[Cankor] Report #255

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**************************************************

CANADA-KOREA ELECTRONIC INFORMATION SERVICE

CanKor # 255

Monday, 10 July 2006
*************************************************

The UN Security Council postpones a vote on sanctions against the DPRK, 
agreeing to give a chance for China’s diplomatic efforts.

The DPRK Foreign Ministry issues a statement defending its right to test 
missiles as part of a "routine military exercize."

Relevant ROK government agencies fail to warn airlines and ships away 
from an air and sea exclusion zone that the DPRK announced prior to 
their missile launches. 14 passenger aircraft fly through the warning 
area on the day of the salvo.

Japan considers whether a pre-emptive attack on the DPRK missile bases 
would be an acceptable form of self-defense under its current constitution.

At a Seoul conference on knowledge sharing for the economic development 
of the DPRK, the ROK government pledges to promote various exchanges 
with the North. Organizations participating in the conference include 
the Asia Foundation, the Delegation of the European Commission to Korea, 
the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) and the Korea 
Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP).

This week’s CanKor OPINION section features the Nautilus Institute’s 
Australian-based Director Peter Hayes telling the USA to stop huffing 
and puffing about missile tests--strategically a non-issue--and 
concentrate energies instead on striking a deal with the DPRK on the 
"real issue," namely to reduce its stock of plutonium. Peter Beck, 
Director of the International Crisis Group’s North East Asia Project, 
says that only direct talks between Washington and Pyongyang at a high 
level will work, and the top priority must be ending North Korea's 
nuclear programme.
*************************************************

Contents:
1. UN RESOLUTION ON HOLD WHILE CHINA TALKS TO DPRK
http://today.reuters.com/news/newsArticle.aspx?type=topNews&storyID=2006-07-10T190906Z_01_T197448_RTRUKOC_0_US-KOREA-NORTH.xml&archived=False

2. DPRK FOREIGN MINISTRY STATEMENT ON MISSILE LAUNCHES
http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm>http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm

3. ROK FLIGHTS BANNED ON ROUTES NEAR THE NORTH
http://joongangdaily.joins.com/200607/07/200607072234071709900090309031.html

4. JAPAN MULLS CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PRE-EMTIVE ATTACK
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite’cid=1150885958452&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull

5. ROK PROMOTES "KNOWLEDGE SHARING" WITH DPRK
http://times.hankooki.com/lpage/biz/200606/kt2006062918213411910.htm

OPINION
6. STOP HYPERVENTILATING, START TALKING -- HAYES
http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/0654Hayes.html

7. DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS REMAIN THE ONLY PATH -- BECK
http://abcnews.go.com/International/print’id=2164410

QUIDNUNC: Readers ask and respond to common and uncommon questions
THIS WEEK: 1. Why do some North Korean elites change their names?
2. When and where did the last round of bilateral missile negotiations 
occur between the USA and the DPRK and what were the results?
*************************************************

1. UN RESOLUTION ON HOLD WHILE CHINA TALKS TO DPRK
by Evelyn Leopold and Irwin Arieff, Reuters, 10 July 2006

China indicated on Monday it might back a modified UN Security Council 
resolution on North Korea's missile tests and the council put off a vote 
on sanctions to allow for more regional diplomacy. Japan had sought an 
immediate vote on the resolution but on Monday agreed to first give a 
chance to diplomatic efforts by China. The council members agreed.

Chinese Vice Premier Hui Liangyu, expressing support for the fellow 
communist state, began a six-day visit to Pyongyang that was scheduled 
before the North Koreans set off an international uproar by test-firing 
seven missiles last week.

"The traditional friendship between China and North Korea has withstood 
the tests of history and its tribulations," Hui said in a speech in 
Pyongyang, according to Xinhua news agency.

But international attention turned on Beijing to use its influence with 
North Korea to rein in its arms program, which has caused special 
concern because of its development of nuclear weapons. Up to now, China 
has opposed sanctions on North Korea, and said it preferred to see the 
UN Security Council issue a statement, condemning Pyongyang’s actions. 
But on Monday it said a resolution might be acceptable.

