[Cankor] Report #219

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Dear subscriber,

Welcome to issue #219 of the CanKor Report.

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The CanKor team

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CANADA-KOREA ELECTRONIC INFORMATION SERVICE

CanKor # 219

Friday, 9 September 2005
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Two prominent US experts brief Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice after 
their return from talks with DPRK officials in Pyongyang. John Lewis and 
Siegfried Hecker say that the DPRK will insist that the statement of 
principles under discussion at the six-party talks in Beijing this week 
acknowledges the DPRK's right to peaceful use of nuclear power.

The World Food Programme denies an ROK news report that the UN agency has 
been asked to leave the country. However it is true that the agency's status 
in the country is under review, since the DPRK wishes to switch from food 
aid to development assistance.

The ROK Ministry of Unification takes issue with a recent publication by 
Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland entitled "Hunger and Human Rights: The 
Politics of Famine in North Korea," published by the US Committee for Human 
Rights in North Korea (http://www.hrnk.org/hunger/hungerReport05.pdf). In 
the report, the authors criticize the lack of transparency and monitoring 
that accompanies ROK food aid to the DPRK. In this week's FOCUS section 
"Facts and arguments on humanitarian aid" we publish both the ROK critique 
and the letter of response by Haggard and Noland.

If the current six-party process results in a settlement of the nuclear 
weapons issue, part of the package deal will involve incentives to advance 
the DPRK's economic development goals. CanKor editor Erich Weingartner 
reflects on the social development tasks that face international assistance 
in the fields of education, health and social protection in the DPRK.
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Contents:
1.   NORTH KOREA STANDS FAST ON NUCLEAR ENERGY USE
     http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/08/AR2005090802088.html
2.   KOREA WANTS DEVELOPMENT HELP OVER EMERGENCY FOOD AID
     http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/news/world/stories/091005dnintnkorea.c43192b.html

FOCUS: Facts and arguments about humanitarian aid
3.   ROK REFUTES REPORT ON LACK OF FOOD AID TRANSPARENCY
     In Korean: http://www.hrnk.org/documents/mou090205b.pdf
     In English: http://www.hrnk.org/documents/mou090205b-eng.pdf
4.   NOLAND AND HAGGARD DEFEND FOOD AID REPORT
     http://www.hrnk.org/documents/hnMOU090705.pdf
5.   EDUCATION, HEALTH AND SOCIAL PROTECTION IN THE DPRK
     http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/initiatives/eenk/
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1.   NORTH KOREA STANDS FAST ON NUCLEAR ENERGY USE
     by Glenn Kessler, Washington Post, 9 September 2005

Two prominent experts on North Korea who recently made an unpublicized visit 
to the reclusive nation briefed Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice 
yesterday as US negotiators prepared to return to Beijing for a renewal of 
six-nation disarmament talks.

China announced yesterday that the talks would resume next Tuesday, after a 
recess of more than five weeks after the participants were unable to reach 
agreement on a "statement of principles" that would guide negotiations to 
eliminate North Korea's nuclear programs. Japan, South Korea and Russia are 
also participants in the talks.

John W. Lewis, a retired Stanford University professor, and Siegfried S. 
Hecker, retired director of Los Alamos National Laboratory, met with Rice 
yesterday afternoon to provide details of their talks with key North Korean 
officials, including the top negotiators for the North Korean side. The two 
men summarized their conversations in Pyongyang, made some suggestions for 
bridging gaps, and provided an assessment of the chances of reaching an 
agreement, according to one US official.

During the talks with Lewis and Hecker, North Korean officials made it clear 
that they intend to insist that the statement of principles acknowledge 
North Korea's right to peaceful use of nuclear power, according to Charles 
L. "Jack" Pritchard, a former State Department Korea expert, who accompanied 
the two men. To varying degrees, South Korea, China and Russia have 
supported the North Korean position, while Japan has backed the US stance 
that North Korea's behaviour gives it no right to even a peaceful program, 
except for research for medical, agricultural or industrial use.

"The North Koreans saw a chink in the armour," Pritchard said. "They have 
concluded this is a winning argument."

Pritchard said that as a result, any statement emerging from the talks 
appears less likely to be as clear and definitive as US officials had hoped. 
This in turn might drag out future negotiations.

