[Cankor] Report #233

[cankor at cankor.ca]

Dear subscriber,

Welcome to issue #233 of the CanKor Report.

May we draw your attention to our QUIDNUNC section at the end of the Report, in which readers contribute questions and answers on a wide variety of subjects. This week you will find two answers to the question: What is the meaning of "democratic" in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea?

We solicit answers to the next question: How accurate is it to call North Korea "Stalinist"?

Please send your answer (maximum 150 words) to: editor at CanKor.ca

The CanKor team.

For articles not original to CanKor, direct links are available in the Contents section, should you wish to consult the originals on the internet.

If the links no longer function, you may refer to the full text articles appended to the issue.

For back issues, archives and other content, please visit our website:
http://www.cankor.ca
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CANADA-KOREA ELECTRONIC INFORMATION SERVICE

CanKor # 233

Friday, 20 January 2006
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Kim Jong Il's secretive visit to China is exposed to Chinese television viewers when he meets Chinese President Hu Jintao before returning to Pyongyang. Before the Chinese press, Kim states how deeply impressed he is by China's achievements in economic modernization and development, which "fully proves that China's reform and opening-up policy is correct." Hu promises China's support as the DPRK explores its own development path "conforming with the country's own conditions." After an apparently unscheduled return trip to Beijing at the tail end of a visit to the region, American chief negotiator to the Six Party Talks Christopher Hill declines to confirm whether he met DPRK chief negotiator Kim Kye Gwan, who was thought to be travelling with Kim Jong Il.

China overtakes the USA as South Korea's largest trading partner, while the ROK takes the place of Taiwan as the second largest exporter to China. ROK exports to China rise 24 percent in 2005 to US$77 billion, while imports of Chinese goods rise 26 percent to $35 billion.

This week's CanKor FOCUS presents excerpts from a November 2005 publication of the US Commission on International Religious Freedom, entitled "Thank You Father Kim Il Sung: Eyewitness Accounts of Severe Violations of Freedom of Thought, Conscience, and Religion in North Korea." Although much of the publicity surrounding this document centred on sensational refugee- defector accounts of brutal religious persecution, the study also offers a sober and insightful analysis of the history of religion in Korea, attempting to distinguish between known facts and biased conjecture regarding the current religious experience. Based on extensive research and a wealth of first-person interviews, lead author David Hawk has assembled an authoritative summary of information about the status of contemporary religious practice. The first excerpt on existing religious life in the DPRK is taken from the summary "Findings" at the beginning of the document, while the second excerpt on Christianity is taken from Chapter 8, on contemporary state policy and practice. 
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Contents:

1.   TOP LEADERS OF CHINA AND DPRK HOLD TALKS IN BEIJING
     http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2006-01/18/content_513432.htm

2.   KOREA BECOMES SECOND LARGEST EXPORTER TO CHINA
     http://english.chosun.com/w21data/html/news/200601/200601170004.html

FOCUS: Contemporary religious practice in the DPRK

3.   EXISTING RELIGIOUS LIFE IN NORTH KOREA
     http://www.uscirf.gov/countries/region/east_asia/northkorea/NKwitnesses.pdf

4.   CHRISTIANITY IN THE DPRK: CURRENT POLICY AND PRACTICE
     http://www.uscirf.gov/countries/region/east_asia/northkorea/NKwitnesses.pdf

QUIDNUNC: Readers ask and respond to common and uncommon questions.
THIS WEEK: What is the meaning of "democratic" in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea?
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1.   TOP LEADERS OF CHINA AND DPRK HOLD TALKS IN BEIJING
     China Daily (Xinhua), 18 January 2006

Hu Jintao, general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and Chinese President, held talks in Beijing with Kim Jong Il, general secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) and chairman of the National Defence Commission of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). During their talks, Hu and Kim exchanged views amid a warm and candid atmosphere on furthering relations between the two parties and the two countries, and on international and regional issues of common concern. Important and wide-ranging consensus has been reached.

Kim paid an unofficial visit to China from 10 to 18 January as Hu's guest. During his stay in China, Kim visited central China's Hubei Province, south China's Guangdong Province and China's capital Beijing. Hu hosted a welcoming banquet in honour of Kim in Beijing and accompanied Kim in a visit to a crop research institute under the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences. 

