[Cankor] Report #235

[cankor at cankor.ca]

Dear subscriber,

Welcome to issue #235 of the CanKor Report.

May we draw your attention to our QUIDNUNC section at the end of the Report, 
in which readers contribute questions and answers on a wide variety of 
subjects. This week there are two responses to the question: "What is the 
meaning of 'Songun,' used repeatedly in the New Year's Joint Editorial?"

Our techie readers are challenged to answer this question:
How can the DPRK, with no technological infrastructure and limited internet 
connection, possibly produce a team of hackers capable of posing any 
credible threat? (See CanKor #167 and #174)

Please send your answer (maximum 150 words) to: editor at CanKor.ca

The CanKor team.

For articles not original to CanKor, direct links are available in the 
Contents section, should you wish to consult the originals on the internet.

If the links no longer function, you may refer to the full text articles 
appended to the issue.

For back issues, archives and other content, please visit our website: 
http://www.cankor.ca
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CANADA-KOREA ELECTRONIC INFORMATION SERVICE

CanKor # 235

Friday, 3 February 2006
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During his State of the Union Address, US President George W. Bush refrains 
from direct denunciation of the DPRK, nor does he mention accusations of 
counterfeiting, as some RO Korean officials had worried. The ROK National 
Intelligence Service tells South Korean lawmakers in a closed briefing there 
is no evidence Pyongyang is still forging US dollars, contrary to US claims.

The ROK begins to dismantle anti-tank fortifications in the heart of Seoul. 
Several other cities also consider removing their barricades. Residents 
consider the 57 antitank fortifications in the area surrounding Seoul an 
anachronistic eyesore in an age of anti-tank missiles.

The International Crisis Group releases a report examining Beijing's 
influence over Pyongyang, noting that it is far less than outsiders tend to 
believe. China shares the goal of DPRK denuclearization, but attaches even 
greater importance to maintaining stability and ensuring regime survival. 
This issue of CanKor reproduces the report's Executive Summary.

This week's CanKor FOCUS looks at a number of lifestyle campaigns that have 
recently made their appearance in the DPRK. Leader Kim Jong Il calls smokers 
one of the "three main fools of the 21st century", where chain-smoking is 
still the norm among the male half of the population. To help them butt out, 
a DPRK pharmaceutical company has developed a candy that suppresses the urge 
to smoke. Another campaign aimed at DPR Korean men targets long hair and 
sloppy appearance. Yet another campaign takes aim at youth delinquency and 
heavy alcohol consumption.
*************************************************

Contents:
1.   WHAT BUSH SAID ABOUT THE DPRK (AND WHAT HE DIDN'T)
     http://english.chosun.com/w21data/html/news/200602/200602010035.html

2.   DPRK 'NOT FORGING US DOLLARS' SAYS ROK INTELLIGENCE
     http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4672902.stm

3.   HERE COMES THE SUNSHINE, DOWN GO THE BARRICADES
     http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/02/international/asia/02korea.html

4.   CHINA AND NORTH KOREA: COMRADES FOREVER?
     http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3920&l=1

FOCUS: Inside DPRK: Campaigning for better lifestyles

5.   STUB IT OUT, KIM JONG IL TELLS KOREANS
     http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/asia-pacific/3382595.stm

6.   DPR KOREAN FIRM DEVELOPS ANTI-SMOKING CANDY
     http://healthandfitness.sympatico.msn.ca/News/ContentPosting.aspx?contentid=d780828298744827b2d43b4341739558&show=True&number=6&showbyline=False&subtitle=&detect=&abc=abc

7.   DPRK WAGES WAR ON LONG HAIR
     http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4157121.stm

8.   DPRK CRACKS DOWN ON TROUBLED YOUTH
     http://english.donga.com/srv/service.php3?bicode=050000&biid=2005120254528

QUIDNUNC: Readers ask and respond to common and uncommon questions.
THIS WEEK: What is the meaning of "Songun," used repeatedly in the New 
Year's Joint Editorial? (See CanKor #232)
*************************************************

1.   WHAT BUSH SAID ABOUT THE DPRK (AND WHAT HE DIDN'T)
     Chosun Ilbo, 1 February 2006

President George W. Bush's view of North Korea on the evidence of his 
state-of-the-union address remains consistent, and so does the wide gap 
between the US and South Korea in dealing with the North. The two allies 
face an uphill struggle trying to find a shared approach.