To prod North Korea to return to the talks, Rice had declared that the 
United States recognized North Korea's sovereignty. From the North Korean 
perspective, a sovereign nation has a right to peaceful nuclear energy, and 
one way the United States can demonstrate that it respects North Korea's 
sovereignty is to support that right.

North Korea's position -- which also included a demand for a light-water 
reactor to compensate it for giving up its current nuclear facilities -- has 
led to sometimes heated discussions within the Bush administration over how 
to counter Pyongyang's gambit, US officials said. Some officials, such as 
Assistant Secretary Christopher R. Hill, the chief US negotiator, have 
contended that the issue of whether North Korea has a theoretical right to 
peaceful nuclear energy is not as important as the main question of whether 
an agreement to eliminate North Korea's nuclear programs can be reached in 
the first place. Moreover, even if North Korea wanted to build a civilian 
nuclear program, none of the countries at the table now would even be 
willing to fund it.

"The issue for some of the partners is whether . . . North Korea could then 
reclaim a right to nuclear energy," Hill said last month. "If you ask me, 
it's not exactly a showstopper issue -- the real issue is getting rid of all 
their nuclear programs."

But other officials have pushed back, saying that such a concession would 
allow the North Koreans to chip away at an agreement, especially if they 
managed to hide materials or programs not discovered during the verification 
process.

Some of the internal debate has centered on arcane and detailed discussion 
over various articles of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Some argue 
that the first two articles support a theoretical right, but others argue 
that that hinges on compliance with the fourth article, which requires a 
country to live up to its obligations. North Korea has violated those 
obligations and withdrawn from the treaty.

Some conservatives in the administration, however, believe the 
administration has weakened its position in the North Korean talks by 
agreeing to support the European negotiations with Iran on its nuclear 
programs, and by quickly reaching a deal this year with India to supply it 
with civilian nuclear energy. Iran has violated the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty, and India never joined it.
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2.   KOREA WANTS DEVELOPMENT HELP OVER EMERGENCY FOOD AID
     by Jae-Soon Chang, The Associated Press, Seoul, 9 September 2005

North Korea wants the World Food Program to shift the focus of its aid from 
food supplies to development projects that would help the communist nation 
feed itself, the UN aid agency said Friday. The nation of 23 million has 
received emergency food from the WFP and other international groups since 
natural disasters and mismanagement caused its economy to collapse in the 
mid-1990s.

A South Korean newspaper said the North has asked the WFP to leave the 
country. Gerald Bourke, a Beijing-based spokesman for the agency, denied the 
report in the Chosun Ilbo newspaper but said the North has told aid agencies 
it wants to review their status. The North is concerned about becoming 
dependent on aid and expressed "a preference for development assistance over 
emergency humanitarian assistance," he said.

He said the UN agency was in talks with the government about "the terms of 
what we hope to be a continued presence in the country."

"Very obviously there is considerable humanitarian need still in North 
Korea," Bourke said.

The WFP tries to feed about 6.5 million North Koreans. Major donors include 
the United States, South Korea, Japan and China, which along with Russia are 
trying to negotiate an end to North Korea's nuclear weapons program. Nearly 
$2 billion in food aid has flowed into the country over the last decade, 
according to a report by the US Committee for Human Rights in North Korea.

On Thursday, President Bush's newly appointed envoy on human rights abuses 
in North Korea suggested future US food aid might be linked to liberating 
political prisoners.

"I think consistent with what the president's overall approach is on human 
rights, and bringing North Korea directly into the community of nations, we 
have to take a look at all different areas of our relationship," Jay 
Lefkowitz told a news conference.

In June, the United States decided to ship more than 50,000 tons of food to 
the North, saying the decision was based on humanitarian considerations 
alone and had nothing to do with efforts to get the North to disarm. State 
Department spokesman Tom Casey said later Thursday that Washington's policy 
has not changed.

"We do not use food aid as a weapon. Decisions on such assistance are based 
on need and our ability to ensure that food will reach those for whom it is 
intended," Casey said.
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FOCUS: Facts and arguments about humanitarian aid

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3.   ROK REFUTES REPORT ON LACK OF FOOD AID TRANSPARENCY
     Ministry of Unification, Public Relations Policy Support, 2 September 
2005

South Korea supported North Korea with 150,000 tons of rice in 1995. Due to 
continued suffering of North Korean citizens from the famine since then, 
South Korea has continued its humanitarian efforts. South Korea considers 
the fair distribution of food to needy North Korean citizens to be the most 
important goal.