Wu Bangguo, member of the Political Bureau Standing Committee of the CPC Central Committee and chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, China's top legislature, and Wen Jiabao, member of the Political Bureau Standing Committee of the CPC Central Committee and Chinese premier, met with Kim respectively. Members of the Political Bureau Standing Committee of the CPC Central Committee Jia Qinglin, Zeng Qinghong, Huang Ju, Wu Guanzheng, Li Changchun and Luo Gan accompanied Kim in his visiting tours or took part in related activities. 

Hu, on behalf of the CPC, and the Chinese government and people, extended a warm welcome to Kim. To maintain close contacts between top leaders of the two sides is a major characteristic of China-DPRK good neighborly friendship, Hu said, adding that since Kim became the WPK's general secretary, leaders of the two sides have had exchanges of visits with fruitful results each time. 

Under the current circumstances when international and regional situations are undergoing profound and complicated changes, said Hu, to further advance the relations between the two parties and the two countries is in line with the common interests of the two countries and conducive to the peace, stability and development in Northeast Asia. He said in recent years, with concerted efforts from both sides, the relations between the two parties and the two countries have made new progress, and the two countries have scored new achievements in economic and trade cooperation of mutual benefit and maintained close consultation and cooperation in international and regional issues. 

Sino-DPRK traditional friendship is the common treasure of the two parties, countries and peoples, said Hu. It is an unswerving strategic guideline of the CPC and the Chinese government to consolidate and develop bilateral good neighbourly friendship and cooperation. Hu said the Chinese side will make joint efforts with the DPRK to continuously inject new vigour and vitality into bilateral traditional friendship and push forward the growth of bilateral good neighbourly friendship and cooperation so as to bring more benefits to the two countries and their peoples and contribute more to the peace, stability and prosperity in Northeast Asia and the world at large. 

Kim expressed his thanks for Hu's invitation and hospitality and his pleasure at meeting with Hu again after their meeting in Pyongyang in October last year. Kim said the DPRK-China relationship has been cultivated by leaders of old generations of the two countries and carried forward under the new circumstances. The friendship has not only pushed forward the socialist construction of the two countries, but also promoted peace and stability in the Korean Peninsula, Northeast Asia and the world at large. He said the WPK and the DPRK government will, as always, further explore bilateral cooperative potentials in various fields, especially in the economic field, conduct cooperation in the principles of meeting each other's needs, reciprocity and win-win, and make every effort for the better development of bilateral friendship. 

Hu spoke positively of the DPRK's domestic construction and said the CPC and the Chinese government and people sincerely hope for political stability, economic prosperity and people's happiness in the DPRK, and are delighted to see the DPRK's achievements in building a strong and prosperous country. Hu said the Chinese side will, as always, support the WPK's, and the DPRK government and people's active exploration of a development path conforming with the country's own conditions. He said he is convinced that the DPRK side will, under Kim's leadership, make new achievements in building a strong and prosperous country with unity and arduous work. 

Kim said that under the leadership of the CPC, China has made great achievements in socialist modernization construction with Chinese characteristics and in the reform and opening-up drive. He attributed China's remarkable development to the important thought of Three Represents, concept of scientific development, and building a socialist harmonious society. These guidelines and policies put forward by the CPC conform with China's own conditions. 

Kim said that during his visit in China, he witnessed the outstanding achievements in various fields in South China, especially the special economic zones. China's new look and vigorous development gave him a deep impression and fully proves that China's reform and opening-up policy is correct. He said the WPK and the DPRK government and people feel delighted with China's development and congratulate China on the progress. He said the DPRK firmly believes that the hard-working Chinese people will, under the CPC's leadership with Hu as the general secretary, make new and greater achievements in fulfilling the goal mapped out in the 11th Five-Year Program, the building of a socialist well-off society with harmonious development, and the great cause of realizing the reunification of the motherland. 

The two sides also briefed each other on the two countries' economic and social development. Senior Chinese officials Liu Qi, Wu Yi, Zhang Dejiang, Yu Zhengsheng, Guo Boxiong, Zeng Peiyan, Wang Gang and Tang Jiaxuan accompanied Kim in the visit or attended related activities. Kim's entourage included the DPRK Premier Pak Bong Ju, and senior officials with the DPRK's foreign ministry, the financial planning department and the science and education department of the WPK Central Committee and the DPRK cabinet.
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2.   KOREA BECOMES SECOND LARGEST EXPORTER TO CHINA 
     Arirang News, English Chosun Ilbo, 17 January 2006.

