[Cankor] Report #230

[cankor at cankor.ca]

Dear subscriber,

Welcome to issue #230 of the CanKor Report.

For articles not original to CanKor, direct links are available in the
Contents section, should you wish to consult the originals on the internet.
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The CanKor team

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CANADA-KOREA ELECTRONIC INFORMATION SERVICE

CanKor # 230

Tuesday, 13 December 2005
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At a celebration of the fifth anniversary of his Nobel Peace Prize, former 
ROK president Kim Dae-jung outlines his three stages toward Korean 
unification. Former North Korean special forces soldiers who defected to the 
South say they are best suited to end DPRK leader Kim Jong Il's regime and 
improve human rights conditions. The director of the US State Department's 
Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons says that China's 
growing gender imbalance is feeding the sex-slave trade of North Korean 
refugee women.

The annual conference of the Canadian Consortium on Asia Pacific Security 
(CANCAPS) featured a session devoted to analysis of current DPRK issues. 
This week's CanKor OPINION section presents a report and extensive excerpts 
of Jing-dong Yuan's presentation on "China's North Korea problem: the 
nuclear issue and geopolitics of northeast Asia," and Wade L. Huntley's 
presentation "On the verge: current implications of a nuclear North Korea."
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Contents:
1.   KIM DAE-JUNG CALLS FOR THREE-STAGE UNIFICATION
     http://joongangdaily.joins.com/200512/08/200512082212030909900090309031.html

2.   NORTH KOREAN DEFECTORS PUSH FOR REGIME CHANGE
     http://www.chinapost.com.tw/asiapacific/detail.asp?ID=73272&GRP=C

3.   NORTH KOREAN SEX SLAVES FLOODING CHINA: US OFFICIAL
     http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2005/12/10/2003283761

OPINION: Conference of the Canadian Consortium on Asia Pacific Security
4.   THE DPRK NUCLEAR DILEMMA
     by David Burke, original to CanKor

5.   CHINA'S NORTH KOREA PROBLEM
     by Jing-dong Yuan, original to CanKor

6.   CURRENT IMPLICATIONS OF A NUCLEAR NORTH KOREA
     by Wade L. Huntley, original to CanKor

QUIDNUNC: Readers ask and respond to common and uncommon questions
*************************************************

1.   KIM DAE-JUNG CALLS FOR THREE-STAGE UNIFICATION
     by Park So-young and Chun Su-jin, Joong Ang Daily, December 09, 2005

Former ROK President Kim Dae-jung said yesterday that peace on the Korean 
Peninsula was dependent on the United States and North Korea negotiating a 
settlement regarding Pyongyang's nuclear issues. Mr. Kim was at a ceremony 
in Seoul to celebrate the fifth anniversary of him winning the Nobel Peace 
Prize, where he gave a speech titled "How to Keep Peace in a Crisis." The 
former president was awarded the prize for his sunshine policy toward North 
Korea and a summit with Kim Jong-il in 2000.

Mr. Kim said that only after successful talks between Washington and 
Pyongyang could the two Koreas enter the first stage of unification.

He described this as "integration of the South Korean proposed confederation 
and North Korea's low-level federal system." The confederate system would 
see the two Koreas possess individual rights of diplomacy and national 
defence, while the original federal model called for by the North would 
create a federal government, above Seoul and Pyongyang, to oversee diplomacy 
and national defence.

Since the 1990s, however, North Korea has come closer to the South Korean 
proposal, and has promoted a "low level federal system." Mr. Kim said the 
"three stages of unification," were "confederation to federation to 
unification." He also reiterated his three principles of unification: 
"peaceful coexistence, peaceful interchange and peaceful unification." He 
added that following the resolution of nuclear issues the six-party talks 
must lead to the establishment of a permanent entity, where the two Koreas, 
the United States and China make efforts to end the state of war on the 
peninsula and sign a peace treaty.
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2.   NORTH KOREAN DEFECTORS PUSH FOR REGIME CHANGE
     by Kwang-tae Kim, China Post, 8 December 2005

Nine former North Korean special forces soldiers who defected to the South 
vowed Wednesday to push for regime change in their communist homeland unless 
it abolishes political prison camps and improves human rights. The 
Association of Free North Korean Soldiers made the pledge at a press 
conference a day before South Korean, US and other officials and activists 
open a high-profile international conference on human rights abuses in the 
North. The three-day conference was organized by South Korean human rights 
groups and Freedom House, a US-based pro democracy organization that held a 
similar meeting in Washington in July and plans another in Belgium next 
March.

