[Cankor] Report #198

[cankor at cankor.ca]

Dear subscriber,

Welcome to issue #198 of the CanKor Report.

For articles not original to CanKor, direct links are available in the
Contents section, should you wish to consult the originals on the internet.
If the links no longer function, you may refer to the full text articles
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The CanKor team

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CANADA-KOREA ELECTRONIC INFORMATION SERVICE
CanKor # 198
Tuesday, 1 March 2005
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Newly appointed chief delegates to the six-party talks, US ambassador to
Seoul Christopher Hill, ROK Deputy Foreign Minister Song Min Soon, and Sasae
Kenichiro, director-general of the Japanese Foreign Ministry's Asia-Oceania
bureau, meet to decide a common strategy on how to respond to the latest
round of Chinese diplomacy. Chinese officials explain that Pyongyang's four
conditions for returning to the six-party talks have more to do with
abstract requests such as a pledge of "no hostile intent" on the part of the
USA, rather than material rewards for compliance.
The three-word phrase "no hostile intent" that Kim Jong Il is waiting to
hear from the lips of US President Bush is getting considerable airtime. The
Bush administration prefers to assure North Korea that the USA has "no
intention of invading" the DPRK. Glenn Kessler explains the difference
between these two concepts in a Washington Post article found in this issue
of CanKor.
This week's FOCUS is on the second half of 2004, with CanKor editor Erich
Weingartner's biannual summary of events related to the DPRK.
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Contents:
1.  DPRK SETS FOUR CONDITIONS FOR NUCLEAR TALKS
     http://times.hankooki.com/lpage/nation/200503/kt2005030118205611990.htm
2.  THREE LITTLE WORDS BUSH HAS AVOIDED: "NO HOSTILE INTENT"
     http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/Search?keywords=north%20korea

FOCUS: Year-end Summary of Events
3.  REPORT ON DEVELOPMENTS RELATED TO DPRK, JULY - AUG 2004
     Original article, copyright CanKor
4.  REPORT ON DEVELOPMENTS RELATED TO DPRK, SEPT - OCT 2004
     Original article, copyright CanKor
5.  REPORT ON DEVELOPMENTS RELATED TO DPRK, NOV - DEC 2004
     Original article, copyright CanKor
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1.  DPRK SETS FOUR CONDITIONS FOR NUCLEAR TALKS
     by Ryu Jin, Korea Times, 1 March 2005

North Korean leader Kim Jong Il has presented four conditions for returning
to the six-party talks on his nuclear weapons program, including a demand
for a security guarantee from the United States, according to a Japanese
news agency Tuesday.
Kim told Wang Jiarui, a high-profile Chinese official who visited Pyongyang
last month, that he wants Washington to give the reasons why it labelled his
country as an "outpost of tyranny," the Kyodo News Agency reported, citing
unnamed diplomatic sources. In addition to the aforementioned conditions,
the report said he made another pair of requests such as Washington's pledge
that it would negotiate with Pyongyang on an equal basis and a sincere
attitude that could be trusted by North Koreans.
During a three-and-a-half-hour meeting with the Chinese envoy on Feb. 21,
the North Korean leader was quoted as saying his country would go to the
discussion table when there are "mature conditions" for the six-party
dialogue. Officials in Seoul, who had been briefed by Beijing on the outcome
of Wang's trip, said the "conditions" seemed to refer to more abstract
demands such as a US pledge of "no hostile intent," rather than "material
rewards" for simply rejoining the talks.
Last Saturday, South Korea, the US and Japan held a strategy session in
Seoul to devise ways to lure North Korea back to the bargaining table as
soon as possible. The US and its Asian allies reached a consensus, according
to sources, that they could allow the North more opportunities to have
bilateral talks with the US within the six-party formula. Beijing, which
virtually has the sole channel to talk with Pyongyang, will send its chief
nuclear negotiator, Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei, to Seoul today to learn
more about Saturday's tripartite session before contacting North Korea
again.
North Korea and the US held negotiations for three times from August 2003 to
June 2004 along with South Korea, China, Japan and Russia. But no clear
breakthrough has been found yet to resolve the 28-month-long nuclear
standoff. Citing the US "hostile" policies, which they argue is aimed at
toppling the Kim Jong Il regime, North Korea has refused to hold a fourth
round of talks. In a surprise announcement on Feb. 10, the North claimed it
already possesses nuclear weapons.
Most officials and experts view Kim's remarks, made at his meeting with the
Chinese envoy about two weeks after the announcement, as an indication that
his country would eventually come back to the disarmament talks sometime in
the near future. But others predict it will take some more time for North
Korea to return to the bargaining table as it has not yet listened to the
US, which has so far avoided giving the North the three words it yearns for:
no hostile intent.
The US put dictators and corrupt officials on notice on Monday, using its
annual report on global human rights practices to focus the spotlight on the
continuing abuses in Cuba, China, North Korea and Myanmar. Senior US
officials, presenting the 2004 report, once again emphasized the theme of
advancing democracy and freedom that was struck by President George W. Bush
in his second inaugural address and State of the Union speech.
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2.  THREE LITTLE WORDS BUSH HAS AVOIDED: "NO HOSTILE INTENT"
     by Glenn Kessler, Washington Post, 22 February 2005