Bush listed North Korea among countries without benefit of democracy, saying 
his government was accepting "a call of history to deliver the oppressed and 
move this world toward peace and to seek the end of tyranny in our world" --  
including, presumably, in North Korea. That remark seems precisely what 
President Roh Moo-hyun had in mind when he said on Jan. 25 his government 
disagreed "with some opinions in the US that apparently want to take issue 
with and pressure the North Korean regime, sometimes hoping for its 
collapse." He warned of "friction and disagreement" between Seoul and 
Washington if the US attempts to resolve the problem that way. Bush's speech 
makes it clear that the US will indeed "take issue with and pressure" North 
Korea, and therefore friction and disagreement cannot be far behind.

Government officials, however, seem relieved after Bush's address because it 
went easy on comments directly denouncing the North or holding it 
responsible for counterfeiting, as many of them worried. "The president's 
speech focused on Middle East issues including Iran and Iraq. The North was 
just listed as one of five nations causing worries," a Foreign Ministry 
official said. An official at the six-way talks on Pyongyang's nuclear 
ambitions also said the North was given less attention than Iran.

Bush did dwell less on North Korea than in previous years, especially the 
"axis of evil" speech in 2002. One reason may be that priorities have 
shifted. But a closer look shows that Bush has intensified his criticism of 
the North since last year, when he merely called on it to give up its 
ambition for nuclear weapons but refrained from any negative comments about 
the country. This time, he has made it clear that Pyongyang is an enemy. The 
address also reiterated the importance of the Patriot Act -- the very 
security bill under which Washington slapped financial sanctions on the 
North. In other words, perhaps more clues are to be found in the actions the 
US will take against the North than in the strength of its denunciation.

How Pyongyang will respond to being included among a fresh list of the 
enemies of freedom along with Burma and Iran remains to be seen. In response 
to the "axis of evil" speech, North Korea said Bush had "declared war" on it 
and the US was an "evil empire." Prof. Kim Geun-sik of Kyungnam University 
says even though Bush used no language that could provoke the North 
directly, he made it clear that the foreign policy objectives of ending 
"tyranny" and spreading freedom remain, which in turn makes it likely the 
North will denounce him anyway. "It seems that the prospect of resuming 
six-party in February is becoming increasingly remote," he added.

State of the Union Address available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-19.html
*************************************************

2.   DPRK 'NOT FORGING US DOLLARS' SAYS ROK INTELLIGENCE
     BBC News, 2 February 2006

North Korea is no longer forging US dollars, contrary to US claims, South 
Korea's intelligence agency has said. The agency had no evidence Pyongyang 
has made forged, so-called "supernotes" since 1998, a lawmaker briefed by 
the National Intelligence Service (NIS) said. US sanctions imposed in 
connection with the alleged forgery have stalled talks on the North's 
nuclear ambitions. The US negotiator to the talks warned on Wednesday that 
diplomacy was the preferred, but not the only, option.

The South's national intelligence agency briefed lawmakers in a closed-door 
session on Thursday. A legislator with the ruling Uri Party, Im Jong-in, 
later told reporters that North Koreans had been arrested in 1990 for 
counterfeiting US dollars, but that the last time the NIS was aware of such 
behaviour was in 1998.

Washington's belief that the North was continuing the practice has led to US 
sanctions on a number of firms, infuriating Pyongyang and stalling 
international talks on its nuclear programme. Christopher Hill, the US chief 
negotiator on the North, said Washington could consider other options if the 
stalemate continued.