Lim Chun Young, who served 14 years in one of the North Korean military's 
special warfare units before defecting to the South in 2000, said that 
former soldiers are best suited to end leader Kim Jong Il's regime and 
improve human rights conditions.

"We will try to bring about regime change unless North Korea abolishes its 
slaughterhouse-like political prison camps and unleashes the freedom of its 
people who are chained to the country's system," Lim said at the news 
conference. "This is not word play, but a last warning ahead of action."

In a press release, the group said it plans to forge links with the North 
Korean military. Lim said the group planned to carry out "direct activities" 
in relation to North Korean border guards, though he provided no details. 
Wednesday's news conference was attended by eight other former soldiers. Lim 
said his group includes some 53 ex-soldiers from the special units.
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3.   NORTH KOREAN SEX SLAVES FLOODING CHINA: US OFFICIAL
     Taipei Times, Beijing and Seoul, 10 December 2005

Thousands of North Korean refugees are working as sex slaves in China under 
threat of being returned should Chinese authorities catch them, the US 
ambassador for fighting international slavery said yesterday. After two days 
of talks with Chinese officials, John Miller, director of the US State 
Department's Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, said many 
victims of the modern-day slave trade were women and girls forced into 
prostitution or marriage.

"Sometimes they're trafficked out of North Korea. North Korean officials are 
complicit," Miller told reporters. "If they are caught by the Chinese 
authorities, they are sent back to North Korea and punished."

China views North Korean refugees on its territory as illegal economic 
migrants who should be sent back. But the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, 
the USA and other countries have pressed China to treat at least some of 
them as legitimate refugees who should not be repatriated.

Miller said there were no accurate statistics of the number of North Korean 
women forced into prostitution or marriage in China. But he said charities 
and church groups working in the region estimate between 30 percent and half 
of the many thousands of North Koreans who cross into China every year are 
"trafficking victims," forced or tricked into slavery. Chinese press reports 
on the cross-border trade have said North Korean women are sold to Chinese 
brokers for several hundred to a thousand dollars each.

The repatriated women can face prison sentences of five years or longer, or 
even execution. But most often they are held for several months in forced 
labour camps, London-based organization Anti-Slavery International said in a 
recent report.

"There are countless testimonies of beatings, torture, degrading treatment, 
and even forced abortions and infanticide from those who have escaped," the 
report said of these camps. Most of the North Korean women caught in slave 
trafficking were forced into marriages with Chinese farmers, the report 
said. China's growing population imbalance means many poor farmers cannot 
easily find brides. The women often face abuse and beatings but several 
interviewed said "their current situation is better than risking 
repatriation or starvation," the report said.
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OPINION: Conference of the Canadian Consortium on Asia Pacific Security

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4.   THE DPRK NUCLEAR DILEMMA
     by David Burke, Anson Consulting Inc., Ottawa, 12 December 2005

[The annual conference of the Canadian Consortium on Asia Pacific Security 
(CANCAPS) featured a session on the DPRK nuclear dilemma, organized and 
chaired by CanKor editor Erich Weingartner. The following are excerpts from 
Rapporteur David Burke's summary report.]

The Chair welcomed the attendees and extended the regrets of Foreign Affairs 
Canada. Marius Grinius, Canadian ambassador to Korea, had planned to make a 
presentation, but was unable to do so because of travel to Pyongyang to 
present his credentials. In a new departure, Canada's ambassador to Seoul 
will also represent Canada in Pyongyang.

Professor Jing-dong Yuan of the Monterey Institute of International Studies 
presented his paper on "China's North Korean Problem: The Nuclear Issue and 
Geopolitics of Northeast Asia." The question whether this is a problem or an 
opportunity for China was a significant part of his analysis. He reviewed 
the history of China DPRK relations and the key sticking points. He noted 
that there is a new security situation developing in NE Asia since the 
acknowledgement by the DPRK that it possesses nuclear weapons. China 
maintains the view that "peace and stability" are an essential precondition 
to its continued economic growth and hence the ability of the Chinese 
Communist Party to maintain the consent of the Chinese people to rule. The 
DPRK's adherence to its own brand of communism, "Juche", with a feudal form 
of leadership that is passed from father to son, is at odds with the 
direction of reform and opening in China. The DPRK has put China on the 
horns of a dilemma. It cannot allow the DPRK to fail. The peaceful 
resolution of the crisis is essential for China and the security of the 
region.