Until now, the North and South Korean have continuously engaged in 
discussions to increase the transparency of food distribution. In order to 
ensure the fair distribution of food, the distribution site has been 
inspected and documented in the North-South Food Loan Agreement. South Korea 
has visited the distribution site and is confirming distribution status.

South Korea has consistently stressed that the equitable distribution of 
food must be confirmed in order for food support to continue. North Korea 
has cooperated and agreed in this regard. This year, the number of 
distribution sites being inspected and the number of inspections have 
increased in comparison to last year. As a result, there is better 
distribution transparency.

2000
Amount of Food: Rice -- 300,000 T, Corn -- 200,000 T
Number of Confirmed Distributions: 1
Location of Confirmed Distributions: Pyongyang

2002
Amount of Food: Rice -- 400,000 T
Number of Confirmed Distributions: 1
Location of Confirmed Distributions: Nampo

2003
Amount of Food: Rice -- 400,000 T
Number of Confirmed Distributions: 12
Location of Confirmed Distributions: Nampo, Chongjin, Hungnam, Wonsan, 
Haeju, Pyongyang

2004
Amount of Food: Rice -- 400,000 T
Number of Confirmed Distributions: 10
Location of Confirmed Distributions: Kaesong, Kosong, Chongjin, Hamheong, 
Hamhong, Songrim

2005 (expected)
Amount of Food: Rice -- 500,000 T
Number of Confirmed Distributions: 20
Location of Confirmed Distributions: Donghae-Ahn, Seohae-Ahn (**both are 
beach names which could indicate area names)

Therefore, Marcus Noland's (the International Economic Institute's Director) 
statement, that "South Korea is unconditionally providing food support 
without distribution transparency" is untrue. In order to provide food to 
assist North Korean civilians, the South Korea will continue to strengthen 
transparency efforts.

With respect to Director Marcus Noland's statement that "South Korea must 
provide food support to North Korea through the WFP," South Korea has been 
providing rice to North Korea directly, and in addition, South Korea has 
also been providing food support to North Korea by participating with the 
WFP since 1996 in order to solve the famine situation in North Korea. Since 
2001, South Korea has provided 100,000 tons of corn to North Korea annually 
through the WFP.

In 2003, South Korean food contribution comprised 20% of the WFP's 512,000 
tons of food; in 2004, the South Korean contribution comprised 27% of the 
WFP's 368,000 tons of food. It appears that stating South Korea should 
provide its food support through the WFP ignores the benefits which direct 
support could have on progress of North-South relations, and the 
humanitarian efforts for North Korean civilians.

The Representative of the Unification Department
*************************************************

4.   NOLAND AND HAGGARD DEFEND FOOD AID REPORT
     by Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, 8 September 2005

[The following is a letter written by the authors of Hunger and Human 
Rights: The Politics of Famine in North Korea, written by Prof. Stephan 
Haggard and Dr. Marcus Noland (see: 
http://www.hrnk.org/hunger/hungerReport05.pdf) to Mr. Han, Ki-Soo, Director, 
Cooperation Fund Division, Inter-Korean Economic & Cooperation Bureau, 
Ministry of Unification, ROK in response to a refutation posted on the 
Ministry of Unification website (see item X above).]

Dear Mr. Han,

Thank you for your interest in our work. Be assured that we share with your 
government the earnest desire for reconciliation on the Korean peninsula and 
improvement in the human rights and material conditions of the North Korean 
people. We also believe sincerely that your government has made important 
contributions in this regard. Clearly, we should keep the central focus on 
the behavior of the North Korean government, not on our more peripheral 
disagreement with the Ministry of Unification about how best to achieve a 
commonly held purpose, namely ameliorating suffering in North Korea.

We are also thankful for the information that you have provided on your 
efforts with respect to your efforts at monitoring your relief program, 
although some of that information confirms, rather than allays, our 
concerns.