"We want a diplomatic solution to this problem ... we believe it's the best 
solution, absolutely the best solution (but) it's probably not the only 
solution," he told a forum in Washington. (...)
*************************************************

3.   HERE COMES THE SUNSHINE, DOWN GO KOREAN BARRICADES
     by Norimitsu Onishi, New York Times, 2 February 2006

Workers are dismantling an antitank fortification built decades ago by South 
Korea in Uijongbu to serve as a defensive measure in the event of an attack 
by North Korea. Several other cities are also removing their barricades. The 
concrete slab, transformed into a giant billboard, offers few clues. "Kids 
learn from Dad's good driving and yielding," says an advertisement for Kia 
Motors. Below it a message warns: "Report Spies. Call 080 777 1113."

"Where are the spies?" asked Moon Jung Bin, 12, a seventh grader who was 
munching away at a nearby Dunkin' Donuts with her classmate Lim Ji Su, also 
12. "How do you discover who's a spy?" Ji Su said, as the two, perhaps 
inevitably, started giggling. Neither had ever noticed the exhortation to 
report on infiltrators from North Korea. As for the odd-looking structure 
itself, although Jung Bin believed it was "some construction project," Ji 
Su's parents had told her that it was, in fact, an antitank fortification.

In the event of an invasion, explosives would blow up the fortification and 
send concrete blocks crashing down to form an instant barricade. This would 
slow North Korean tanks that presumably would be barreling down this road to 
Seoul, just 12 miles to the south, the way they did on the second day of the 
Korean War. But in yet another sign of the easing of tensions between the 
Koreas and the changing nature of warfare, South Korean workers began 
dismantling the fortification at Uijongbu (pronounced wee-jong-boo) last 
month and are expected to finish tearing it down before spring. A second one 
is to be demolished by the end of the year, and the last four are expected 
to go in the next few years.

Indeed, several cities with roads leading to Seoul have quietly started 
doing the same in recent months, after getting the South Korean military's 
permission. One by one, these structures that were considered variously over 
the decades, as shields against Communism, protectors of the free world, 
traffic nuisances or environmental eyesores, are disappearing from the 
landscape. A year after South and North Koreans began to work together at 
the Kaesong special economic zone, on the northern side of the demilitarized 
zone not far from here, the fortifications were perhaps bound to appear 
anachronistic.

"Tanks, coming?" Jung Bin said, as her eyes widened and the two seventh 
graders erupted in a fresh round of giggling. "It sounds like a story from 
far away."

With the two Koreas still technically at war, the two fronts remain among 
the world's most heavily militarized, with hundreds of thousands of South 
and North Korean soldiers stationed on either side of the demilitarized 
zone. Checkpoints and military facilities dot the area. Still, in an age of 
missile-led warfare, the antitank fortifications appeared to have lost their 
raison d'être. What is more, after the South began carrying out its 
"sunshine policy" of engaging the North in the late 1990's, tension lessened 
considerably on the peninsula.

The Defense Ministry said that in 1999, cities with the fortifications, 
including Uijongbu, Kuri, Paju, Koyang and Yangju, began asking that they be 
removed. The cities, which had swelled over the years as bedroom communities 
to Seoul, complained that the structures caused traffic jams and were 
eyesores. Some 57 antitank fortifications are believed to have been erected 
in the area surrounding Seoul, most of them in the 1970's and 1980's. Citing 
security, defense officials said they could not reveal how many were being 
dismantled. In a written statement, defense officials said they had approved 
their removal in areas where the military could maintain "overall defense 
capabilities" by strengthening other facilities.

Tension here on South Korea's northern front decreased considerably as both 
sides agreed in 2004 to dismount loudspeakers that had been used for decades 
to blare propaganda across the demilitarized zone, said Park Chang Kwon, a 
researcher at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses. As the South's 
psychological wariness of the North Korean threat has diminished, Mr. Park 
said, phone calls reporting spies have also fallen.