It has been just a few years since China overtook the US as Korea's largest trading partner. And last year Korea emerged as the second largest exporter to China, overtaking Taiwan with exports rising 24 percent from 2004 to US$77 billion. Over the same period Korea's imports of Chinese goods rose 26 percent to $35 billion. 

The findings by the Korea International Trade Association offer the latest snapshot of the global volume of economic exchanges with the burgeoning Asian economy. Japan is currently the largest exporter to China. China ranked third in the world in the total amount of traded goods last year following the USA and Germany. Korea forecasts continued growth in China-bound exports in the coming years. 

However, one concern raised by Korean economists is that a large portion of the country's exports to China are purchased by Korean-run joint ventures there. That fact is prompting calls for revised exports strategies to ensure more Korean products are sold to Chinese consumers. 
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FOCUS: Contemporary religious practice in the DPRK

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5.   EXISTING RELIGIOUS LIFE IN NORTH KOREA
     by David Hawk, November, 2005.

[The following section on religious life in the DPRK is excerpted from the summary "Findings" at the beginning of a US Commission on International Religious Freedom publication entitled, "Thank You Father Kim Il Sung: Eyewitness Accounts of Severe Violations of Freedom of Thought, Conscience, and Religion in North Korea." The original may be consulted in PDF format at http://www.uscirf.gov/countries/region/east_asia/northkorea/NKwitnesses.pdf -- CanKor.]

--> By the 1960s, the King Il Sung regime had suppressed and eliminated virtually all public observance of religion, substituting Juche/Kimilsungism in its place. However, due to a changed international environment in the 1970s, the regime decided to allow the re-emergence of a highly circumscribed and controlled public religious practice. It is this revival of highly circumscribed and tightly monitored and controlled religious practice, organized and supervised through a series of religious "federations" for Buddhism, Chondokyo, and Protestant, Catholic and, most recently, Orthodox Christianity, that is cited by DPRK authorities to indicate that North Korea respects religious freedom. 

--> Religious believers inside North Korea today generally fit into one of three general categories: 1) People who participate in the officially sanctioned religious federations and who are described as "old society, pre-WWII" religious adherents and their children; 2) pre-WWII religious adherents who, along with their children, worship clandestinely outside of the officially sanctioned system; and 3) religious adherents who maintain religious beliefs in secret, but who acquired these beliefs from exposure to co-religionists in China, either by crossing the border themselves or through correspondence with others who cross the border and return. Persons in category three are not tolerated. 

--> Information gathered for this study reveals that the two Protestant churches and one Catholic church in Pyongyang, while under tight control of the government, are able to conduct some genuine religious activities. Worshipers at these churches as of 2005 are mostly old society, pre-WWII Christians and their children who are taking advantage of the opportunity to profess their faith openly and worship in the presence of other believers. These churches have, at least since 1995, held activities regularly, although these activities are under consistent government monitoring. Membership in, and attendance at, the churches in Pyongyang are controlled by the Korean Workers Party, and there is reportedly a lengthy waiting list. 

--> South Koreans and others interviewed for this study reported on their visits to eight officially sanctioned "house churches" in North Korea, including five in Pyongyang, one in Kaesong, one in Sungchon, and one in South Hwanghae Province. Attendees at these gatherings were consistently identified as old-generation Christians and their children who gather to pray, read scriptures, and sing hymns, often from memory. The number of officially sanctioned house churches in North Korea could not be verified in the course of this study. 

--> There are no Roman Catholic priests in North Korea, and the one Catholic church in the country has no direct relationship with the Vatican. 

--> Leaders of the Chondokyo religion in South Korea state that while it is possible to study the religion at Kim Il Sung University, there is no freedom to propagate Chondokyo beliefs in North Korea. The number of Chondokyo adherents and "preaching rooms" could not be confirmed from the information gathered for this study. 

--> Many of the interviewees knew of the existence of some of the more famous mountain-top Buddhist temples in North Korea, but surmised that these temples were maintained as "cultural heritage sites." None had seen a temple open for public religious activities or that housed Buddhist monks. The extent to which worship, study, and meditation is carried out at Buddhist temples could not be ascertained during the course of this study. 