[See excerpts of Jing-dong Yuan's paper below.]

Wade L. Huntley, Director of the Simons Centre for Disarmament and 
Non-proliferation Research at the Liu Centre, University of British 
Columbia, presented the second paper, "On the Verge: Current Implications of 
a Nuclear North Korea." The paper addressed issues arising out of the 
September 19 agreement reached at the fourth round of Six Party Talks. 
Huntley gave a brief review of the history of the talks, asserting that 
"bolder action is necessary to resolve the issue." The collapse of the 
problematic 1994 Agreed Framework shifted the ground rules. The line in the 
sand has been moved in the DPRK's favour, with the DPRK pushing as hard and 
as fast as it wants on developing a nuclear capability. Huntley suggested 
that analysis of the history of the events shows that the DPRK is 
provocative when it is neglected. The recent US policy response appears to 
be moving back towards the Clinton administration's policy -- taking some 
action while engaging. The September 19 agreement seems to be a validation 
of negotiation. It is, however, not a resolution, but an opportunity for 
further engagement. A bolder, more imaginative approach is called for, but 
the USA's mishandling of the situation has left the security situation worse 
off.

[See excerpts of Wade Huntley's paper below.]

The two discussants, Charles Burton of Brock University in St. Catharines, 
and Ross O'Connor of Laval University in Quebec, agreed that three years 
after the nuclear confrontation of October 2002, we are back where we were 
during the nuclear confrontation of 1994. Watching the situation is 
reminiscent of the U2 song: "Stuck in a Moment." The fact that the Republic 
of Korea is in a military alliance with the USA is awkward for China. Kim 
Jong Il has not shown any interest in moving towards the Chinese economic 
model. The DPRK is in deep economic trouble, as noted by both speakers. In 
the absence of Western food aid, China's potential influence grows. The 
September 19 agreement "stops the bleeding" but we are not yet near the end. 
The US administration has sent conflicting signals, with hardliners 
effectively short-circuiting a resolution to the problem. It was noted that 
Japan is getting anxious about the impasse and may be poised to take action 
on its own. The presentations were followed by lively discussion and 
questions. The issue of regime transformation was briefly discussed. It was 
noted that the transformation will "not be a pretty picture." Those that 
anticipate that there would be a Germany-type post-Cold War take-over are 
being naive. To base policy planning on a clean, quiet rehabilitation and 
transition is a clear case of hope trumping experience.
*************************************************

5.   CHINA'S NORTH KOREA PROBLEM
     by Jing-dong Yuan, Ottawa, 3 December 2005

[Jing-dong Yuan is Associate Professor of International Policy Studies and 
Director of Research, East Asia Non-proliferation Program, Center for 
Non-proliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies. The 
following are excerpts of a presentation at the CANCAPS annual conference in 
Ottawa.]

Since early 2003, China has been playing an increasingly more pro-active but 
equally more frustrating role in seeking a resolution to the North Korean 
nuclear crisis. Specifically, Beijing has been instrumental in providing the 
impetus and venue for the trilateral meeting and later, Six-Party Talks. 
While the multilateral forum offers good opportunity for China and the 
United States to cooperate on an issue of common interest, it also imposes 
on China the unenviable task of reconciling apparently irreconcilable 
positions between Pyongyang and Washington, with the risk of alienating both 
in the process.

Canada is strongly interested in the peace and security in Northeast Asia 
and in global disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation. Almost four 
years ago, Ottawa established diplomatic relations with the DPRK. For years, 
the Canadian government, Canada-based academic communities and NGOs have 
sought to promote cooperative security, confidence building, and disarmament 
in the Asia-Pacific region in general, and with regard to the Korean 
Peninsula in particular. Ottawa has also been engaging China as a way to 
integrate that country into the international political and economic 
structures.