Unfortunately, your letter also contains a number of misrepresentations of 
our position. It is not clear to us that you read the full report, reviewed 
the transcript of our press conference, consulted with your embassy's 
official who attended the press conference, or confirmed the alleged 
statements with us before posting your commentary.  For your information, 
the report can be downloaded from the website of the US Committee for Human 
Rights in North Korea http://www.hrnk.org/hunger/hungerReport05.pdf. We 
would also be happy to provide you with a printed copy.

First, we did not say that your government attaches no conditions to the aid 
it provides. We argued, rather, that the conditions for South Korea's 
assistance appear to fall short of the protocols that have been worked out 
over time between the United Nations World Food Program (WFP) and the North 
Korean authorities.

It is our understanding based on a number of interviews with your colleagues 
at the Ministry of Unification (MOU), including those directly involved in 
the relief program, that to date the MOU has conducted no pre-implementation 
assessment of food needs in North Korea, and has issued no statement of the 
intended beneficiaries of its assistance or the plans for guaranteeing that 
such assistance will in fact reach the targeted beneficiaries.

Your letter notes the amount of grain donated, the "frequency of 
confirmation," and the monitoring areas. Both the number of monitoring 
visits by South Korean inspectors and the areas of monitoring fall far short 
of those conducted by the WFP. For example, you refer to 10 site visits in 
2004 and a projected 20 visits for the aid you are to deliver in 2005. 
However, the WFP currently conducts 50 to 70 site visits per month, 
conducted by approximately 40 foreign staff, and these not only include 
public distribution centers but ports, food-for-work sites and the full 
range of institutions receiving assistance. Moreover, the quality of South 
Korean monitoring appears to fall short of WFP standards as well, as it 
involves long pre-notification periods of approximately one month 
potentially enabling North Korean authorities to disguise true conditions at 
sites designated for inspection. It is our understanding from our interviews 
with your colleagues that the South Korea does not audit of the disposition 
of its aid beyond visual confirmation that rice is indeed stored in the 
public distribution center under inspection, much less issue its own ration 
cards on the WFP model.

South Korean assistance also continues to be provided in the form of rice 
that is the preferred staple of the elite rather than less desirable grains 
such as barley or millet that would be less prone to diversion and therefore 
more likely to reach vulnerable portions of the population.

We should point out that we are not alone in noting the greater potential 
for diversion of South Korean aid; a number of South Korean NGOs and 
commentators have made the same points.

As our report makes clear, we are not interested in diversion per se, but 
rather in the effectiveness of the aid program.  One way of evaluating 
effectiveness is through surveys of the nutritional status of the targeted 
populations.  As you know, the United Nations organizations have now 
conducted several of these studies to indirectly assess the efficacy of 
their efforts.  To our knowledge, the MOU has conducted no similar 
evaluation of the impact of its own program.

You note quite rightly that South Korea has been a generous donor to the 
WFP. However, the share of total South Korean assistance provided through 
the WFP has fallen over time as your total humanitarian assistance has gone 
up. We note that you do not provide details on the share of your assistance 
through the WFP.

Food aid may have had other beneficial political effects, such as 
facilitating meetings with North Korea. However, we believe it is a bad 
precedent for the international community to pay North Korea to fulfill its 
international obligations or to engage in dialogue. This strategy invites 
North Korea to withhold its cooperation for the purpose of being rewarded, 
as recent events clearly show. Moreover, these political benefits are offset 
by the potential that food aid is diverted to undeserving groups, including 
the military.

We should also point out that after we conducted interviews with your 
colleagues, we submitted a pre-publication draft of our report to them for 
comment and received no response.

Contrary to at least one erroneous press report, our belief is not that 
humanitarian assistance to North Korea should be cut, but that South Korea 
should bring its expertise on the country to bear by channeling a larger 
share of its assistance through the WFP. If South Korea were to do this, we 
believe that the humanitarian community as a whole would make much greater 
progress in guaranteeing that food aid is reaching its intended 
beneficiaries. We also believe that such a strategy would in no way impede 
your government's efforts to conduct other forms of economic cooperation 
with North Korea.

We also note that your Ministry has apparently published a rebuttal to our 
report on your website without providing us the opportunity to respond. We 
would appreciate it if this letter were also posted. We are taking the 
liberty of publishing your letter on the Committee's website along with this 
response, and will distribute our response to the South Korean press as 
well.