No antitank fortifications were in place in the predawn hours of June 25, 
1950, when fighting broke out along the 38th parallel dividing the 
peninsula. Between 8,000 and 10,000 North Korean troops, supported by 50 
Soviet-made tanks, easily broke through a critical defense line here in 
Uijongbu. By June 28, the North Korean troops had seized Seoul. It was much 
later -- after 31 North Korean guerrillas sneaked across the demilitarized 
zone in 1968 and reached the woods behind the residence and offices of the 
South Korean president before they were caught -- that the fortifications 
went up.

Back then, Uijongbu was a largely agricultural town with fewer than 100,000 
inhabitants, said Lee Ju Sung, the city's assistant manager of development 
projects. Military restrictions forbade buildings taller than five stories.

"An average person couldn't file a complaint against the fortifications back 
then because we were living under a military dictatorship," Mr. Lee said. 
"If you complained, you would have been accused of being pro-Communist. 
Nowadays, the military tries to accommodate people's needs."

Today, about 450,000 live here; two-thirds commute to Seoul. High-rise 
residential buildings are clustered near the train station. Like most young 
people interviewed in the area, Kim Nan Hee, a 19-year-old student waiting 
at a bus stop next to the fortification, said the sooner it was gone, the 
better. "It's ugly," she said. "Besides, we'll be reunifying soon."

But Na Jung Seon, 59, who operates a small real estate office in the shadow 
of the fortification, was less optimistic about the possibility of 
reunification. "I'm a conservative person," he said. "I don't trust the 
North Korean regime. They're our adversaries." Mr. Na did detect one benefit 
from the removal of the fortifications. "The city's image should improve," 
he said, though he was not sure that would raise real estate prices.
*************************************************

4.   CHINA AND NORTH KOREA: COMRADES FOREVER?
     International Crisis Group, 1 February 2006

[The following is the Executive Summary of a new Report by the International 
Crisis Group, which examines Beijing's influence over Pyongyang. The full 
document can be viewed in PDF and Word formats at: 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/north_korea/112_china_and_north_korea_comrades_forever.pdf - 
- CanKor.]

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
China's influence on North Korea is more than it is willing to admit but far 
less than outsiders tend to believe. Although it shares the international 
community's denuclearization goal, it has its own concept of how to achieve 
it. It will not tolerate erratic and dangerous behaviour if it poses a risk 
of conflict but neither will it endorse or implement policies that it 
believes will create instability or threaten its influence in both Pyongyang 
and Seoul. The advantages afforded by China's close relationship with the 
North can only be harnessed if better assessments of its priorities and 
limitations are integrated into international strategies. Waiting for China 
to compel North Korean compliance will only give Pyongyang more time to 
develop its nuclear arsenal.

China's priorities with regard to North Korea are:
     * avoiding the economic costs of an explosion on the Korean Peninsula;
     * preventing the US from dominating a unified Korea;
     * securing the stability of its three economically weak northeastern 
provinces by incorporating North Korea into their development plans;
     * reducing the financial burden of the bilateral relationship by 
replacing aid with trade and investment;
     * winning credit at home, in the region and in the US for being engaged 
in achieving denuclearization;
     * sustaining the two-Korea status quo so long as it can maintain 
influence in both and use the North as leverage with Washington on the 
Taiwan issue; and
     * avoiding a situation where a nuclear North Korea leads Japan and/or 
Taiwan to become nuclear powers.

China's roughly two-billion-dollar annual bilateral trade and investment 
with North Korea is still the most visible form of leverage for ending 
deadlock and expediting the nuclear negotiations. However, there is 
virtually no circumstance under which China would use it to force North 
Korea's compliance on the nuclear issue. Even though the crackdown on North 
Korea's banking activities in Macao in September 2005 demonstrated that 
China is not completely immune to outside pressures to rein in bad 
behaviour, Beijing is unlikely to shut down the North's remaining banking 
activities in the country.

China opposes sanctions on North Korea because it believes they would lead 
to instability, would not dislodge the regime but would damage the nascent 
process of market reforms and harm the most vulnerable. It also has reasons 
related to its own quest for reunification with Taiwan - not to mention 
human rights issues in Xinjiang and Tibet, and its own economic interests in 
Sudan and elsewhere - for opposing aid conditionality and infringements on 
sovereignty and being generally reluctant to embrace sanctions.