"We asked them to modify their position," Chinese UN Ambassador Wang 
Guangya said. "If they wish to have a resolution, they should have a 
modified one, not this one."

US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said she hoped Beijing could 
persuade North Korea to return to the six-party talks on its nuclear 
program, which include North and South Korea, China, Japan, Russia and 
the United States.

"We do think that the Chinese mission to North Korea has some promise 
and we would like to let that play out," Rice told reporters in Washington.

North Korea launched at least six missiles early last Wednesday and 
fired off a seventh some 12 hours later. The missiles included a 
long-range Taepodong-2, which some experts had said could hit Alaska. US 
officials said it flew for less than a minute and fell into the sea west 
of Japan. US Ambassador John Bolton said Wang had not put forth any 
amendments to the resolution in talks with Japan and the other four 
veto-holding council nations -- United States, Russia, China, Britain 
and France.

"We will reassess on a daily basis whether to proceed," Bolton told 
reporters. "Delays won't be infinite."

The United States, he said, wanted North Korea to return to stalled 
six-nation talks aimed at ridding the reclusive nation of its nuclear 
weapons program and to return to a moratorium on its missile launches.

"I think this is entirely an exercise in Chinese diplomacy," Bolton 
said. "They surely have been embarrassed by these provocative missile 
launches."

As for changing the resolution to meet Chinese demands, Japanese UN 
Ambassador Kenzo Oshima said the sanctions would not be dropped. But 
Bolton hinted the resolution could be revised depending on the outcome 
of China's talks. During the weekend Beijing's Foreign Ministry 
telephoned all Security Council members in what one council member said 
was "heavy lobbying" against a vote on the resolution.

"They said they don't want this resolution and they meant it and said it 
could worsen the situation in the region rather than improve it," said 
the diplomat, who would not be named because of the secrecy of the 
negotiations.

The draft resolution asks member states to take "those steps necessary" 
to prevent North Korea from receiving missile related funds or exporting 
and importing materials, goods and technology used in missiles and 
weapons of mass destruction. The resolution would leave it to individual 
governments to take measures to carry out the bans. The six-party talks 
stalled in November when Pyongyang objected to US financial sanctions 
based on claims North Korea counterfeited US currency and trafficked drugs.
*************************************************

2. DPRK FOREIGN MINISTRY STATEMENT ON MISSILE LAUNCHES
Korean Central News Agency, 6 July 2006

A spokesman for the DPRK Foreign Ministry gave the following answer to a 
question raised by KCNA Thursday as regards the missile launches in the 
DPRK: In the wake of the missile launches by the Korean People's Army 
the USA and some other countries following it, including Japan, are 
making much ado about a serious development. They are terming them 
"violation" and "provocation" and calling for "sanctions" and "their 
referral to the UN Security Council."

The latest successful missile launches were part of the routine military 
exercises staged by the KPA to increase the nation's military capacity 
for self-defence. The DPRK's exercise of its legitimate right as a 
sovereign state is neither bound to any international law nor to 
bilateral or multilateral agreements such as the DPRK-Japan Pyongyang 
Declaration and the joint statement of the six-party talks. The DPRK is 
not a signatory to the Missile Technology Control Regime and, therefore, 
is not bound to any commitment under it.

As for the moratorium on long-range missile test-fire, which the DPRK 
agreed with the USA in 1999, it was valid only when the DPRK-US dialogue 
was under way. The Bush administration, however, scrapped all the 
agreements its preceding administration concluded with the DPRK and 
totally scuttled the bilateral dialogue. The DPRK had already clarified 
in March 2005 that its moratorium on the missile test-fire lost its 
validity.

The same can be said of the moratorium on the long-range missile 
test-fire, which the DPRK agreed with Japan in the DPRK-Japan Pyongyang 
Declaration in 2002. In the DPRK-Japan Pyongyang Declaration the DPRK 
expressed its "intention to extend beyond 2003 the moratorium on the 
missile fire in the spirit of the declaration." This step was taken on 
the premise that Japan moved to normalize its relations with the DPRK 
and redeem its past.