What's in a phrase? Everything, in the craft of diplomacy. This is the story
of three little words -- "no hostile intent" -- and the fierce tussle within
the Bush administration over them as officials tried to develop a policy to
confront North Korea's nuclear ambitions. To a non-diplomat, the phrase
might seem typical of the awkward and diffuse verbiage frequently uttered by
men in pinstriped suits. But to the North Korean government, hearing those
words from the United States looms large as the diplomatic equivalent of the
Holy Grail.
Yet President Bush has never uttered them. Neither has Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice. Former secretary of state Colin L. Powell did, especially
in the final months of his tenure -- and he frequently suggested Bush had
said them, too. But we're getting ahead of the story.
Government officials around the world pay close attention to the words
spoken by US officials, especially the president. But few countries devote
as much time or effort as North Korea. For half a century, the reclusive
government in Pyongyang has viewed the United States as its primary enemy -- 
the only country with the military might to possibly crush it.
Peter Hayes, executive director of the Nautilus Institute for Security and
Sustainability in San Francisco, said studying and analyzing the comments of
US officials is a significant career track in the Pyongyang bureaucracy.
"They watch like hovering hawks," said Hayes, who has made seven trips to
North Korea. "They monitor American rhetoric, statements and the policy
process much more closely than we monitor them."
In 2000, the final year of the Clinton administration, a senior North Korean
official visited Washington and met with President Bill Clinton and other
top officials. At the end of his visit, on Oct. 12, the governments issued a
joint communiqué that declared that "as a crucial first step, the two sides
stated that neither government would have hostile intent toward the other."
Wendy Sherman, a former top State Department official who was the chief US
negotiator of the communiqué text, said her counterpart made it clear that
including the phrase about "hostile intent" was critical to North Korea's
making concessions on its missile program.
What does "no hostile intent" mean? As with a lot of diplomatic shorthand, a
precise definition can be elusive, in part because the phrase's meaning
depends largely on the ear of the beholder. For North Korean leaders,
diplomats say, the phrase goes beyond a pledge not to invade, conveying an
implicit message of respect between two peer nations.
"Ultimately, it is about regime survival," Sherman said. As part of
negotiations, the Clinton administration placed the statement in a section
that stressed the need for peace and security in the region, so allies would
not think a declaration of "no hostile intent" would mean an abandonment of
US protection.
Fast-forward to the Bush administration. The talks with North Korea started
by Clinton were put on hold. In his State of the Union address in 2002, Bush
identified North Korea as part of an "axis of evil" that included Iran and
Saddam Hussein's Iraq.
In October 2002, the United States accused North Korea of having a
clandestine nuclear program and, with its allies, cut off fuel deliveries
promised under an agreement reached with Clinton. In December, North Korea
kicked out international inspectors and restarted a shuttered nuclear
facility.
To stem the sense of crisis -- coming as the United States readied an
invasion of Iraq -- on Dec. 29, 2002, Powell hit five Sunday-morning talk
shows. In every appearance, he resurrected the "no hostile intent" phrase
that had appeared in the Clinton communiqué -- and attributed it to Bush.
"This year, the president made a clear statement that he had no hostile
intent toward North Korea," Powell said on CBS's "Face the Nation." "And he