Behind Beijing's apparent contradictory policy stances is a carefully 
crafted and consistently pursued strategy that seeks to secure and advance 
China's bottom line on resolving the crisis. China maintained a close 
relationship with North Korea for over four decades. When the Korean War 
broke out in 1950, Chairman Mao overruled most of his close advisors and 
dispatched the Chinese People's Volunteers in support of Kim Il Sung, even 
losing his own son in the three-year war. For years to come, the bilateral 
relationship was termed as "sealed in blood and flesh." In 1961, China and 
North Korea signed the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual 
Assistance, committing both sides to the assistance of each in case of 
military attacks by the third country.

The international strategic environment took a dramatic turn in the early 
1970s as Beijing and Washington sought rapprochement and in 1979, the two 
countries formally established diplomatic relations. Toward the late 1980s, 
with the end of the Cold War and over more than a decade of economic reforms 
and opening up, Beijing began to subtly shift its past rigid attitudes 
toward South Korea. In August 1992, Beijing and Seoul established diplomatic 
relations. While the Chinese leadership had taken great care in easing the 
"shock", Pyongyang still felt betrayed and the Sino-DPRK bilateral 
relationship entered a new era of uncertainty, distance and occasional 
alienation.

Beijing's shift from a "one Korea" to a "two Koreas" policy has been driven 
by economic as much as strategic considerations. With the end of the Cold 
War and growing optimism of an emerging multipolar world, China considered 
obsolete the Cold War dual-axis of the Beijing-Moscow-Pyongyang alliance vs. 
the Washington-Tokyo-Seoul alliance. By then, China had already normalized 
relationships with all of North Korea's enemies: the United States, Japan, 
and South Korea. But the economic driver proved to be the more weighty 
consideration, especially in the context of China's fatigue of providing 
grants-in-aid to North Korea and the latter's economic stagnation, in 
contrast to South Korea's economic ascendancy, from which China could make 
much gain.

Since 1992, Beijing-Pyongyang ties have remained strained if not completely 
alienated. The two countries' fundamental strategic interests continue to 
drift apart. For China, economic developments and prosperity require further 
and deeper integration into the global economy, acceptance of and compliance 
with existing international norms and rules, and maintenance of stable 
relationships with major powers and a stable and peaceful regional security 
environment. Pyongyang, however, continues to stick to its rigid 
feudal-socialist ideologies, especially its juche principle, regime 
survival, and increasing paranoia and sense of isolation and desertion. The 
Soviet and Chinese establishment of diplomatic relations with Seoul without 
corresponding diplomatic breakthrough between North Korea and most western 
countries, the United States and Japan in particular, incurred added fear of 
insecurity, prompting Pyongyang to seek nuclear weapons as security 
insurance.

With such titanic shift in the international geostrategic landscape and 
increasingly incompatible national interests, the old "lip-and-teeth" 
China-DPRK relationship based on shared strategic interests and the need for 
mutual assistance is now replaced with a more ad hoc, needs-based and 
utilitarian patron-client relationship, with growing asymmetry in 
responsibilities interdependence.

Three broad trends mark this shift. First, growing political distrust has 
developed between the two erstwhile allies. Second, failure and reluctance 
of North Korea to undertake meaningful economic reforms, combined with 
decades of socialist central planning, economic mismanagement, and natural 
disasters in the mid- to late-1990s added significant burdens to China and 
created problems of refugees and illegal migration. However, the most 
serious challenge is how to respond to Pyongyang's nuclear brinkmanship 
since the second nuclear crisis in October 2002.

Despite their differences and disputes over a range of issues, China and the 
USA share a common interest in maintaining the Korean Peninsula nuclear 
free. However, their endgames for North Korea are different. For Beijing, 
the best outcome is a non- (or de-) nuclearized but surviving North Korean 
regime. For Washington, nuclear disarmament is the fundamental issue and to 
the extent that this can only be achieved by a regime change, even if with 
non-military means, that should be the way to go.