The Japanese authorities, however, have abused the DPRK's good faith. 
They have not honored their commitment but internationalized the 
"abduction issue," pursuant to the US hostile policy toward the DPRK, 
although the DPRK had fully settled the issue. This behavior has brought 
the overall DPRK-Japan relations to what was before the publication of 
the declaration. It is a manifestation of the DPRK's broad magnanimity 
that it has put on hold the missile launch so far under this situation.

The joint statement of the six-party talks on September 19, 2005 
stipulates the commitments to be fulfilled by the six sides to the talks 
to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula. But no sooner had the joint 
statement been adopted than the USA applied financial sanctions against 
the DPRK and escalated pressure upon it in various fields through them. 
The USA, at the same time, has totally hamstrung the efforts for the 
implementation of the joint statement through such threat and blackmail 
as large-scale military exercises targeted against the DPRK. It is clear 
to everyone that there is no need for the DPRK to unilaterally put on 
hold the missile launch under such situation.

Such being a stark fact, it is a far-fetched assertion grossly 
falsifying the reality for them to claim that the routine missile 
launches conducted by the KPA for self-defence strain the regional 
situation and block the progress of the dialogue. It is a lesson taught 
by history and a stark reality of the international relations proven by 
the Iraqi crisis that the upsetting of the balance of force is bound to 
create instability and crisis and spark even a war. But for the DPRK's 
tremendous deterrent for self-defence, the USA would have attacked the 
DPRK more than once as it had listed the former as part of an "axis of 
evil" and a "target of preemptive nuclear attack" and peace on the 
Korean Peninsula and in the region would have been seriously disturbed.

The DPRK's missile development, test-fire, manufacture and deployment, 
therefore, serve as a key to keeping the balance of force and preserving 
peace and stability in Northeast Asia. It is also preposterous for them 
to term the latest missile launches a "provocation" and the like for the 
mere reason that the DPRK did not send prior notice about them. It would 
be quite foolish to notify Washington and Tokyo of the missile launches 
in advance, given that the USA, which is technically at war with the 
DPRK, has threatened it since a month ago that it would intercept the 
latter's missile in collusion with Japan. We would like to ask the USA 
and Japan if they had ever notified the DPRK of their ceaseless missile 
launches in the areas close to it.

The DPRK remains unchanged in its will to denuclearize the Korean 
Peninsula in a negotiated peaceful manner just as it committed itself in 
the September 19 joint statement of the six-party talks. The latest 
missile launch exercises are quite irrelevant to the six-party talks. 
The KPA will go on with missile launch exercises as part of its efforts 
to bolster deterrent for self-defence in the future, too. The DPRK will 
have no option but to take stronger physical actions of other forms, 
should any other country dares take issue with the exercises and put 
pressure upon it.
*************************************************

3. ROK FLIGHTS BANNED ON ROUTES NEAR THE NORTH
by Kang Kap-saeng, Chun Su-jin, Joong Ang Ilbo, 8 July 2006

The Ministry of Construction and Transportation belatedly ordered 
domestic airlines not to use an international air route that takes them 
over the sea exclusion zone North Korea announced on the morning of July 
4. The action came two days after the North launched a salvo of missiles 
into the area about 700 kilometers (420 miles) northwest of Niigata, Japan..

On Thursday, the Maritime Ministry, also belatedly, warned Korean 
merchant ships to avoid that exclusion zone. North Korea has warned 
ships out of the area until next Tuesday. Yesterday, the ministry said 
that Korean ships must notify it of plans to sail in any part of the 
East Sea (Sea of Japan) near North Korean territory.

Dozens of passenger aircraft have flown through the warning area since 
the North Korean announcement, including 14 on the day of the salvo. The 
Transportation Ministry complained that it had reacted belatedly to the 
North Korean warning because it had not been given information in the 
hands of the Defense Ministry about the warning and Pyongyang's launch 
preparations.

Airline officials complained that they were also kept in the dark, and 
finger-pointing ensued. Military officials said the Defense Ministry had 
informed Korea's intelligence agency, which was responsible for passing 
the information along to other agencies and the airlines.