said that in South Korea earlier this year." On Fox News, Powell quoted Bush
as saying, "I have no hostile intent toward the North."
Actually, Bush had said no such thing. Speaking to reporters in Seoul one
month after the "axis of evil" speech, Bush again said that North Korea's
government was evil and that he would not "change my opinion on the man, on
[North Korean leader] Kim Jong Il, until he frees his people."
But Bush added: "We have no intention of invading North Korea. South Korea
has no intention of attacking North Korea, nor does America."
Experts say this language does not impress the North Koreans, especially
after they were labelled part of an "axis of evil."
Powell's language on "no hostile intent" was picked up by the State
Department spokesman, Richard A. Boucher, when he briefed the news media in
the weeks after Powell's television appearance. But the language disturbed
hard-liners in the administration, who believed that North Korea had clearly
demonstrated a hostile policy toward the United States -- and that the
phrase limited the administration's options in using economic and other
weapons to pressure Pyongyang. They began to press for its elimination from
the administration's talking points.
Defence Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld raised the issue with Rice, who was
then national security adviser, an official familiar with the conversation
said. Rice agreed that the language should be dropped, and that only Bush's
earlier comment about not attacking and invading be used.
Language shifts of this sort are rarely formally announced. Boucher did an
impressive job of dancing around the question when sharp-eared reporters at
the State Department asked about it. On Feb. 19, 2003, Boucher cut off a
reporter just as he was about to ask whether "no hostile intent" was still
the policy. "Yes, we have no plans to attack or invade North Korea. I can
say that without a problem," Boucher said.
Powell also dropped the phrase. But when United States began holding
six-nation negotiating sessions with North Korea in 2003 and 2004, the
language began to creep back into his statements, especially after the Bush
administration hinted that it might join in a multilateral security
guarantee for North Korea. Powell again frequently suggested that Bush had
"repeatedly" used the words "no hostile intent."
But an extensive search of presidential statements finds that the closest
Bush ever got to North Korea's magic phrase was during a speech on Jan. 7,
2003, although he made it clear he was not talking about the North Korean
government: "We have no aggressive intent, no argument with the North Korean
people."
A White House official said last week that there was "no hidden meaning"
behind Bush's not using the phrase -- just that the president wanted to be
more specific in dealing with North Korea's fear of a military attack.
Powell and Bush "are two different men using different words," he said.
The issue flared again as Rice prepared for her confirmation hearings, when
the State Department's Asia bureau proposed that she use the phrase "no
hostile intent." But she simply repeated the president's "no attack or
invade" language.
In this year's State of the Union speech, Bush appeared to take pains not to
denounce North Korea and noted that he was working with allies to solve the
crisis through diplomacy. But Sherman said it might have made a significant
difference if Bush had finally uttered the phrase "no hostile intent." "It
could have had real meaning to North Korea and moved the negotiations
forward," she said. Instead, a week later, North Korea announced that it had
nuclear weapons and was pulling out of the negotiations, citing what it
called the administration's "hostile policy."
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FOCUS: Year-end Summary of Events

