
  

We cannot make this happen by ourselves. If we commit to this proposal, we consider that we will have succeeded if the proposed Korea-Japan Nuclear Weapon Free Zone is under active consideration by key policymakers in Korea, Japan, and the United States by the beginning of 2012.

More information on benefits, costs, obstacles, advantages and outcomes.

See a list of Nautilus' published research papers.