It was unclear how many, if any, other flag carriers fly the same route, 
which passes over Russia's Sakhalin Island, near the warning area and 
then into North Korean airspace. Officials here said some had flown the 
route after the North Korean warning; the matter was one for national 
aviation authorities and airlines to decide.

North Korea receives payment for allowing airlines to use its airspace. 
The route over North Korean waters is shorter than routes skirting its 
airspace, which generally arc down over Japan and then west to Incheon. 
The shorter distance results in time and fuel savings.
*************************************************

4. JAPAN MULLS CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PRE-EMTIVE ATTACK
by Associated Press (AP), 10 July 2006

Japan is considering whether a preemptive strike on North Korean missile 
bases would be an acceptable form of self-defense under the pacifist 
Japanese constitution, the government spokesman said Monday.

"If we accept that there is no other option to prevent an attack ... 
there is the view that attacking the launch base of the guided missiles 
is within the constitutional right of self-defense. We need to deepen 
discussion," Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe said. Abe added that the 
ruling party may take up the matter internally.

Japan's constitution currently bars the use of military force in 
settling international disputes and prohibits Japan from maintaining a 
military for warfare. Tokyo, however, has interpreted that to mean it 
can have armed troops to protect itself.

Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi said Monday that the international 
community must be united in saying that North Korea's missiles launches 
last Wednesday were wrong, a news report said. Koizumi told an internal 
Liberal Democratic Party committee that Japan was working at the UN 
Security Council to produced a unified global response, Kyodo News 
agency reported.

"We are responding (to the launches) at the UN Security Council in a way 
that will enable the international community to unite and say that 'it's 
wrong for you do such a thing," Koizumi told members of his Liberal 
Democratic Party, Kyodo News agency reported. Japan is pushing a UN 
resolution condemning North Korea for the launches and imposing 
sanctions on the communist nation.

On Sunday, Defense Agency Chief Fukushiro Nukaga told reporters that 
Japan needs to move forward on debate over whether having first-strike 
capabilities would still be within the bounds of the constitution, a 
news report said.

"It's only natural as an independent country that people should think we 
ought to have some minimal capability within a fixed framework," Nukaga 
said, according to Kyodo News agency.

Japan's ruling Liberal Democratic Party has long pushed for a 
constitutional revision to make it easier for its military to fight if 
the country came under attack. Tokyo currently interprets the 
constitution in a way that allows the existence of its 240,000-strong 
Self-Defense Forces.
*************************************************

5. ROK PROMOTES "KNOWLEDGE SHARING" WITH DPRK
by Kim Sung-jin, Korea Times, 30 June 2006

The government Thursday said it will continue to promote various 
projects to exchange economic knowledge with the reclusive North Korea. 
Vice Finance and Economy Minister Bahk Byong-won said Thursday that 
private economic cooperation between the South and the North has become 
brisker than ever with the Kaesong Industrial Complex and North Korean 
tourism projects getting into full swing, but inter-government 
cooperation is still very limited.

"What we need more than anything else to further advance the cooperative 
inter-Korean economic relations is an extension of knowledge-sharing 
programs with the North," Bahk said. He made the remarks at a conference 
on knowledge sharing for the economic development of North Korea at the 
Westin Chosun Hotel in downtown Seoul.

Participants in the conference included the Asia Foundation's country 
representative in Korea Edward Reed, head of political section of the 
Delegation of the European Commission to Korea Maria Castillo Fernandez, 
former Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation's (SDC) North Korean 
office resident director Rudolf Strasser and Korea Institute for 
International Economic Policy (KIEP) president Lee Kyung-tae.

As Bahk noted, government-level economic exchange programs between the 
South and the North are still very limited although Seoul and Pyongyang 
agreed on revising a plan to dispatch economic inspectors across the 
demilitarized zone (DMZ) at the Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation talks 
held on Cheju Island between June 3 and 6.

"The Korean government will make consistent efforts to widen knowledge 
sharing with the North as well as with the international community," 
Bahk said. "We also hope that academia, non-government organizations and 
international organizations will play a leading role in extending 
inter-Korean knowledge sharing programs," he added.