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3.  REPORT ON DEVELOPMENTS RELATED TO DPRK, JULY - AUG 2004
     by Erich Weingartner, prepared for CIDA

On 1 July, UNESCO registers 63 North Korean tombs containing murals and
relics from the Koguryo period as a World Cultural Heritage.
DPRK Foreign Minister Paek Nam Sun meets South Korean Foreign Minister Ban
Ki-moon at the ministerial-level meeting of the 11th ASEAN Regional Forum in
Jakarta on 1 July. The following day he meets US Secretary of State Colin
Powell, making this the highest-level US-DPRK encounter since 2002. Topics
revolve around the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The DPRK later
expresses disappointment with the ARF's lack of impartiality.
The governor of Primorskii Krai in the Russian Far East sends funds to aid
in the construction of Jongbaek Russian Orthodox Church in Pyongyang.
On 5 July, the DPRK relays a letter to Japan from members of the Japanese
Red Army Faction, stating that they wish to return home. An article in the
KCNA says that the DPRK government has no objection to their wish to return
home.
The heads of general-level military talks in Kaesong on 6 July agree to the
second phase in removal of propaganda tools along the inter-Korean border.
Ceremonies across the DPRK commemorate the 10th anniversary of President Kim
Il Sung's death on 8 July. Eulogies and editorials extol his leadership.
The DPRK on 14 July rejects a US proposal to solve the nuclear dispute,
tabled in six-party talks held in Beijing in June. Verification, says the
DPRK, means monitoring a "state of freeze." The US position that the North
receive rewards only after the complete dismantlement of its nuclear
programme is unacceptable.
The DPRK reacts angrily to the passing of the North Korean Human Rights Act
of 2004 by the US House of Representatives on 16 July, saying the act
seriously hurts the dignity of the DPRK. The nuclear issue and the human
rights issue are viewed by North Korea as two levers in a policy to "isolate
and stifle" the DPRK. Awaiting Senate approval, the bill authorizes US$2
million per year to promote human rights, democracy, rule of law, and a
market economy in North Korea.
KCNA reports on 20 July that a Korean businessman in the USA is promoting
the sale of North Korean alcohol, initially soju (distilled rice wine),
later other liquors.
ROK authorities airlift two groups totaling 468 North Korean
refugee/defectors to Seoul from Vietnam on 27 and 28 July. Although this is
the largest single group to arrive in ROK, the number does not indicate an
increase in the flow of people out of the DPRK. A North Korean statement
accuses South Korea of committing an anti-national act, calling it
"organized and premeditated allurement, abduction and terrorism committed by
the South Korean authorities against the people of the North in broad
daylight."
A shipment of 35,000 tons of Russian food aid arrives in Nampo 31 July for
distribution by the UN World Food Programme.
Torrential rains in more than 70 cities and counties cause heavy damage on 2
