[Cankor] Report #234
cankor at cankor.ca
cankor at cankor.ca
Mon Jan 30 21:21:08 CST 2006
Dear subscriber,
Welcome to issue #234 of the CanKor Report.
May we draw your attention to our QUIDNUNC section at the end of the Report,
in which readers contribute questions and answers on a wide variety of
subjects. This week there is continued discussion on the question: "What is
the meaning of 'democratic' in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea?
and two answers to the question: "How accurate is it to call North Korea
'Stalinist'?"
One reader wonders, "What is the meaning of 'Songun,' used repeatedly in the
new years joint editorial (CanKor #232)?"
Please send your answer (maximum 150 words) to: editor at CanKor.ca
The CanKor team.
For articles not original to CanKor, direct links are available in the
Contents section, should you wish to consult the originals on the internet.
If the links no longer function, you may refer to the full text articles
appended to the issue.
For back issues, archives and other content, please visit our website:
http://www.cankor.ca
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CANADA-KOREA ELECTRONIC INFORMATION SERVICE
CanKor # 234
Friday, 27 January 2006
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After a pause of more than three years, Japan and the DPRK are set to
re-open normalization talks in Beijing on 4 February. In line with the
format that was agreed by the two sides in December, the talks will consist
of three separate but parallel discussions -- each with its own set of
negotiators -- covering the abduction issue, security, and the establishment
of diplomatic relations, including possible compensation for Japan's
colonial history.
Seoul finds it hard to accept pressures by Washington to fall in line with
financial sanctions imposed on the DPRK for counterfeiting and money
laundering, fearing that this will not only collapse Six-Party Talks, but
also disrupt inter-Korean exchanges. The ROK nonetheless agrees to join --
at least partially -- the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI),
established to block the transfer of weapons of mass destruction and related
illicit activities.
China asks the USA to relax financial sanctions in order to encourage the
DPRK to return to Six-Party Talks. The proposal involves giving the DPRK
access to currently frozen accounts that are not linked to any illegal
activities, such as ones used for normal international remittances.
This week's CanKor FOCUS presents a retrospective summary of key events
involving the DPRK during the second half of 2005, selected and authored by
CanKor editor Erich Weingartner in bi-monthly instalments.
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Contents:
1. TOKYO AND PYONGYANG TO REOPEN TALKS
http://www.asahi.com/english/Herald-asahi/TKY200601270249.html
2. NEW OBSTACLE TO NUKE TALKS AND INTER-KOREAN RELATIONS
http://times.hankooki.com/lpage/opinion/200601/kt2006012520264454040.htm
3. CHINA ASKS US TO SOFTEN SANCTIONS AGAINST DPRK
http://home.kyodo.co.jp/modules/fstCategory/index.php?cmenuid=7&
FOCUS: Year-end Summary of Events
4. REPORT ON DEVELOPMENTS RELATED TO DPRK, JULY - AUG 2005
Original article, copyright CanKor
5. REPORT ON DEVELOPMENTS RELATED TO DPRK, SEPT - OCT 2005
Original article, copyright CanKor
6. REPORT ON DEVELOPMENTS RELATED TO DPRK, NOV - DEC 2005
Original article, copyright CanKor
QUIDNUNC: Readers ask and respond to common and uncommon questions.
THIS WEEK: How accurate is it to call North Korea "Stalinist"? and
additional comments on What is the meaning of "democratic" in the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea?
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1. TOKYO AND PYONGYANG TO REOPEN TALKS
The Asahi Shimbun, 27 January 2006
Japan and North Korea will hold their first bilateral talks in more than
three years on normalizing diplomatic ties, using a new negotiating system
that separates the abduction, history and security issues, Foreign Minister
Taro Aso said Friday. The 13th normalization talks will be held over four or
five days in Beijing starting on 4 February, Aso told a news conference.
Parallel discussions will be held on the three major obstacles to normalized
relations: the abduction of Japanese nationals by Pyongyang; security issues
such as North Korea's nuclear and missile development programs; and issues
over Japan's past colonization of the Korean Peninsula, including possible
compensation. The two sides agreed to the format in December.