The bilateral relationship affords China little non-coercive influence over 
Pyongyang. Viewing it as one sustained by history and ideology ignores 
powerful dynamics of strategic mistrust, fractured leadership ties and 
ideological differences. Pyongyang knows Beijing might not come to its 
defence again in war and fears that it would trade it off if it felt its 
national interest could benefit.

One factor shaping China's preference for the status quo in North Korea is 
the presence of two million ethnic Koreans in the country including an 
estimated 10,000 to 100,000 refugees and migrants at any one time. Although 
refugee flows are perceived to present one of the greatest threats to China 
in case of political or economic collapse in the North, most Chinese 
analysts and officials are unconcerned about the short-term threat posed by 
border crossers. Meanwhile, genuine political refugees are now quietly 
leaving China and being resettled in South Korea without Chinese 
opposition - sometimes even with its assistance - so long as they depart 
without causing embarrassment.

Chinese President Hu Jintao's visit to Pyongyang in October 2005 and Kim 
Jong Il's return visit in January 2006 underscored deepening economic 
relations. China is undertaking a range of infrastructure projects in and 
around North Korea and now accounts for 40 per cent of its foreign trade. 
Since 2003, over 150 Chinese firms have begun operating in or trading with 
North Korea. As much as 80 per cent of the consumer goods found in the 
country's markets are made in China, which will keep trying gradually to 
normalize the economy, with the long-term goal of a reformed, China-friendly 
North Korea.

Although it cannot deliver a rapid end to Pyongyang's weapons program, China 
must still be an integral component of any strategy with a chance of 
reducing the threat of a nuclear North Korea. No other country has the 
interest and political position in North Korea to facilitate and mediate 
negotiations. It is also the key to preventing transfers of the North's 
nuclear materials and other illicit goods, although its ability to do this 
is limited by logistical and intelligence weaknesses, and unwillingness to 
curb border trade. Over the long-term, Chinese economic interaction with the 
North may be the best hope for sparking deeper systemic reform and 
liberalization there.
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FOCUS: Inside DPRK: Campaigning for better lifestyles

*************************************************

5.   STUB IT OUT, KIM JONG IL TELLS KOREANS
     BBC, 9 January 2006

North Korea has launched a nationwide anti-smoking campaign after its leader 
Kim Jong-il reportedly quit the habit and called on his people to follow 
suit. Reports in the South Korean media said Kim recently singled out 
smokers as one of the "three main fools of the 21st century", along with 
those who are ignorant about computers and music. North Korean television 
has carried slogans and programmes telling people how harmful cigarette 
smoking can be to their health.

"Let's quit smoking and contribute in good health to the building of a 
powerful nation," Choe Ong-ju, the North's chief public hygiene inspector, 
urged viewers.

South Korean TV quoted experts on the North as saying that although there 
are no accurate statistics, an estimated 40 per cent of the North's 22 
million people smoke cigarettes, one of the highest rates in the world. 
Unconfirmed reports have circulated in the Japanese press that Kim suffered 
a prolonged bout of ill health in late 2003. The North Korean media gave no 
coverage to his activities for several weeks between October and December.
*************************************************

6.   DPR KOREAN FIRM DEVELOPS ANTI-SMOKING CANDY
     Associated Press, 20 December 2005

A North Korean drug firm claims to have developed a candy that suppresses 
the desire to smoke cigarettes and heals smoking-related diseases. The 
white, round candy removes nicotine from the body, "lifts the love of 
cigarettes without adverse effects, improves the immunity and heals the 
diseases caused by cigarettes," Korea Pugang Pharmaceutic Co., Ltd. said on 
its English-language website. The firm said the candy is made from "rare 
medicinal herbs" collected from the mountains of northern North Korea in 
accordance with a therapy pioneered by an ancient Korean herb doctor.