August. DPRK authorities report more than 100,000 hectares of paddy and
non-paddy fields submerged or washed away, and dwellings for more than 1,000
families and public buildings destroyed.
An exhibition of consumer goods opens in Pyongyang on 3 August. On display,
according to KCNA, are more than 50,000 items produced by factories and
enterprises across the country, as well as by housewife work teams in rural
areas, and "sideline work teams" in the fields of agriculture and fisheries.
Jane's Defence Weekly reports on 5 August that the DPRK appears closer to
deploying a new mobile ballistic missile. US government officials stress
that the missile, based on Soviet-era submarine-launched designs, would not
be able to reach the US mainland, since the DPRK does not have suitable
submarines.
Thai human rights scholar and international law professor Vitit Muntarbhorn
is appointed the first UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in the DPRK on
11 August. He urges the DPRK to view his appointment as a window of
opportunity.
Persistent reports of the death of Kim Jong Il's favoured consort,
Japanese-born Ko Yong Hi, has rekindled speculation about his succession.
Mother of two of Kim's sons, and idolized in the DPRK as "the respected
mother" of the nation, Ko has since the late 1990s promoted one of her sons
as successor.
North and South Korean teams march together under a common flag in the
opening ceremonies of the 28th Olympic Games in Athens on 14 August.
Changes in the DPRK economy have led to surging food prices while salaries
are largely at a standstill, according to United Nations sources, creating a
new class of people now depending on food assistance. On 16 August, the UN
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reports that the
DPRK has turned down the United Nations Consolidated Appeals process for
2005. The DPRK prefers to receive international assistance through
non-governmental agencies, in order to focus on mid-term and long-term
development beyond immediate humanitarian needs, an OCHA official says. The
UN has asked the international community this year to donate US$209 million
for the DPRK. 60 percent (i.e. US$126 million) has been pledged or already
donated.
A DPRK delegation secretly visits Beijing on 16 August, ostensibly to
discuss the schedule for working-group meetings ahead of six-party talks.
Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer returns from a two-day visit to
the DPRK on 19 August, "optimistic" that Pyongyang will attend the next
round of nuclear talks, despite an upsurge of anti-US vitriol. Russian media
report that the fourth round of nuclear talks are "likely" to start from the
last Saturday of September.
The first State of the Environment in the DPRK report is launched 27 August
by the UN Environment Programme (UNEP). In partnership with UNDP, the report
involved 20 different DPRK government and academic agencies.
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4.  REPORT ON DEVELOPMENTS RELATED TO DPRK, SEPT - OCT 2004
     by Erich Weingartner, prepared for CIDA