Annual inter-Korean economic transactions, including the transaction of 
merchandise and services such as tourism, have made a significant 
improvement over the past five years regardless of the political tension 
on the Korean Peninsula. They expanded to $1 billion in 2005 from some 
$200 million prior to the inter-Korean Summit held in 2000.

Meanwhile, the Korea International Trade Association (KITA) said 
Thursday that inter-Korean economic transaction, or trade, expanded 30 
percent in the first five months of this year, thanks to vibrant 
industrial activity in Kaesong just across the inter-Korean border. 
Between January and May, inter-Korean economic transactions amounted to 
$428.63 million, up 34.4 percent from the same period last year. In the 
cited period, North Korea-bound South Korean goods jumped 35.4 percent 
to $264.97 million, and imports from the North increased 32.9 percent to 
$163.66 million.

Inter-Korean economic transactions are forecast to expand sharply next 
year as the number of South Korean manufacturers moving into the Kaesong 
industrial complex will reach 300 with the completion of the first phase 
of the industrial park construction project, up from current 15. Seoul 
plans to help Kaesong house as many as 2,000 South Korean firms by 2012 
when the complex is fully developed.
*************************************************

OPINION

*************************************************

6. STOP HYPERVENTILATING, START TALKING
by Peter Hayes, Nautilus Institute, Policy Forum Online, 7 July 2006

The United States should stop huffing and puffing and threatening to 
blow down the North Koreans house. This will not work and simply makes 
America look like a big, bad wolf, albeit one who blew and blew but 
nothing happened. Sure, Japan, Australia and the UK will line up with 
the United States, show grimly concerned, stern faces and dutifully 
denounce North Korea for firing a missile. But the rest of the world 
knows that the United States is hyperventilating and that it has no 
strategy to bring North Korea’s nuclear threat to heel.

Let’s begin with a few basic facts about the North’s missile test. So 
far, North Korea has its long-range missile twice, once in 1998, and 
once in 2006. Two tests in eight years, both dismal failures. At this 
rate, it will take them
160 years to test 40 missiles, which is the number for the United States 
to bring a missile from development into operational levels of reliability.

This assumes that any North Korean long-range missiles ever work. 
Missiles are very complex machines involving thousands of parts working 
in extreme conditions. North Koreans are notoriously bad at systems 
engineering. In fact, it’s a good thing that they tested because now we 
are assured that the North Koreans do not and will not have in the near 
future a missile that can deliver a nuclear warhead on the continental 
United States. The only target that they know they can hit with one of 
their long-range missiles is themselves, and then only by detonating it 
before they try to launch the missile.

Second, the North Koreans have the same legal right as any other state 
to conduct missiles tests. They are not signatory to the Missile 
Technology Control Regime, which has no treaty status in any case. They 
are not obliged but reportedly did issue notices to airman and mariners 
to stay clear of the missile’s launch path. They had the legal right to 
unilaterally terminate their unilaterally declared missile moratorium.

Indeed, it is worth noting the United States tested a Minuteman III 
missile from Vandenberg California to the west Pacific on June 14th. 
Like the DPRK attempted launch, it was fired at nighttime. Unlike the 
DPRK rocket, it worked. According to the US Air Force, the missile’s 
three unarmed re-entry vehicles traveled approximately 4,800 miles in 
about 30 minutes, hitting pre-determined targets at the Kwajelein 
Missile Range in the western chain of the Marshall Islands.

Moreover, there is nothing illegal about North Korea firing a rocket so 
that its payload passes above the land of another country (Japan) 
provided that it is in space when it passes overhead, roughly above 
around 100,000 feet in altitude. The United States and other space 
powers zealously preserve this right for themselves.

So much for some basic facts. Let’s turn to why North Korea fired it now.