The current crisis is graver than the nuclear crisis in 1993-94. Both 
Pyongyang and Washington maintain hard line positions. The continued 
stalemate could push North Korea to take even more risky steps. Any military 
options could conceivably result in environmental devastation and a massive 
refugee flight across the Yalu into China, gravely disrupting Chinese 
economic development. A hastily unified Korea following the collapse of the 
North Korean regime could well deprive China of any say in the future 
strategic alignment of Northeast Asia, with the prospect of a US military 
presence right up to the Chinese-Korean border. A united Korea might inherit 
the North's nuclear and missile capabilities, and rising Korean nationalism 
could also pose a challenge to Beijing's ability to manage its Korean ethnic 
minority in Jilin Province. Finally, there is the specter of a nuclear chain 
reaction, with concerns over Japan's possible rearmament and nuclearization, 
using the North Korean nuclear issue as a pretext.

In this context, continuing to support North Korea is no longer driven by 
the need to prop up an ideological bedfellow, but rather by China's 
long-term strategic interests. China cannot support, and would even oppose 
if need be, any measures that threaten the survival of the DPRK. It is in 
this context that China's three-part position on the matter must be 
understood: (1) peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula should be 
preserved; (2) the peninsula should remain nuclear-free; and (3) the dispute 
should be resolved through diplomatic and political methods between the USA 
and the DPRK.

Instead of blaming North Korea for the collapse of the 1994 Agreed 
Framework, China has been calling for both Pyongyang and Washington to 
return to abide by the agreement. Chinese analyses appear to reflect a level 
of understanding of North Korea's frustration over the non-implementation of 
the Agreed Framework and its security plight. Some even suggest that the 
Bush administration's hard line policy toward North Korea it to blame for 
Pyongyang's behaviour. Beijing deeply worries that Pyongyang may be pushed 
into taking even more reckless action. China therefore decided to adopt a 
more active diplomacy. One could argue that Beijing's efforts -- including 
twisting Pyongyang's arms -- have played no small part in getting Pyongyang 
to accept the Six Party Talks framework. However, China's influence over Kim 
Jong Il is quite limited.

What Beijing seeks is both de-nuclearization and peninsula peace and 
stability. The two are inseparable and must go hand-in-hand. This is the 
essence of China's North Korea policy and how it manages an increasingly 
frustrating problem.
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6.   CURRENT IMPLICATIONS OF A NUCLEAR NORTH KOREA
     by Wade L. Huntley, Ottawa, 3 December 2005

[Wade Huntley is Director of the Simons Centre for Disarmament and 
Non-Proliferation Research at the Liu Institute for Global Issues, 
University of British Columbia. The following are excerpts of a presentation 
at the CANCAPS annual conference in Ottawa.]

The problems posed by North Korea's nuclear ambitions are multifaceted, 
bearing directly on Korean peninsula security, East Asian relations and 
global non-proliferation efforts. The September 19 agreement emerging from 
the fourth round of the Six-Party Talks was a hopeful step toward a 
comprehensive negotiated settlement. But the immediate aftermath of the 
announcement of the agreement saw a sequence of national statements 
dampening this hope. The future remains highly uncertain.

I. North Korea 2005
North Korea's nuclear aspirations have been problematic since it first 
joined the NPT in 1985. From 1994 the Agreed Framework did successfully 
freeze North Korea's plutonium-based nuclear program, but it never succeeded 
in resolving discrepancies of past North Korean activities or in removing 
known spent fuel from the country as ultimately intended. These shortcomings 
loomed when, in October 2002, the Bush Administration confronted North Korea 
with charges that it was undertaking a second, uranium-based nuclear program 
leading to collapse of the Agreed Framework and North Korea's withdrawal 
from the NPT.

The collapse of the Agreed Framework in 2002 is a critical watershed. Under 
the Agreed Framework, North Korea's nuclear ambitions were mainly contained. 
Since 2003, North Korea has been free to push its programs as hard as it 
can, with fabrication of a nuclear explosive device probably within its 
technical competence. By withdrawing from the Agreed Framework and the NPT 
essentially without meaningful sanction, North Korea has successfully moved 
the "line in the sand" considerably in its favour. By early 2005, just 
months before the 2005 NPT Review Conference, North Korea for the first time 
stated explicitly that it possessed nuclear weapons.

II. Implications of a Nuclear North Korea
There are three areas of consequence of North Korea's nuclear ambitions: 
deleterious regional responses, proliferation of nuclear materials and 
expertise, and the corrosive impact on the NPT.