On 2 September the ROK admits that scientists enriched a tiny amount of
uranium in 2000 to a level close to what would be usable in a nuclear
weapon. On 9 September, South Korean scientists admit they separated a tiny
amount of bomb-grade plutonium in 1982 without notifying the IAEA. The DPRK
denounces the USA for applying a double standard to the two Koreas, claiming
that the experiments might have been conducted on US instructions. The DPRK
links the issue to participation in the next round of six-party talks,
having already indefinitely postponed the 10th inter-Korean economic talks
scheduled for 31 August to 3 September.
A "Workshop on Economic Reform" is held in Pyongyang from 31 August to 4
September, organized by the European Commission and Germany's Friedrich
Naumann Foundation, and hosted by the DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The US Defence Department on 1 September announces deployment of 15 Aegis
destroyers in the Pacific theatre, two of them permanently stationed in the
Sea of Japan to counter North Korean missiles.
On 2 September, ROK and US officials approve 11 of 15 South Korean companies
to begin operating in the Kaesong Industrial Zone. This followed a
case-by-case review of possible US-made dual-use technology that might be
brought into the DPRK in contravention of the 1996 Wassenaar Agreement. On 6
September, the DPRK challenges the ROK to reject US obstructionism. The
Export-Import Bank of Korea announces on 24 September it will insure between
70%-90% of the losses incurred by Southern investors due to broken
agreements, blocked remittances, asset confiscation, or war.
On the anniversary of the DPRK's founding (9 September), a huge mushroom
cloud is observed in the northern Ryanggang Province, bordering China.
Playing down fears that the cloud may have been a nuclear test, the DPRK
asserts the detonation was part of a hydroelectric dam construction. Foreign
ambassadors are invited to the area for a visual inspection.
In mid-September, the DPRK informs the international community that it will
require less food aid, but seeks longer-term development aid. Procedures for
monitoring and access would also be "simplified". A five-member delegation
of the Canada-DPR Korea Association arrives in Pyongyang on 18 September for
a seven-day visit, bringing films produced by the National Film Board of
Canada.
On 24 September, the ROK government confirms the illegal export to North
Korea via China of 107 metric tons of sodium cyanide-commonly used in
agriculture and industry, but also a key ingredient of nerve gas.
In a keynote speech before the UN General Assembly on 27 September, DPRK
Vice-Foreign Minister Choe Su Hon states that the main factor undermining
international peace and stability is unilateralism, and that the UN system
needs to strengthen fairness in international relations, based on
multilateralism. He blames "the ever intensifying US hostile policy" and the
lack of clarity about South Korea's nuclear experiments for undermining
six-party talks. At a news conference afterwards, Choe says that the DPRK
has already reprocessed 8,000 depleted fuel rods and transformed them into
weapons.
On 29 September, 44 refugee-defectors climb over the walls of the Canadian
Embassy in Beijing, the largest single storming of any Beijing embassy to
date. In the first debate of the presidential campaign on 30 September,
President Bush and Democratic nominee Kerry clash over the US North Korea
policy. An estimated 100,000 people rally in Seoul on 4 October to oppose
abrogation of the infamous the National Security Law.
The US Senate having already approved the North Korea Human Rights Act on 28
September, the US House of Representatives unanimously passes the act on 5
October. Stated purpose of the act is to promote the human rights of North
Koreans, including a free flow of information into and out of the DPRK, to
protect refugees from the country, and to progress toward the peaceful
reunification of the Korean peninsula under a democratic system of
government. A DPRK spokesperson says that passing the act has removed any
justification to participate in six-party talks. The act is a "tool to
topple the regime," and a "a declaration of war." On 18 October, President
Bush signs the act into law.
The DPRK parliament on 11 October adopts two sets of regulations on
insurance and real estate for South Koreans doing business in the North.
North and South Koreans join a World Council of Churches consultation in
Tozanso, Japan from 17 to 20 October, to commemorate a meeting in the same
location 20 years before that is widely regarded as the precursor of
rapprochement on the Korean Peninsula. From 21 to 23 October, the Korea
Peace Forum hosts an inter-religious peace conference in Seoul.
A ceremony is held in Kaesong on 21 October to inaugurate the ROK state-run
Office for Land Development in the Kaesong Industrial Zone. In attendance
are 63 members of the ROK National Assembly.
Three conditions are put forward by the DPRK on 22 October for resumption of
six-way talks: the USA should a) drop its hostile policy, b) provide rewards
for a freeze of Pyongyang's nuclear facilities, and c) put on the agenda
past nuclear experiments by South Korea. On a visit to Japan, China, and the
ROK, US Secretary of State Powell rejects the demand for economic
inducements.
A Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) exercise is held off the coast of
Japan on 26 October, involving navy and coast guard vessels from 10
countries, including Japan, France, and Australia.
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5.  REPORT ON DEVELOPMENTS RELATED TO DPRK, NOV - DEC 2004
     by Erich Weingartner, prepared for CIDA