First, the North Koreans believe that they have nothing to lose from the 
Bush White House because it will never negotiate with them in good 
faith. They believe that the Chinese have failed to deliver a United 
States at the Six Party Talks in Beijing that is willing to negotiate a 
reasonable and plausible deal with North Korea, and that China knows 
that the DPRK knows this fact. They do not believe that China will 
punish them for bristling against the United States. They know that 
South Korea’s elections in late May shifted the political center of 
gravity away from supporting the DPRK, so there’s little to be lost from 
this quarter. They know that Russia will do anything for money and that 
no one is going to pay Russia to do anything for or against North Korea. 
Finally, they believe that they can get American attention by poking 
Japan in the eye. In short, there were no major external constraints on 
the North conducting a missile test.

Thus, the decision to fire a missile was dictated primarily by domestic 
factors in the DPRK. The way that Kim Jong Il sustains his rule at the 
top of the party-military-line agency pyramid of power that constitutes 
North Korea is by tilting. After the failure of the September 2005 six 
party talks to produce any substantive gains, he tilted to the 
conservative hard-line to show his toughness in the face of external 
pressure to his own military and population. In North Korea, this is 
popular.

In this instance, the American-led campaign to stop the test offered the 
perfect tactical opportunity to stand up to the United States yet again, 
thereby both reinforcing his image inside North Korea as a strong 
leader, and ambushing the United States by demonstrating to regional 
powers that it cannot coerce the DPRK into capitulation over the nuclear 
issue. Thus, after a long delay while Kim Jong Il undoubtedly calculated 
and recalculated the odds of various outcomes, the missile test went 
ahead, timed to contrast with the US Shuttle launch on July 4th.

Externally, he achieved his goal. For all its tough rhetoric at the UN 
Security Council, the United States is doing nothing, either militarily 
or diplomatically, that will affect North Korea’s ability to sit tight, 
make more plutonium and nuclear weapons, and outwait the Bush 
Administration’s tenure.

Ironically, some pundits in the United States see this as a big setback 
for North Korea. John Bolton, the likely source of the leak about the 
pending missile test to that ever-ready conduit back to Washington, the 
New York Times, evidently thinks that North Korea fell into his trap and 
is now so isolated that he can push for Security Council authorization 
for sanctions or even military action under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. 
Nothing could be farther from the truth. What is important with North 
Korea is not its missile program but its plutonium production. If the 
North Koreans have no nuclear warheads, then whether they have 
long-range missiles doesn’t matter much.

This is not to say that the failure of the missile test won’t have an 
impact. Indeed, heads will now roll in Pyongyang. No totalitarian leader 
likes to be made to look weak in front of his own people. Kim Jong Il 
will now tilt back to diplomacy having tested the military-first line 
with the missile test and finding that it blew egg all over his face.

Americans should stop hyperventilating about North Korean missiles and 
start talking to North Korea about what will work at the next round of 
six party talks if the United States comes prepared to strike a deal. 
The starting point is the September 15 2005 Joint Statement of the 
Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks. If John Bolton pushes too hard at 
the UN Security Council, he’s likely to shoot the United States in the 
foot because China and Russia will simply block attempts to sanction 
North Korea.

Should he somehow succeed, however, he risks pushing Kim Jong Il’s back 
into a corner. Kim may then expend some of his precious stock of 
plutonium, and conduct a nuclear test to recover ground with the 
military and the confidence of his own population. On July 6th, the DPRK 
referred to "its tremendous deterrent for self-defence" in a radio 
broadcast to its own population, and argued that but for this deterrent, 
the United States would have attacked it already.

North Korea’s missile test was a strategic non-issue. Making a big deal 
out of it simply enabled the United States to delay dealing with the 
real issue and made it more likely that North Korea will now test its 
nuclear weapons. Thus, the outcome of North Korea’s nuclear challenge 
once again hangs in the balance.
*************************************************

7. DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS REMAIN THE ONLY PATH
by Peter Beck, ABC, July 2006

Now that the North has fired a series of missiles and could launch more 
in the coming days, we are faced with difficult choices. It is already 
clear that China and Russia will not support UN sanctions on North Korea 
for testing its missiles. South Korea is also not keen to squeeze Kim 
Jong Il's regime too hard lest it have to pick up the pieces if the 
country collapses, or worse, lashes out. No one outside of North Korea 
can be happy about the North's provocative act, but the missile firings 
have not been in breach of any international law, and they have not 
changed the security situation enough for these nations to take the 
tough action being urged by the Bush administration.