--> Despite the assertions of the North Korean government that the state and religion are separate, it is clear that the religious activities that take place in the DPRK under the auspices of government-sponsored religious federations could more accurately be described as emanations of the North Korean party-state. The religious activity that is allowed takes place under the authority and control of the corresponding religious federation. The religious federations are members of, and controlled by, the National United Front for the Unification of the Fatherland, which is in turn controlled by the Korean Workers Party, the ruling arm of the regime. Under the federation structure, there is no apparent mechanism, procedure, or structure for allowing belief systems and forms of worship that are not covered by an appropriate federation. 

--> Interaction between North Korea federation churches and churches in South Korea is used as a medium of Korean reconciliation. Religious interaction between North Koreans and religious adherents outside North Korea that takes place outside of the supervision of the religious federations is not permitted. 
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4.   CHRISTIANITY IN THE DPRK: CURRENT POLICY AND PRACTICE 
     by David Hawk, November, 2005

[The following section is excerpted from Chapter 8 of a US Commission on International Religious Freedom publication entitled, "Thank You Father Kim Il Sung: Eyewitness Accounts of Severe Violations of Freedom of Thought, Conscience, and Religion in North Korea." The complete original document may be consulted in PDF format at: http://www.uscirf.gov/countries/region/east_asia/northkorea/NKwitnesses.pdf Footnotes have been omitted to save space. -- CanKor.]

In examining current policy and practice toward freedom of religion or belief in the DPRK today with respect to Christianity, it is important to keep in mind that there are three quite distinct categories of Christian believers in North Korea. The first are those persons who are members of the Party/state-sponsored Korean religious federations or worshipers at the recognized churches and home worship centers, who are described as old society, pre-WWII Christians and their children. The second category contains those individuals who were also pre-WWII Christian believers and who, together with their children, have personally maintained their faith while not practicing their beliefs openly, and who may not even know about the small, state-sponsored church structure. Some may know about the latter, but may have chosen not to reveal themselves or affiliate with the state-organized structures. The third category involves "new" converts who have had contact with the Korean-Chinese churches in Northeast China or the organized efforts of South Korean and Korean-American Protestant groups along the China-Korea border. 

Persons in the third category, North Koreans who acquired religious beliefs while in China, largely since 1995, are not tolerated. Two former members of the North Korean political police (Gukgabowibu) who defected to South Korea and who were interviewed in Seoul for this report, stated that their work included hunting down such Christians. Identifying North Koreans who have been in touch with such mission enterprises is reportedly the aim of the brutally coercive interrogations of North Koreans who have been forcibly repatriated from China to North Korea. 

The fact that there is such a category as the second one described above -- pre-WWII believers and their children who privately and quietly maintain their beliefs while hiding to the best of their ability their religious identity -- is an indication that the North Korean constitutional provision for "freedom of religious beliefs" is apparently not known of or believed, or else is belied by the actions of local authorities. (Several persons from this category were interviewed for this report.) Information about the situation for the first category of persons and the recognized religions in North Korea today remains very limited. North Korea does not provide such information and foreigners, including South Koreans, have access to only very small official or authorized segments. Moreover, as is seen in the interviews with North Korean refugees conducted for this report, many North Koreans have had little or no contact with authorized religious activities, and know next to nothing about it. 

HOUSE CHURCHES/HOME WORSHIP CENTERS 

Beginning in 1974, the DPRK allowed some Christian believers to meet in home worship centers, although not without the presence of Workers Party members or police during the worship services. The earliest statistics obtainable on this matter date from 1981, when an official of the Korean Christian Federation (KCF), Pastor Ki-Joon Koh, told a group of Korean-Americans and South Koreans residing in Europe that there were about 500 house churches and 5,000 practicing Christians in North Korea. In 1988, KCF representatives informed a visiting delegation of Canadian church officials that "about 6,000 of an estimated 10,000 Protestants were members of the KCF." The membership sections of the KCF were described as "house churches," 50 of which were located in Pyongyang. The KCF was described as having sections in all the provinces and 50 cities and counties. In 2002, the DPRK informed the UN Human Rights Committee that there were 500 house churches or family worship sites and 12,000 Christian believers. In December 2002, the KCF claimed that there were 12,300 registered Christians and 513 family service locations. It is possible that the differences in numbers over a 20 year period reflect imprecision in translation between the estimated number of believers and the "membership" of the KCF, rather than increasing numbers of Christian believers, as the KCF states that they do not "evangelize." It appears that the proclaimed number of house churches has remained rather constant during the 25 year period for which statistics have been available. 