A steadily (if slowly) growing arsenal of nuclear weapons in North Korea 
will aggravate tensions and uncertainties in East Asia, in some cases 
potentially past breaking points. North Korea's actions could trigger a 
nuclear proliferation "domino effect" in East Asia. A Japanese decision to 
go nuclear would be harder than some imagine and would not follow 
reflexively from North Korean behaviour. But even an increasing foreboding 
of proliferation is bad news for the region. If these points of resistance 
do not hold, and East Asian nuclear dominos begin falling, that's worse news 
for the region.

North Korea's nuclear program gives it the potential to export fissile 
materials. The Bush administration's Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) 
can impede, but cannot with certainty prevent, such exports. The PSI's 
legitimacy has grown as it has gained more national adherents and the 
endorsement of the G-8 Global Partnership and the UN Secretary General. But, 
the PSI (like similar initiatives) remains disassociated with the NPT 
regime, sidestepping rather than reinforcing its compliance mechanisms.

North Korea is the first state ever to withdraw from the NPT. Unfortunately, 
a political accommodation to get North Korea back into the NPT absolving 
past non-compliance would undermine NPT mechanisms still more, and may 
encourage other NPT states to flout their similar obligations. This is a 
real dilemma, but should be reckoned in its broadest context. North Korea's 
nuclear weapons acquisition poses a far greater threat to the NPT regime. If 
unique treatment of North Korea stems from a shared global goal of curbing 
nuclear proliferation, detrimental precedent-setting can be mitigated.

III. Policy Choices
For over a decade the central question bedevilling many policy-makers has 
been: Is North Korea prepared to agree to surrender its nuclear capability? 
Engagement advocates tend to assert "yes:" North Korean belligerence is 
mainly manoeuvring for bargaining position. Confrontation advocates usually 
purport "no:" North Korean accommodation is merely a tactic to assuage 
neighbours and buy time. The September 19 agreement has, for the moment, 
bolstered those on the "yes" side.

But this is the wrong question, because the regime's internal motivations 
are essentially unknowable. First, this debate between engagement versus 
confrontation overlooks the reality that North Korea neither dependably 
reciprocates US accommodation, as engagement advocates hope, nor routinely 
cowers to US intimidation, as confrontation advocates expect. Rather, North 
Korea's most consistent behaviour has been to act provocatively whenever it 
sensed US attention waning. US policy has been most successful when it 
prioritizes interaction over neglect.

More fundamentally, it may be the case (as is true for any government facing 
a complex decision) that North Korea's leadership has not made up its mind, 
and won't until a choice is at hand. Hence, assumptions of any specificity 
concerning motivations in Pyongyang are a poor basis for other countries' 
crucial policy decisions. Instead, policy should be premised on shaping the 
international environmental conditions within which North Korea must 
promulgate its own actions.

In addition, policy must reckon with the fundamentally shifted status quo. 
Use of force is less feasible than ever. But a 1990s-style engagement of 
North Korea is no longer enough, because achieving a non-nuclear Korean 
peninsula now requires rolling back an existing capacity. The international 
community should rigorously pursue this goal but also take measures to 
prevent its development from fuelling nuclear proliferation elsewhere. Both 
these goals point to building better cooperation among key interested 
parties and enhancing mechanisms of regional security cooperation and global 
non-proliferation compliance.

IV. The September 19 Agreement
The September 19 agreement evinces not only a commitment by North Korea to 
end all nuclear weapons development, but also a validation of a negotiated 
approach to the current Korean nuclear crisis which both North Korea and the 
United States have, at various times, resisted.

The agreement is not a trivial or minimal advance; it represents the first 
significant progress in several years. But neither is the agreement a 
full-fledged resolution, akin to the 1994 US-North Korea Agreed Framework; 
the agreement is only a first step. It is more of an opportunity than an 
accomplishment. The obstacles to successful negotiated denuclearization of 
the Korean peninsula remain daunting. But opportunities for broader 
improvements in regional security emanating from the six-party talks process 
may also strengthen the capacity of the parties to solve the nuclear crisis 
itself.

The significance of the agreement is that it brings all six parties to the 
talks into concord on a common language, and elevates the seriousness of the 
six-party talks process itself. In particular, the agreement reflects the 
greater moderation and "realism" evinced by the Bush Administration's North 
Korea policy in the second term.