For years, North Korea has been staging an anti-smoking campaign, with 
leader Kim Jong Il calling smokers one of the "three main fools of the 21st 
century," along with people ignorant of music and computers. Experts in 
South Korea estimate more than 40 per cent of North Korea's 22 million 
people light up regularly, compared with about 33 per cent in the South. 
Considering it is rare for North Korean women to smoke, the smoking rate 
among male adults is believed to be much higher.

According to the website, the company won a patent for the anti-smoking 
candy in February this year. The order form available at the website is 
written in both English and Korean but doesn't give a price. The 
Pyongyang-based company asks those who want to buy the product to contact 
its headquarters and its branch offices around the world, from China and 
Japan to Indonesia, Vietnam, Cuba and Zimbabwe.
*************************************************

7.   DPRK WAGES WAR ON LONG HAIR
     BBC, 8 January, 2005

North Korea has launched an intensive media assault on its latest 
archenemy -- the wrong haircut. A campaign exhorting men to get a proper 
short back-and-sides has been aired by state-run Pyongyang television. The 
series is entitled "Let us trim our hair in accordance with Socialist 
lifestyle."

While the campaign has been carried out primarily on television, reports 
have appeared in North Korean press and radio, urging tidy hairstyles and 
proper attire. It is the strongest media campaign against men's sloppy 
appearances mounted in the reclusive and impoverished Communist state in 
recent years. The propaganda drive on grooming standards has gone a stage 
further than previous attempts. This time television identifies specific 
individuals deemed too shoddy.

Pyongyang television started the campaign last autumn with a five-part 
series in its regular TV Common Sense programme. Stressing hygiene and 
health, it showed various state-approved short hairstyles including the 
"flat-top crew cut," "middle hairstyle," "low hairstyle," and "high 
hairstyle" -- variations from one to five centimetres in length. The 
programme allowed men aged over 50 seven centimetres of upper hair to cover 
balding. It stressed the "negative effects" of long hair on "human 
intelligence development", noting that long hair "consumes a great deal of 
nutrition" and could thus rob the brain of energy. Men should get a haircut 
every 15 days, it recommended.

A second, and unprecedented, TV series this winter showed hidden-camera 
style video of "long-haired" men in various locations throughout Pyongyang. 
In a break with North Korean TV's usual approach, the programme gave their 
names and addresses, and challenged the fashion victims directly over their 
appearance. The North Korean media normally reserves the reporting of names 
of its citizens to exemplary individuals who show high communist virtues. 
The series was shot at various public locations -- on the street, at a 
sports stadium, a barbershop, a bus stop, a restaurant, a department store. 
Some unruly-haired pedestrians or customers captured on camera "meanly ran 
away", the programme said, while others made excuses about being too busy to 
get a trim.

Television newsreels such as "Employees of Pyongyang Textile Plant keep 
their hairstyle and dressing neat and tidy" and "Hairdressers at 
Ch'anggwangwo'n manage men's hair according to the demands of the 
military-first era" have also aired.  State radio programmes such as 
"Dressing in accordance with our people's emotion and taste" link clothes 
and appearance with the wearer's "ideological and mental state".

Tidy attire "is important in repelling the enemies' manoeuvres to infiltrate 
corrupt capitalist ideas and lifestyle and establishing the socialist 
lifestyle of the military-first era," the radio says. Newspapers too 
highlight the civic advantages of short hair and smart shoes. Hair is a 
"very important issue that shows the people's cultural standards and mental 
and moral state", argues Minju Choson, a government daily.

"No matter how good the clothes, if one does not wear tidy shoes, one's 
personality will be downgraded." For party papers such as Nodong Sinmun, the 
struggle against foreign and anti-communist influence is being fought out in 
the arena of personal appearance. "People who wear other's style of dress 
and live in other's style will become fools and that nation will come to 
ruin," it says.
*************************************************

8.   DPRK CRACKS DOWN ON TROUBLED YOUTH
     by Myoung-Gun Lee, Dong Ilbo, 2 December 2005

It has been confirmed that North Korean authorities have launched a campaign 
against young North Koreans who steal crops from farms and who frequently 
engage in drinking. Dong-A Ilbo obtained a document from a "youth 
institution," a state organization of North Korea, which criticized that 
"there are still young people who are immature to the extent where they 
steal the precious crops of farmers." The document was released last 
September.

