PETER HAYES OCTOBER 25, 2026 I. INTRODUCTION Peter Hayes analyses the applicability of international law to nuclear threat-making, nuclear use, and nuclear proliferation to the Korean peninsula. He concludes that international law cannot by itself stop nuclear threat-making and nuclear use but that international law “supplies the vocabulary and instruments from which a settlement could […]
RICHARD TANTER SEPTEMBER 18 2026 I. INTRODUCTION In this essay, Richard Tanter asks to which Australian defence facilities does the United States have significant access? The startling answer is that 17 nominally Australian bases are US-controlled; and the US military and US defense companies have access to 70% of 134 Australian-controlled military facilities. This level […]
Dear colleague, We are pleased to announce the on-line short course: Nuclear Weapons Law. Taught by some of the world’s foremost experts in the field, this course takes students through the diverse elements of laws governing armed conflict and the use of nuclear weapons. At a time when the risk of nuclear war is increasing, it […]
GARETH EVANS AUGUST 31 2026 I. INTRODUCTION Gareth Evans argues that it is imperative to educate government policymakers and military practitioners–and those advising or influencing them–on all the ways in which existing international law constrains both the use and threat of use of nuclear weahttps://nautilus.org/announcements/books/the-law-on-nuclear-weapons/pons, and the critical importance of restoring its salience. “An […]
PETER HAYES JULY 15 2026 I. INTRODUCTION Peter Hayes summarizes USSTRATCOM Special Instruction 534-16 in 15 key points covering the mission of strategic early warning of attack on the United States with nuclear weapons delivered by missiles, the early warning command hierarchy and architecture, measures of effectiveness, procedures and measures to avoid and then manage […]
VINCE SCAPPATURA AND RICHARD TANTER APRIL 19, 2026 I. INTRODUCTION Vince Scappatura and Richard Tanter examine the relationship between Australia’s deepening position in relation to United States nuclear weapons and strains in government legitimation practices. Australia’s involvement in U.S. nuclear weapons operations has deepened from longstanding reliance on extended deterrence and the hosting of major U.S. […]
PETER HAYES MARCH 25 2026 I. INTRODUCTION Peter Hayes argues that the methods revealed in USSTRATCOM SI 526-01 for estimating the reliability of US command and control procedures and of weapons systems in delivering nuclear weapons to targets may instill false confidence in US nuclear commanders that nuclear strikes will be achieved as planned and […]
EMILY CRAWFORD MARCH 16 2026 I. INTRODUCTION Emily Crawford argues that nuclear command, control and communications (NC3) systems are beset by vulnerabilities, including susceptibility to cyber and other remote attacks, as well as weaknesses due to obsolete legacy technologies and complex command and communication structures.” She concludes: “For NC3 systems to effectively and accurately fulfil […]
PETER HAYES FEBRUARY 22 2026 I. INTRODUCTION This special report written and edited by Peter Hayes summarizes and provides copies of 10 documents released under the US Freedom of Information Act on legal guidance on STRATCOM’s compliance with the laws of armed conflict in relation to nuclear weapons. Peter Hayes is Director of the Nautilus […]
ANNA HOOD FEBRUARY 20 2026 I. INTRODUCTION Anna Hood analyses whether Articles I and II of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) permit nuclear sharing. She argues—contrary to previous research—that the ordinary meaning of Articles I and II, the NPT’s travaux préparatoires and subsequent agreements and practice point to a deep ambiguity as to whether nuclear […]