It will be the first bilateral talks between Tokyo and Pyongyang on
normalizing relations since the meeting held in Malaysia in October 2002.
Koichi Haraguchi, a senior diplomat, and North Korean Ambassador Song Il Ho
will be in charge of the overall negotiations for normalizing relations.
Kunio Umeda, deputy director-general of the Foreign Ministry's Asian and
Oceanian Bureau, and Kim Chol Ho, deputy chief of the North Korean Foreign
Ministry's Asian Bureau, will focus on the abduction issue. Tadamichi
Yamamoto, a senior official in charge of North Korean nuclear issues, and
Chong Tae Yang, deputy chief of the North Korean Foreign Ministry's American
Bureau, will discuss security.
Aso emphasized that Japan's priority is to resolve the abduction issue. He
said Tokyo will ask Pyongyang to allow all abductees to return to Japan,
conduct a thorough investigation to uncover all details of past abduction
cases, and hand over the agents responsible.
Pyongyang, however, has argued that the abduction issues are already
resolved. The North Korean side will likely focus on the compensation issue
and Japan's economic cooperation during the talks.
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2. NEW OBSTACLE TO NUKE TALKS AND INTER-KOREAN RELATIONS
The Korea Times, 25 January 2006
The stalemate in the six-party nuclear negotiations is confounded further by
Seoul's consenting to Washington's call to join its global efforts to stop
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). With an agreement
reached late last month, the nation is to partially join the US-led
multilateral campaign -- the Proliferation of Security Initiative (PSI) --
aimed at blocking the transfer of WMD by "rogue" countries such as North
Korea and Iran. In particular, the inclusion of drills for intercepting
suspected WMD shipments in annual South Korea-US military exercises is
certain to provoke the North and strengthen its resolve to boycott the
negotiations, suspended since last November. What worries Seoul most is that
this would seriously impair inter-Korean relations.
Despite the foreseeable setback to the talks and inter-Korean cooperation,
and given that some 70 countries are full PSI members, the nation has no
choice but to partially join the campaign. The United States identifies the
North as the world's most active WMD proliferator, including the production
of missiles. Even though the PSI is chiefly designed to crack down on the
manufacture and trade of WMD, its scope is generally accepted to include
driving out illegal activities like currency counterfeiting and drug
smuggling. Thus, the North is squeezed more than other supposed rogue
countries because of its alleged counterfeiting of American banknotes and
money laundering, subjecting it to the financial sanctions imposed by
Washington last October.
To make matters worse, the US Embassy in Seoul called upon the Korean
government on Tuesday to join in Washington's financial strictures against
Pyongyang. Fearing such a concession would lead to not just the collapse of
the six-party negotiations but also the disruption of inter-Korean
exchanges, the latest US demand is hard for Seoul to accept. Besides, Seoul
doesn't fully agree with the US financial sanctions because there is no
apparent evidence of the North's illicit activities.
Nobody denies US endeavors to end the spread of WMD, or to halt
counterfeiting and other illegal activities. But, many here believe
Washington's harsh stance will worsen the nuclear crisis on the peninsula,
forcing Pyongyang to increase its nuclear brinkmanship. They hope the Bush
administration will also show efforts to bring the North back to the nuclear
talks.
Last but not least, the North ought to come to the negotiating table as
quickly as possible, dropping its demand that the USA lift the punitive
financial action in exchange for its return to the talks. This is the only
thing which may induce Washington to loosen its grip on the North.
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3. CHINA ASKS US TO SOFTEN SANCTIONS AGAINST DPRK
Kyodo News Service, New York, 26 January 2006
China asked the United States last week to relax some financial sanctions
imposed against North Korea, and presented the US side with a compromise
proposal to that end, according to diplomatic sources at the United Nations.
The proposal was made Jan. 18 when Christopher Hill, US assistant secretary
of state for East Asia and Pacific affairs and the chief US delegate to the
six-party talks on Pyongyang's nuclear ambitions, met in Beijing with
Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei, the country's head delegate to the
talks, according to the multiple sources from countries involved in the
six-way talks.