In conclusion, we believe that we share a common goal: that of alleviating 
hunger in North Korea, and a common belief that the international community 
should remain engaged in that effort. But we also believe that we should be 
honest with ourselves about the terms on which that effort proceeds.

Sincerely,
Stephan Haggard
Marcus Noland
*************************************************

5.   EDUCATION, HEALTH AND SOCIAL PROTECTION IN THE DPRK
     by Erich Weingartner, Berlin, 16 June 2005

[The following are excerpts of a paper on Social Development Issues 
presented by CanKor Editor Erich Weingartner at the Stanley Foundation 
conference on the "Future Multilateral Cooperation With the Democratic 
People's Republic of Korea." Co-sponsored by the German Council on Foreign 
Relations (DGAP), the conference was held 15-17 June in Berlin, Germany, 
bringing together representatives of involved governments, think tanks, and 
policymakers to discuss the opportunities and challenges for economic and 
social engagement with the DPRK in the event of a successful conclusion to 
the Six-Party Talks. ]

EDUCATION
Education in the DPRK is free and universal. All children up to the age of 
17 are enrolled in school. The adult literacy rate is 99 percent.

Despite the impressive accomplishments of the past, subject expertise and 
learning methods have not evolved in step with international standards. 
Over-emphasis on political education and enforcement of conformity has led 
to sub-standard academic achievements. The DPRK's isolation and the 
extensive restrictions placed on means of communication (for example the 
Internet) have limited access to modern research and international academic 
networks.

Economic difficulties have resulted in shortages of textbooks and school 
supplies. Educational infrastructure is degrading rapidly. Inadequate 
heating in schools produce illness and absenteeism. Because of the 
excessively political nature of instruction, the international community 
will avoid major investment in this sector.

HEALTH
The DPRK guarantees universal and free health care. There are thousands of 
hospitals and clinics at the provincial, county and ri levels. There is a 
higher ratio of doctors to population than in China and Vietnam. Urban-rural 
disparities in access to health care are minimal.

Due to food shortages, the infant mortality rate has increased. Child deaths 
are caused by diarrhoea and acute respiratory infections (ARI), with 
malnutrition underlying half of these deaths. The 2004 Nutrition Assessment 
shows a steady improvement since 2002, but stunting and wasting remain high.

Tuberculosis increased almost 600% between 1994 and 2001. Malaria has 
re-emerged as a health concern, as has the more recent threat of avian 
influenza.

Severe and widespread shortage of basic equipment, a general degradation in 
the infrastructure, and the deterioration of water and sanitation systems 
have reduced the capacity of the health system to manage disease. Inpatient 
wards, operating theatres, emergency departments and delivery rooms lack 
heating in sub-zero winter temperatures. There is a shortage of even 
stethoscopes. Available equipment is often over thirty years old.

Rehabilitation of domestic pharmaceutical factories has been slow. The 
country is largely dependent on essential drugs provided by the WHO, UNICEF 
and the Red Cross Federation. The WHO supports skills upgrading among 
medical staff.

SOCIAL PROTECTION
Other aspects of the DPR Korean social security system are more difficult to 
document. The constitution, laws and policies guarantee a comprehensive set 
of social services, subsidies and safety nets.

Unfortunately, there is a dark side. Individual liberties are curtailed, and 
extremely harsh punishments are meted out for anti-social behaviour or 
disloyalty to the party or the leader. The economic hardships of recent 
years have led to an increasing number of migrants, refugees and defectors 
crossing into China, Russia and South Korea.

There is one particular human rights aspect that should be of concern in any 
discussion of social protection in the DPRK. Although the Juche socialist 
ideal promises a society of equals in which class oppression is eliminated, 
most evidence shows that social and political inequality is fostered in the 
DPRK. Refugee interviews reveal a society classified according to expected 
levels of loyalty and reliability to the regime. There is little chance of 
mobility. Class labels are inherited by succeeding generations. Since the 
state is the sole allocator of resources, inequalities are justified and 
perpetuated by the state's political and economic imperatives.

The DPRK's 2002 economic adjustments have not benefited all population 
groups equally. Government spending and social investments have not kept 
pace. One can assume that class ranking will have an impact on who benefits 
and who loses in the growing gap in income and standard of living.