South Koreans and others interviewed for this report have visited eight house churches: five in Pyongyang and one each in Kaesong, Sungchon, and South Hwanghae provinces. The worshipers are consistently identified as "old Christians," persons who were Christians prior to the liberation from Japan following WWII and their children, who gather to pray, read scripture, and sing hymns, often from memory or from written pages without musical notes. 

Although the number of former North Koreans interviewed for this report is not large enough to be definitive, none of them had had any contact with or had even heard of the "house churches" or the national, provincial, or local structure of the KCF. Information about the way in which home worship centers were reestablished after the mid-1970s is not available. One Korean-speaking expert, who travels to North Korea regularly, expressed doubt about the claim that there were 500 such home worship centers in North Korea. 

THE FOUR CHURCHES IN NORTH KOREA 

Between the late 1950s and late 1980s, there were no open and functioning Protestant or Catholic church buildings in North Korea. In November 1988, Bongsu (also transliterated as Bongsoo) church, named after the neighborhood in which it is located on a hill in the outskirts of Pyongyang, was inaugurated. Reportedly, some 250 to 350 persons worship there. 

Also in 1988, the Changchung Catholic church opened. The DPRK informed the UN that there are currently 800 Catholics but no priests in North Korea. Changchung has no direct relationship with the Vatican, which does not consider Catholics in North Korea to be a church, but rather a "community of believers" under the jurisdiction of the Catholic Archdiocese of Seoul. This jurisdictional designation by the Vatican would not be acceptable to the DPRK government. 

Various reasons have been suggested to explain the opening of these two churches when none had been allowed to operate before. One Korean-American church official interviewed for this report attributed this, first, to requests by foreign visitors to attend services, and second, to the influence of Chinese policy where, in 1977-78, church buildings that had been confiscated during the Cultural Revolution were returned to the officially recognized church bodies. North Koreans had visited China often enough to be aware of this evolution of Chinese policy in the post-Mao era. Another former North Korean interviewed for this report, a high-level defector, attributed the policy change to North Korean hopes of hosting an International Youth Festival in 1988, in competition with Seoul's hosting of the 1988 Olympic games, during which many foreigners would come to Pyongyang and the total absence of any church or Buddhist temple would be obvious. 

A second and smaller Protestant church, called Chilgol, was opened in 1992 in the middle of a large apartment complex in Pyongyang. This church was constructed, on Kim Il Sung's orders, on the site of the church where his mother had worshiped. There are roughly 90 Christians who worship there in a setting that is, reportedly, rather less formal than that at Bongsu. The reasons for opening a second Protestant church in Pyongyang, as opposed to one of the other cities in North Korea, other than filial loyalty on the part of Kim Il Sung, is not presently known. 

As of mid-2005, an Orthodox Christian church is nearing completion. Religious adherents interviewed for this report surmise that Kim Jong Il saw a Russian Orthodox church in Khabarovsk on one of his train trips through Russia, and thought that if Pyongyang had such a church it would assist in promoting relations with Russia. The construction of this church is being supported by the Greek Orthodox Church of South Korea. Oddly, however, as noted by a Russian Korea scholar, "...nothing has been heard about North Korean Orthodox believers for six decades (and even in 1945 they hardly numbered more than [a] few hundred)." Nonetheless, the Korean Orthodox Federation (also translated as the "Orthodox Committee of the DPRK") has contacted Russian Orthodox authorities in Moscow, and several North Koreans are either now studying Orthodoxy there or soon will be. 

While pointing to numerous difficulties, problems, and anomalies in Pyongyang's churches, several persons interviewed for this report also commented on a striking feature of considerable symbolic importance: these churches are said to be the only buildings in all of North Korea where the place of prominence on the central wall of the main room is not dominated by a photograph of Kim Il Sung in an altar-type setting. Instead, the main room is dominated by a cross. 

RELIGIOUS PRACTICE AT THE EXISTING CHURCHES 

Exactly who among North Koreans attends services in Pyongyang churches has been called into question. For example, one non-governmental organization in South Korea has asserted that "the people at Bongsu and Chilgol [churches] are non-believers, Communist Party members who are directly put in [to attend the services]." It is also reported that "local citizens are strictly barred from entry [in the churches] and that services are only convened when foreigners come for visits." Information obtained for this report does not sustain these assertions. It does appear that membership in, and attendance at, Bongsu and Chilgol are controlled by the Workers Party, and there is, it is reported, a years' long waiting list. Other residents of Pyongyang would be unlikely to attend services out of curiosity, since association with the Christian religion remains a social-political liability. However, the information currently available indicates that, as is the case with attendees at the house churches, worshipers at the three existing churches as of 2005 are mostly old society, pre-WWII Christians and their children who are taking advantage of the opportunity to profess their faith openly and worship in the presence of other believers.