They said the proposal involves North Korean access to multiple accounts at
a bank in Macao that the Chinese government has placed under its de facto
control after the bank was subjected to US sanctions over alleged illicit
activities involving North Korean entities. The US Treasury Department last
September forbade US financial institutions from doing business with Banco
Delta Asia SARL, a unit of Delta Asia Financial Group, which it accused of
laundering money for North Korea and helping circulate counterfeit $100
bills.
In unofficial talks, Wu indicated China's willingness to unfreeze some of
the affected accounts, the sources said, and Beijing appears to be ready to
unfreeze North Korea-related accounts not linked to any illegal activities,
such as ones used for normal international remittances. It is believed that
Beijing's aim is to soften Pyongyang's opposition to the resumption of the
six-party talks by facilitating its transactions with non-US financial
institutions through the sanctions-hit bank. North Korea is refusing to
return to the negotiating table unless the United States lifts the financial
sanctions.
But Washington says the sanctions are law enforcement matters unrelated to
the nuclear talks, and has urged North Korea to return to the talks
unconditionally.
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FOCUS: Year-end Summary of Events
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4. REPORT ON DEVELOPMENTS RELATED TO DPRK, JULY - AUG 2005
by Erich Weingartner, prepared for CIDA
Boasting improved economic output during the first half of 2005, the DPRK
credits its decision to "embrace advanced technology from foreign countries"
in order to raise the level of science and technology "on par with the
world".
On 9 July the DPRK announces its decision to rejoin Six-Party Talks,
explaining that during contacts made in New York, the USA offered to
recognize the DPRK as a sovereign state, promised not to invade, and agreed
to hold bilateral talks within the framework of the Six-Party Talks. The
DPRK interprets this as a retraction of the US Administration's "outpost of
tyranny" remark.
The DPRK and China on 11 July celebrate the 44th anniversary of their mutual
cooperation agreement signed in 1961. Kim Jong Il declares his wish for
positive progress in the forthcoming Six-Party Talks. Foreign Minister Paek
Nam Sun meets US journalists led by New York Times publisher Arthur
Sulzburger.
The 10th meeting of the North-South Committee for the Promotion of Economic
Cooperation concludes 13 July with an agreement on provision by the ROK of
raw materials for clothes, shoes and soap production, and delivery of
500,000 tons of food in the form of a loan. In return, the DPRK grants the
ROK investment rights in mining of zinc, magnesite and coal. The head of the
Hyundai Group returns from Pyongyang on 16 July with an agreement to operate
tours to Mount Paektu and Kaesong City. Optical fiber cables are connected
across the demilitarized zone on 18 July to prepare for video meetings
between separated families and relatives. The first such virtual reunions
take place on 15 August.
Activists at a conference organized by the US government-funded Freedom
House on 18 July reject suggestions by critics that pressure on the issue of
human rights would upset delicate diplomacy at Six-Party Talks.
Canadian businessman Maurice Strong's contract as top UN envoy to the DPRK
lapses on 19 July, amid suspicions about his role in the UN oil-for-food
scandal.
On 20 July, ROK and DPRK military officers agree to establish liaison
offices to avoid accidental armed clashes, and resume work on dismantling
propaganda facilities along the DMZ. At a follow-up meeting for inter-Korean
maritime cooperation from 25-27 July, the two sides designate a joint
fishery zone in the West Sea to prevent recurring naval skirmishes.
US envoy Christopher Hill and DPRK Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye Gwan,
respective heads of their delegations to the Six-Party Talks, hold a rare,
75-minute one-on-one meeting in Beijing on 25 July, the day before the
formal beginning of the fourth round of Six-Party Talks. Both sides agree to
stay beyond the three-day limit at previous talks, until they "get something
done." On 31 July, Kim Kye Gwan affirms the willingness of the DPRK to
return to the NPT and accept UN inspections if an agreement can be reached.
On 7 August, Six-Party Talks in Beijing adjourn for a three-week "recess,"
due to the inability of the USA and the DPRK to compromise on the wording of
a draft statement on principles to guide future negotiations. At issue is
the USA's requirement that the DPRK must also give up civilian use of
nuclear power. An ROK official reveals on 8 August that the DPRK, ROK, USA
and China have agreed to launch a separate four-party forum to discuss
replacing the 1953 Armistice Agreement with a peace treaty.