Although the government committed itself to continue social services for 30 
categories of recipients, it is doubtful that such a wide range of free 
services is sustainable. Many of them are already dependent on international 
assistance.

THINKING BEYOND THE EMERGENCY
Since regime stability has been identified as a prime motivating force in 
the DPRK, it may be wise to find a positive connection between human 
security and regime security. This is the more urgent in the wake of the 
DPRK's declaration that it is a nuclear power.

Instead of demeaning the Juche idea as morally inferior, it may be 
psychologically expedient to link Juche with self-help strategies 
emphasizing education as a means to help Koreans solve their own problems.

Major emphasis should be placed on providing learning opportunities to 
expose DPR Koreans to the outside world. Education and training for economic 
modernization and integration into the global economy is an acute need, and 
will have direct impact on social development.

A number of agencies have formulated plans to improve the quality of the 
country's system of free and compulsory education. UNICEF provides textbooks 
and basic school supplies, including teaching material on child rights and 
HIV/AIDS, for example.

For the DPRK to exit from its chronic emergency, humanitarian assistance 
needs to be augmented by extensive development cooperation. Much greater 
emphasis needs to be placed on building the capacity for development, which 
will also increase the effectiveness of humanitarian aid.

The DPRK needs to learn that its request for more technical assistance and 
development-oriented support will require an improved quality of interaction 
with the aid community: better transparency, better data and information, 
more policy dialogues, and a participatory approach to working partnerships.

Large-scale donors need to break out of the current political and 
ideological straitjacket that limits their involvement to the humanitarian 
sphere. Political constraints need to be removed and the benefits of 
development cooperation need to be highlighted. Education, health and social 
protection offer a variety of entry points for positive interaction between 
the DPRK and the international community.

Scarce resources, few external partners and the continuing humanitarian 
imperative limit the scope for large-scale interventions. The improvement of 
water and sanitation is a priority need, with pitiful resources. The return 
value in terms of health care alone is vast, with immediate benefit to all 
levels and classes in DPRK society.

Health service improvement has been a collaborative effort on the part of 
the World Health Organization, the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) 
the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) 
and UNICEF. Although miserably under-funded, these agencies have made 
detailed plans, especially in relation to children and women. Included are 
immunization campaigns, training for health personnel and section doctors, 
production of manuals and appropriate supply of equipment. For the sake of 
sustainability, the country's capacity to produce the most essential drugs 
locally should be restored.

Until major donors see a way out of the current political and nuclear 
impasse, chances are that development activities will fail to find 
significant funding. This may be an ideal time for capacity building and 
pilot projects. County-level projects will provide valuable experience for 
planning larger-scale social development schemes once financing becomes 
available.

OPEN QUESTIONS
How can one ensure that the benefits of improvements in education, health 
and welfare reach all segments of society? This may be less of a problem if 
projects tackle large-scale infrastructure of the educational and health 
systems, such as schools, hospitals, water and sanitation, which by their 
nature will benefit all citizens. Is it possible for the DPRK to accept the 
notion that in a market environment, upward mobility replaces ideological 
motivation as the motor of industriousness, efficiency and innovation? What 
educational opportunities can be offered to DPRK policy makers for social 
welfare management in a market environment?

Is it possible to manage economic change in a way that does not erode social 
security? As the socialist origins of the DPRK health and education systems 
confront the realities of the emerging domestic and international markets, 
the social safety net for all levels and classes of society will have to be 
reinforced or realigned to ensure that the affected population has access to 
food and basic social services. Can international financial institutions 
avoid the mistakes of structural adjustment programmes that have devastated 
social protection in so many countries?

How can improvements in social justice be encouraged without being co-opted 
for  "blame and shame" tactics in coercive diplomacy -- as in the case of 
human rights? If multilateralism also means a division of labour, is the USA 
the most appropriate country to lead the way on human rights? After three 
years pushing human rights resolutions at the United Nations Commission of 
Human Rights, how do European sponsors evaluate the effectiveness of this 
procedure? Does an adversarial approach to human rights further the aim of 
persuading DPRK authorities to share information and statistics on social 
welfare indicators? Can the importance of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms be reframed as central elements both of economic development and 
the ultimate fulfilment of Juche ideals?
*************************************************

End CanKor # 219

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CanKor is an electronic information service for readers interested in the 
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