Will the new stance last? The agreement points in the direction of an 
eventual settlement looking increasingly similar to the 1994 Agreed 
Framework that so many Bush Administration principals so vehemently rebuked. 
The willingness of the president to remain committed to a course of greater 
constructive engagement when the road becomes bumpy again will be the real 
test. This commitment will need to be sustained, and strengthened further, 
for the negotiation process to stay on course long enough to flesh out the 
principles of the agreement and resolve the remaining trenchant divisions.

The most immediate hurdles surround the scope and nature of any peaceful 
nuclear program that North Korea might retain. Widely divergent US and North 
Korean national statements issued subsequent to the joint agreement suggest 
that positions on that point remain as divided as ever, and dampened some of 
the initial enthusiasm over the agreement itself. But expressions of 
divergent interpretations of the agreement on this point should have been 
expected, and in fact were to some extent planned. Thus both euphoria and 
despair are overreactions.

Beyond this immediate problem lie the complex difficulties in verifying 
North Korean compliance with whatever stipulations may emerge for 
dismantling its existing nuclear weapons capabilities. Given advances in 
North Korea's nuclear program in the last three years, North Korea will have 
a hard time proving it is non-nuclear, even if it wants to.

However, the provisions of the September 19 agreement hold the promise for 
reaching a regional accord wider in scope than the immediate nuclear crisis. 
US pledges to normalize relations and negative security assurances likely 
carry great weight for a country long subjected to cavalier talk of "regime 
change." Much will need to be worked out over the nature and limits of US 
negative security guarantees; but the costs of early and significant US 
moves toward normalizing relations certainly are relatively cheap compared 
to the potential benefits, which could ultimately include a permanent peace 
regime on the Korean Peninsula.

Conclusion
Genuine progress toward establishing a verifiably non-nuclear Korean 
peninsula supported by a permanent peace regime would resolve one of the two 
major security tensions in East Asia (the other concerns Taiwan). But the 
nuclear confrontation is embedded in a deeper ongoing political, economic 
and energy crisis in North Korea that is necessarily a crisis for the rest 
of the region as well. The nuclear issue cannot be solved without a wider 
resolution to the long-term future of North Korea in East Asia.

Such a resolution could be a catalyst for the gradual emergence of a broader 
arrangement for regional security cooperation, and would provide a major 
boost to non-proliferation efforts globally. Achieving this end will require 
bold initiative on the part of the United States that is more than just a 
simple amalgam of "carrots and sticks."

The September 19 six-party talks agreement falls well short of this mark. 
But the agreement at least acknowledges the relevance of addressing the 
wider context of the nuclear crisis. If dramatic advances are unlikely, we 
can at least hope that genuine negotiation has now begun; that progress, if 
slow, will continue; and that the process will not be overtaken by 
disruptive events before it can produce an enduring non-proliferation 
solution.
*************************************************

QUIDNUNC
In this section of CanKor, we invite readers to send questions, answers, or 
responses. Answers should be under 150 words and may be edited for space.
*************************************************

WHAT ARE THE REASONS FOR FRENCH TACTICS REGARDING THE DPRK? ARE THEY ACTING 
INDIRECTLY FOR THE EU, OR DOING SO AT US BEHEST?

There always has been a question as to why France remains the only EU member 
state that does not have full diplomatic relations with North Korea. The 
official reason given by the French is human rights in North Korea --  
slightly suspect with France's dubious record elsewhere in the world, 
including its own state-sponsored terrorism against "Rainbow Warrior" in New 
Zealand. At one time, rumours suggested that the French were aiming to 
counter-trade diplomatic relations with the North for more KEDO contracts 
for its nuclear industry from the South.
Certainly the French are not acting as surrogates for the EU, nor, do I 
believe, doing a favour for the US with its track record on Iraq.  Whatever 
intent the French may have, it really is difficult to follow their 
reasoning.  My French colleagues at the European Parliament also have 
difficulty explaining their Foreign Office's stance.

Glyn Ford, UK Member of the EU Parliament
*************************************************

WHAT NOW?

How many North Korean refugee-defectors are there in South Korea?

[Answers should be e-mailed to: editor at CanKor.ca]
*************************************************

End CanKor # 230

*************************************************
CanKor is an electronic information service for readers interested in the 
issues of peace and security on the Korean peninsula, published by 
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