The ROK agrees on 10 August to allow DPRK commercial vessels to pass through
its waters between the South Korean mainland and Jeju Island. On the same
day the militaries of the two Koreas test the new North-South hotline.
North and South Korea independently announce amnesties to mark the 60th
anniversary of Korea's liberation from Japanese colonial rule on 15 August
1945. More than 4 million people are pardoned for various crimes and
misdemeanours in the ROK, including those convicted under the anti-communist
National Security Law that prohibits unauthorized contact with the North.
The DPRK amnesty decree takes effect 1 September, but numbers or crimes are
not specified. The last amnesties in both countries took place in 2002.
A high-level DPRK delegation visits Seoul for the 15 August Grand National
Festival for Independence, Peace and Reunification. Delegation members bow
in respect at the National Cemetery, burial place of soldiers killed in the
Korean War. This "taboo-busting" gesture elicits strong emotions, prompting
some to call it a "watershed moment" of inter-Korean relations, others a
"propaganda coup" for the DPRK. The delegation also visits the National
Assembly, the hospitalized former president Kim Dae-jung and President Roh
Moo-hyun.
CNN founder Ted Turner visits the DPRK and the ROK in mid-August to promote
a proposal to turn the DMZ into an ecological peace park. The White House on
19 August names conservative hard-liner Jay Lefkowitz as the new State
Department envoy on human rights in North Korea. This move is criticized by
the DPRK on 27 August as "not a good omen" for Six-Party Talks.
The first meeting of the North-South Committee for Agricultural Cooperation
agrees on 19 August to build a tree nursery and establish an integrated pest
management system. On 24 August ROK and DPRK agree on the need for
additional video reunions, although the North does not consent to the
South's proposal for a monthly schedule. They also remain divided over
confirmation of the fate of South Korean POWs and civilians abducted during
the Korean War.
On 29 August the DPRK proposes to postpone the reopening of Six-Party Talks
until the third week of September. A US congressional delegation headed by
James Leach, chairman of the Subcommittee on Asian and the Pacific Affairs
of the International Relations Committee of the House of Representatives,
arrives in DPRK on 30 August.
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5. REPORT ON DEVELOPMENTS RELATED TO DPRK, SEPT - OCT 2005
by Erich Weingartner, prepared for CIDA
At the beginning of September, the DPRK Red Cross Society sends condolences
to its US counterpart for the victims of Hurricane Katrina. A meeting of
senior commanders of the ROK and US military agree that by October, the ROK
will take over anti-artillery command from US Forces Korea.
DPRK chief negotiator and Vice-Foreign Minister Kim Kye Gwan receives US
Congressmen Tom Lantos and Jim Leach during their visit to Pyongyang, and
tells them that Six-Party Talks would resume on 12 September. Prominent US
experts John Lewis and Siegfried Hecker, returning from a visit to the DPRK
on 9 September tell US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice that the DPRK
would insist on its right to peaceful use of nuclear power for the purpose
of "economic construction and the improvement of the standard of people's
living."
The heads of the DPRK and ROK Olympic committees on 8 September agree to
create an inter-Korean unified team for international sports competitions.
The fourth round of Six-Party Talks concludes in Beijing on 19 September
with a Six-Point Joint Statement of Principles on which future negotiations
will be based. The USA accepts the principle of "commitment for commitment,
action for action," pursued by the DPRK. The statement also "takes note"
that the DPRK asserts its right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The next
day, the DPRK insists that it will return to the international
nonproliferation regime and allow IAEA inspections only after receiving a
light-water reactor. The USA says that discussion on the provision of
civilian nuclear power will take place only after credible verification that
the DPRK has eliminated all its nuclear programmes.
Japan's Foreign Ministry announces that it will resume bilateral talks with
the DPRK to broach "outstanding issues," such as abductions and DPRK
missiles. The UK-based agency Fitch Ratings considers raising the ROK credit
rating following the Six-Party Joint Statement. With inter-Korean trade
expected to reach a record one billion dollars this year, ROK President Roh
Moo-hyun orders the creation of a comprehensive plan for the DPRK's economic
recovery.