The North Korean authorities stressed "theft of the crops is tantamount to 
dishonoring the glorious achievements of our beloved leader (Kim Jong Il) 
who enabled an unprecedented harvest."

Furthermore, lecture material from the Commission for North Hamkyung 
Province, which was launched last August, urged strengthening of security 
regarding crops. The material presented cases including one farmer who stole 
an astounding 200kg of crops from neighboring farms.

Meanwhile, the youth institution also said that "The culture of young people 
drinking and losing control still remains," and quoted Kim Jong Il as 
saying, "When the culture of drinking is prevalent, it is hard to establish 
a revolutionary culture, and society become susceptible to non-socialist 
ideologies."
*************************************************

QUIDNUNC

In this section of CanKor, we invite readers to send questions, answers, or 
responses. Answers should be under 150 words and may be edited for space.

*************************************************
WHAT IS THE MEANING OF "SONGUN," USED REPEATEDLY IN THE NEW YEAR'S JOINT 
EDITORIAL?
*************************************************

In response, I provide you with an excerpt from Dae-Sook Suh, 
"Military-First Politics of Kim Jong Il," Asian Perspective, vol. 26, No. 3 
(2002), pp. 148-50:
"Military-first" politics is a literal translation of a Korean term, son'gun 
chongch'i. It means to give priority to the military in politics, but it is 
not a commonly used phrase in the Korean language... It is a newly coined 
North Korean political phrase that went into wide circulation only after Kim 
Jong Il took power in North Korea. Kim Il Sung did not use the term, nor did 
the South Koreans use the term except to refer to the politics of Kim Jong 
Il... More importantly, the term "military-first" politics does not imply a 
single policy for a particular purpose. Rather, it is a phrase to express a 
new North Korean politics, including a new political structure, new 
political leaders, and a new emphasis on the military throughout the 
society... Kim [Jong Il] said that a standard method of socialist 
revolutions in the past was to give priority to the development of the 
"party-first and military-second" (sondang hugun). But in North Korean 
socialist politics based on the juche (self-reliance) idea, he has chosen 
the opposite path, "military-first and party-second" (son'gun hudang)...

Dean J. Ouellette, Assistant Editor, Asian Perspective, Institute for Far 
Eastern Studies, Seoul, ROK.
*************************************************

The term "Seon'gun cheongchi" [military-first politics] first appeared in 
Rodong Sinmun editorials in June-August 1998, preceding the launch of a 
Taepodong missile across Japan and Kim Jong Il's official succession to 
power later the same year. The function of military-first politics was to 
cope with the ongoing crisis posed by the collapse of the international 
communist system and the breakdown of the domestic economy. Loosening 
discipline among the old Party cadres (defection of Hwang Jang Yop) and 
dissent inside the State Security Agency (conflict with General Kim Yong 
Ryong) forced Kim Jong Il to look for alternatives to both the Juche 
ideology and the traditional alliance of Party and State Security Office. 
Seon'gun has enabled Kim Jong Il to consolidate his power by replacing the 
old cadres in the Party and the government with a younger generation of 
military leaders capable of pursuing the goals of economic reform and social 
modernization.

Leonid A. Petrov, PhD, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, The 
Australian National University, Canberra, ACT, Australia.
*************************************************

What Now?

HOW CAN THE DPRK, WITH NO TECHNOLOGICAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND LIMITED INTERNET 
CONNECTION, POSSIBLY PRODUCE A TEAM OF HACKERS CAPABLE OF POSING ANY 
CREDIBLE THREAT? (see CanKor #167 and #174)?

[Answers should be e-mailed to: editor at CanKor.ca]
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End CanKor # 235

*************************************************
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*************************************************