Decisive testimony on this issue comes from Prof. (Rev. Dr.) Syngman Rhee, a native of Pyongyang and son of a Presbyterian pastor, who came to the United States after the Korean War. During his first visit to Bongsu church, Prof. Rhee recognized persons from church youth groups before the Korean War. Clearly, some of the members are persons who had previously worshiped together in Pyongyang's house churches. (According to relief workers in Pyongyang, some former house church members preferred the closeness and informality of the home worship center and withdrew from Bongsu to continue the practice of home worship in small groups.) A supporting, but also cautionary, observation comes from a former South Korean official of the World Council of Churches who has also visited Pyongyang many times. This official confirms that most worshipers are from pre-WWII Christian families, but also advises that there are other attendees who are there on assignment by the Workers Party or police. In his words: 

"Of course, one must be realistic; because of the current political situation in North Korea, there are bound to be a few non-Christian infiltrators, however we must not let the Communist Party's security arrangements prevent us from recognizing true Christian sentiment in North Korea. The churches are trying to proclaim the Gospel from within the midst of a communist regime and to find ways of surviving with their own wisdom and uniqueness." 

Perhaps it may have been the case in the past that services at Bongsu and Chilgol were sporadic. However, international humanitarian aid workers resident in Pyongyang after 1995 report that they have attended Bongsu and Chilgol regularly and that the churches have worship services every Sunday. Bongsu church reportedly has multiple pastors, whose sermons focus on both theology and Bible stories. A significant difference, however, is apparent when visiting foreign delegations are present and when they are not. When foreigners are present, political messages are included; in the absence of foreigners, the political messages are reportedly dispensed with, in favor of sermons exhorting the congregation to lead a Christian life. 
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QUIDNUNC

In this section of CanKor, we invite readers to send questions, answers, or responses. Answers should be under 150 words and may be edited for space. 

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WHAT IS THE MEANING OF "DEMOCRATIC" IN THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA?

With apologies to Nick Eberstadt from whom I first heard this, the triple redundancy of North Korea's name is a clear statement of what the regime would like to be yet is not. It's a bit like the term peace--heard mostly in places where there is no peace (shalom in Israel, anyong in Korea). We as humans always talk about what we don't have. North Korea, at least in that respect, is like the rest of us. 

Bill Brown, Arlington, VA, USA.
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In North Korea, the concept of democracy is consistent with that of Vladimir Lenin, the leader of the 1919 Russian communist revolution, and juche thought. The government's ultimate goal, according to the North Korean constitution, is to model the entire society according to juche. This places Lenin's concepts of "democratic centralism" and "dictatorship of the proletariat" at the core of North Korean-style democracy. The "proletariat" are those whom the leader has admitted into his political party, the Korean Worker's Party (KWP), because of their loyal service to him and their comprehension of his juche thought.

Kenneth Quinones, "Understanding North Korea," Alpha Books, p. 143.
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What Now?

HOW ACCURATE IS IT TO CALL NORTH KOREA "STALINIST"?

[Answers should be e-mailed to: editor at CanKor.ca]
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End CanKor # 233

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CanKor is an electronic information service for readers interested in the issues of peace and security on the Korean peninsula, published by Weingartner Consulting. Financial support is received from the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). Views expressed on the CanKor website or weekly digest are those of the respective authors, and do not necessarily reflect the official policies or positions of CanKor, CIDA or Weingartner Consulting. CanKor accepts no liability for inaccuracies, errors or omissions.  Copyright of all items listed or reprinted rests with the original publishers.  CanKor provides links to originals when available. To subscribe or unsubscribe, and for all other communication, please address the CanKor editorial team by e-mail at editor at CanKor.ca. Editor: Erich Weingartner; Managing Editor: Miranda Weingartner; Research: Marion Current, Ilene Solomon, Danielle Goldfinger; Web developer: David Seguin. Please visit our website at: www.CanKor.ca
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