Vitit Muntarbhorn, UN special rapporteur on human rights in the DPRK,
submits his first report to the UN General Assembly on 1 November. DPRK
envoy Kim Chang Guk calls the report unfair and prejudicial. Han Song Ryol,
DPRK ambassador to the UN in charge of US affairs, says that Pyongyang will
not participate in six-party talks unless the USA annuls the North Korea
Human Rights Act and lifts economic sanctions against the DPRK.
On 2 November, George W. Bush is re-elected to the US Presidency. The DPRK
reaction is muted, with official comment to the effect that there is little
chance for an improvement of relations. On 13 November, the DPRK underlines
its willingness to continue talks in any form as soon as the USA drops its
regime change option.
A North Korean logger seeking refuge at the American consulate in
Vladivostok is refused asylum to the USA on 3 November, after South Korea
refuses to accept him. On 9 November China cracks down on refugee-defectors
in Beijing, repatriating them to the DPRK amidst protests from human rights
groups.
Former US Army Sgt. Charles Jenkins is convicted on 7 November of desertion
and sentenced to 30 days. His confession details decades of hardship in the
DPRK. On 27 November he is released from military jail and joins his wife, a
Japanese abductee, in her hometown in Japan. The DPRK provides new
information to Japan on two abductees, just days before Tokyo and Pyongyang
begin another round of talks on 9 November. Although the results of DPRK
research into the alleged death of Japanese abductees are disappointing,
says Prime Minister Koizumi, Japan will deliver food aid as already
programmed. Japanese officials announce on 8 December that DNA tests on what
North Korea claims are the remains of Megumi Yokota prove that the bones and
ashes belong to several other people.
ROK President Roh Moo-hyun uses a stopover in Los Angeles on his way to
Argentina on 12 November as an opportunity to send a message to US President
Bush ahead of their meeting at the APEC forum in Chile. He urges Washington
to soften its stance, calls military action unacceptable, and says there is
some validity to the DPRK's claims that its pursuit of nuclear arms is for
deterrence. Canadian businessman Maurice Strong, UN Secretary General's
envoy to the DPRK, agrees that the most effective way to end the nuclear
standoff is for the international community to offer the DPRK a major
economic package as part of a peace settlement and to coax the communist
regime to open up to the world.
A DPRK spokesman calls the reported removal of DPRK leader Kim Jong Il's
portraits from public buildings in Pyongyang "groundless fabrication."
A Korean Peninsula Peace Forum, hosted by the Eastern Canada Chapter of
South Korea's Presidential Advisory Council on Democratic and Peaceful
Unification takes place in Toronto on 19 November.
Although an FAO/WFP crop assessment on 23 November reports the "best harvest
in ten years", North Koreans may experience continuing food deficits due to
insufficient production, deficient diet, lower incomes and rising prices.
On 24 November, the US Congress allocates US$3 million to the North Korea
Human Rights Act, and is likely to name a "special envoy" to monitor human
rights in the DPRK. US satellite surveillance photos indicate that a
10,000-man Chinese army division is preparing for a prolonged deployment
along the North Korean border. KEDO's Executive Board announces a one-year
extension of its freeze on the construction of two light-water nuclear
reactors in the DPRK. At the ASEAN Plus Three summit in Laos on 29 November,
the leaders of China, South Korea and Japan agree to "promote close
consultations and cooperation for the peaceful denuclearization of the
Korean Peninsula through the Six-Party Talks."
The final section of an inter-Korean road along the east coast border is
opened to traffic on 1 December. Working-level inter-Korean talks take place
from 2-4 December at Mt. Kumgang to discuss technical issues involved in
building a permanent meeting place for separated families. An eight-member
team from the ROK and DPRK begin a joint survey of the area 10 December. The
two Koreas announce on 3 December that a South Korean electric power company
KEPCO will supply electricity to the Kaesong Industrial Complex.
Rumours persist of a large-scale manhunt by DPRK authorities to find
potential refugee-defectors near the border with China. The heads of six
associations of North Korean defectors meet in Tokyo on 6 December, where
they agree to establish a government-in-exile.
On 15 December, a ceremony at the Kaesong Industrial Complex marks the start
of production. On the same day, 1,000 sets of pots manufactured at the
Complex by DPRK labourers earning US$50-60 per month are delivered to the
Lotte Department Store in Seoul, where they sell out in only seven hours.
In a speech in Beijing on 22 December, the ROK Unification Minister urges
the USA and the DPRK to make a "historic choice" to solve differences. On
the same day, the South Korean opposition Grand National Party unveils its
new unification policy, surprising some with its moderate and engaging tone.
The Unification Ministry announces on 23 December it will decrease financial
subsidies for North Korean defectors by a third, but plans to introduce an
incentive system to encourage them to undertake job training.
Just in time for Christmas, the 44 North Korean refugee-defectors who were
camped in the Canadian Embassy in Beijing since the end of September are
allowed to leave for a "third country" on 23 December. The compromise worked
out with Chinese authorities includes agreement for China to add a perimeter
fence around the embassy, a move previously resisted by Canada's Ambassador
Joseph Caron for symbolic reasons.
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End CanKor # 198

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CanKor is an electronic information service for readers interested in the
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