Meeting with UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in New York on 23 September,
DPRK Deputy Foreign Minister Choe Su Hon requests the UN to cease food aid
shipments by the end of the year. The DPRK also wants resident NGOs to leave
the country. Aid groups wishing to continue operations must shift from
humanitarian to long-term development assistance. UN relief coordinator Jan
Egeland urges the DPRK to reverse this decision, saying that the abruptness
of the cut-off will harm the country's children.
More than 170 South Koreans are invited to an unprecedented investor
relations event as the two Koreas prepare to open their first joint business
office in the Kaesong Industrial Complex to promote inter-Korean trade.
The IAEA General Assembly passes a resolution on 30 September welcoming the
DPRK's pledge to dismantle its nuclear weapons programme. China declines to
co-sponsor, objecting to its focus on US priorities rather than on
incentives.
On 3 October, the DPRK bans the sale of rice and other staple grains at
private markets. The public distribution system is to control the price and
sale of food grains, a move interpreted by some as backtracking on recent
economic reforms. For the first time in 10 years, the DPRK denies approval
for the annual United Nations crop assessment by the FAO and WFP. The DPRK's
own assessment concludes that a "bumper crop" this year makes food aid no
longer necessary.
The DPRK Workers' Party celebrates its 60th founding anniversary with a
military parade on 10 October, attended by leader Kim Jong Il. Military
leaders promise to "mercilessly crush aggressors" in televised addresses,
but no mention is made during the festivities of the statement issued at
Six-Party Talks.
The WFP on 14 October announces it will close 19 food enrichment factories
in the DPRK beginning in November, the first major step toward winding down
operations meant to feed 6.5 million of the country's most-at-risk people.
On 21 October, New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson returns from a White
House-sanctioned four-day visit to the DPRK, saying he secured permission
for the WFP and 30 of its international employees to stay.
Chairwoman Hyun Jeong-eun of Hyundai Asan, operator of the first ROK tourism
venture in the DPRK, dismisses Vice-chairman Kim Yoon-kyu amid accusations
that he misappropriated South-North cooperation funds. In protest, Pyongyang
slashes the tourist quota to the Kumgang Resort and suspends projected
additional projects in Kaesong and Mt. Paektu.
DPRK leader Kim Jong Il assures visiting Chinese President Hu Jintao of his
commitment to a nuclear-free Korean peninsula and that the DPRK will take
part in the fifth round of Six-Party Talks in November. Hu recommends the
so-called "Chinese Way" of openness and reforms, but receives only polite
praise for Chinese successes from Kim Jong Il. Highlight of the 28-31
October visit is the signing of the DPRK-PRC Agreement on Economic and
Technological Cooperation. Japan's Kyodo news agency reports that Hu plans
to offer as much as US$2 billion in long-term aid, an assertion Chinese
officials deny.
The DPRK warns that US pressure over human rights and drug trafficking
threatens the basic spirit of mutual respect and peaceful coexistence
embodied in the Six-Party joint statement. A nationwide campaign for the
prevention of bird flu epidemic is launched in the DPRK under the direction
of the State Emergency Anti-epidemic Committee. The end of October sees the
finishing touches applied to the richly symbolic restoration of the Holy
Valley Temple in Kaesong, DPRK. Bombed during the Korean War, this Buddhist
historic site promises to become a favoured destination for South Korean
tourism.
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6. REPORT ON DEVELOPMENTS RELATED TO DPRK, NOV - DEC 2005
by Erich Weingartner, prepared for CIDA
A delegation of the Swiss pharmaceuticals giant Novartis visits Pyongyang
from 31 October to 2 November with donations of antibiotics and baby food
worth US$1 million and plans to help rebuild its medical production
facilities. As a first step, Novartis will invite and educate DPR Korean
medical experts and officials.
Koreas hold reunions for separated families at Mt. Kumgang on 5 and 10
November. 100 North Koreans are reunited with 441 family members from South
Korea. 143 South Koreans are reunited with 219 separated family members from
North Korea. The second and third video reunions of separated families are
held 24-25 November and 8-9 December. 151 South Koreans from 40 families
meet 104 North Korean separated family members, while 133 North Korean are
virtually reunited with their 173 South Korean family members.
The International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) in
conjunction with the Chinese Society for Environmental Sciences hosts a
ten-day workshop in Beijing 5-15 November, provided training in sustainable
development strategies and environmental assessment and reporting to five
officials of the DPRK Department of Environmental Protection (DEP).
On 10 November, the DPRK National Veterinary Emergency Epidemic Control
Committee issues a televised emergency alert concerning avian influenza. An
emergency action plan is devised to deal with an outbreak of bird flu. Key
entry points near China are designated as special epidemic control zones.
Quarantine procedures on poultry are strengthened and preventive measures
are instituted.
The first stage of the fifth round of Six-Party Talks ends inconclusively in
Beijing on 11 November after only three days. US negotiator Christopher Hill
refuses to discuss DPRK negotiator Kim Gye Gwan's demand for a civilian
nuclear reactor, saying the DPRK must first disarm and welcome nuclear
inspectors. Both Hill and Kim appear willing to meet bilaterally to discuss
US sanctions related to accusations of DPRK involvement in counterfeiting
and money laundering activities. Hopes for such a meet evaporate on Hill's
return to Washington.
>From 16 to 18 November, a United Nations legal delegation conducts a seminar
in Pyongyang on treaty law and practice, statelessness and refugee issues.
The New York-based UN Treaty Section's Office of Legal Affairs and a Senior
Liaison Officer of the UNHCR in Geneva respond to questions on obligations
under treaties, termination of treaties and breaches of treaty obligations.
Nicolas Michel, Under-Secretary-General and United Nations Legal Counsel
says that "capacity-building is essential for a better understanding and
implementation of international law", adding, "My Office was pleased to be
able to favourably respond to the request for assistance made by the
Government of the DPRK."
The DPRK asks non-governmental aid groups to leave the country by the end of
the year. On 18 November, the Canadian Foodgrains Bank (CFGB) announces it
will wrap up its DPRK food aid programme. The CFGB is a member of FALU (Food
Aid Liaison Unit), an NGO consortium whose offices within the UN World Food
Programme (WFP) in Pyongyang also close mid-December.
The board of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO)
agrees in principle on 24 November to terminate construction of two nuclear
power reactors in the DPRK. The DPRK demands compensation and refuses to
return construction equipment, including heavy machinery and vehicles. The
ROK struggles with Japan and the USA over how to share termination expenses.
Seoul stands to lose at least US$1.4 billion, including US$200-500 million
in cleanup costs.
DPRK trade volumes with China and Japan increase in 2005, according to
figures released on 1 December. Trade with China from January to September
stands at US$1.19 billion, up 25.3 percent from the same period in 2004.
US AID cancels a pledged shipment of 25,000 tons of food aid to the DPRK on
3 December, citing monitoring concerns if the WFP is forced to close
operations. By year's end, the future of WFP presence remains in doubt, with
even optimistic officials predicting a reduction of half of the current
staff of 35 internationals.
On 7 December, the DPRK President of the SPA Presidium, Kim Yong Nam,
receives credentials from Canadian Ambassador Marius Grinius, the first
envoy to represent Canada in both Seoul and Pyongyang. Among the small list
of countries whose ambassadors are simultaneously accredited to both Koreas,
Canada is the first to switch its DPRK representation from Beijing to Seoul.
On the same day, at his first meeting with the press since taking office in
October, US Ambassador to South Korea, Alexander Vershbow, makes
international headlines by calling the DPR Korean government a "criminal
regime," the first involved in government-sponsored currency counterfeiting
"since Adolf Hitler." An outraged DPRK spokesman on 10 December says
Vershbow should be recalled as "the worst ambassador in history."
>From 8 to 10 December, some 1,000 human rights experts, activists and North
Korean defectors gather in Seoul for a high-profile three-day human rights
conference organized by the US-based organization Freedom House. The event
is funded by the US government under the North Korea Human Rights Act.
A divided UN Sixtieth General Assembly Plenary in New York on 16 December
passes resolution IV on the situation of human rights in the DPRK, by a
recorded vote of 88 in favour to 21 against, with 60 abstentions, including
the ROK. A spokesman for the DPRK Foreign Ministry underlines his
government's determination to strengthen its national self-defense
capability if the USA escalates its policy of isolating and crushing the
DPRK on the pretext of the human rights and nuclear issues.
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QUIDNUNC
In this section of CanKor, we invite readers to send questions, answers, or
responses. Answers should be under 150 words and may be edited for space.
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HOW ACCURATE IS IT TO CALL NORTH KOREA "STALINIST"?
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By Stalinism, one refers to the Soviet Union state during the reign of Josef
Stalin, including the following characteristics, which are shared by North
Korea:
-->A single-party state, in which any opposition is regarded as treason.
-->A cult of personality, with the supreme leader regarded as omnipotent.
-->An absence and criminalization of private property.
-->Exclusive control of the economy by the party-state.
-->Total domination of education and media by the party-state and its ruling
clique, under a single ideology.
-->Military priorities in defence and foreign affairs, accompanied by
paranoia towards outside countries, with alliances of convenience.
-->An extensive Gulag of concentration camps, with hundreds of thousands of
political prisoners, held under the most abject conditions.
-->Subordination and repression of religion and all forms of voluntary
association.
-->A closed society, with Potemkin villages for gullible foreign visitors.
-->Consolidation of power accomplished by bloody purges.
Robert Bedeski, Professor Emeritus, University of Victoria, BC, Canada.
*************************************************
Stalin's "People's Democracy" sanctioned no more than a temporary union
between the proletariat and other social groups. Soviet architects of the
DPRK were inherently prejudiced against any social groups other than workers
and peasants. Stalin's model of development aimed at the total
nationalization of industry, total political control, and total mobilization
of the population. All these policies have achieved their perfection under
Kim Il Sung and, until 2002, continued to be pursued under his successor,
Kim Jong Il. Thus, the period 1948-2002 in DPRK history can be called
"Stalinist". Only after 2002 with the introduction of July First Economic
Measures did North Korea step on the path of "reforms" which can be loosely
compared to the post-Stalin liberalization of the Soviet economy.
Leonid A. Petrov, PhD, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, The
Australian National University, Canberra, ACT, Australia.
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WHAT IS THE MEANING OF "DEMOCRATIC" IN THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
KOREA?
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The DPRK was established in 1948, soon after the end of WWII when two
theories of state construction -- the Maoist "New Democracy" and Stalinist
"People's Democracy" -- were at the peak of popularity in East Asia. Both
theories of non-capitalist development had common features and attracted the
active support of the nationalist Left and Centre. The theories, however,
were different in some ways, primarily as they related to the role of the
non-proletarian classes in the process of state-construction. Stalin
realized that the populations of Allied-occupied countries in Europe and
Asia would not support communism immediately, and that a special
transitional period was therefore required to aid local communists to take
over powerful leftist forces. Thus, the official name: Democratic People's
Republic of Korea.
Leonid A. Petrov, PhD, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, The
Australian National University, Canberra, ACT, Australia.
*************************************************
The only aspect of the DPRK that can be considered "democratic" is voting --
if enforced voting (nearly 100% turnouts) for a single "candidate" can have
any genuine democratic meaning. The quotation from Kenneth Quinones (CanKor
Report #233) has no relevance to democracy -- unless we accept Lenin's use
of the word. If we do, then, as Lewis Carroll writes, a word means whatever
I choose it to mean. Oprah Winfrey might define "democratic" as "feeling
good", to suggest an absurd stretch of this doctrine. Shall we accept that
definition?
Robert Bedeski, Professor Emeritus, University of Victoria, BC, Canada.
*************************************************
What Now?
WHAT IS THE MEANING OF "SONGUN," USED REPEATEDLY IN THE NEW YEARS JOINT
EDITORIAL (CanKor #232)?
[Answers should be e-mailed to: editor at CanKor.ca]
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End CanKor # 234
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CanKor is an electronic information service for readers interested in the
issues of peace and security on the Korean peninsula, published by
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