Washington could salvage the current situation and get five of those 
involved in the six-party talks on the same side if it gave up its 
insistence on only talking to North Korea within that framework. The 
administration must recognize two key points: Only direct talks with 
Pyongyang at a high level will work and the top priority must be ending 
North Korea's nuclear program. Other issues -- missiles, human rights, 
chemical and biological weapons, troop reductions, and crime -- should 
all be tackled when the nuclear risk is gone.

The reluctance of three critical members of the talks bares the flaw of 
US policy in North East Asia over the last six years. Washington has 
tried to harness the region into a united front against Kim but only 
Japan has signed up with any enthusiasm. The policy has tied US hands, 
handed over key security decisions to the Chinese, and allowed North 
Korea to provoke splits among a group that has increasingly different 
views on how much risk the North presents.

China, Russia and South Korea all see the disintegration of North Korea 
as more dangerous than the current standoff -- and they have good 
reason. If the government in Pyongyang collapses, nobody knows how the 
vast army will behave or how many people will flee the country. It could 
mean civil war among forces with nuclear, biological and chemical 
weapons to use or sell. South Korea would face a huge financial shock 
bailing out its bankrupt neighbor.

Although bilateral contact can now occur in the margins of the six-party 
talks, this is not the same as top US officials negotiating directly 
with their counterparts and ultimately with Kim, the only man in the 
country who can make a deal anyway.

Direct talks would also be less susceptible to the problem that killed 
off the last round of negotiations when one part of the US government 
decided it was more important to punish Pyongyang for counterfeiting 
dollar bills than getting rid of a nuclear threat. That step undercut 
the progress made by skilled US diplomats and illustrated that the Bush 
administration had no coherent policy on handling Pyongyang. High-level 
direct talks would require that Washington develop a plan and stay with it.

It may stick in the throats of many to give Kim the attention and 
prestige he could gain by talking to the United States as equals but in 
the end it is a small price to pay. Kim wants security guarantees, a 
peace treaty formally ending the Korean War, a US embassy, and money -- 
almost all of which will come from Japan and South Korea. The real costs 
to the United States would be low and the benefits significant. After 
the talks, the United States would be the most powerful country on Earth 
and a lot safer. North Korea would still be bleak, impoverished, and a 
little less dangerous.

Not only would direct talks be more likely to succeed but they would 
open up other policy options if they failed -- unlike the current 
situation in which the choices get more limited by the day. If 
Washington was seen to have put its heart into negotiations, any 
breakdown would be firmly blamed on Pyongyang and the three neighbors 
would be more likely to ratchet up the pressure. Only by talking 
directly can the United States get the unity it needs in North East Asia 
to deal with the threat from Pyongyang.

Peter Beck is the North East Asia project director for the International 
Crisis Group, an independent, nonprofit organization working to prevent 
and resolve deadly conflict. He is based in Seoul, South Korea.
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QUIDNUNC
In this section of CanKor, we invite readers to send questions, answers, 
or responses. Answers should be under 150 words and may be edited for 
space.

*************************************************
WHY DO SOME NORTH KOREAN ELITES CHANGE THEIR NAMES?
*************************************************

I asked the same question when the Rev. Hwang Si Chon changed his name 
to Rev. Hwang Min U in 1998. At that time, Rev. Hwang was Director of 
the International Affairs Department of the Korean Christians 
Federation. More recently he has become head pastor of Chilgol Church in 
Pyongyang. In response to my question, Rev. Hwang first told me that 
changing one’s name is a quite common practice in the DPRK. He explained 
that as a Christian, he had always been uncomfortable with "Si Chon," 
since it was associated in people’s mind with Chondokyo (the indigenous 
Korean "Religion of the Heavenly Way"). "Min U," he explained, referred 
to "the people," something he considered more appropriate to a 
Christian, especially one who believes in the social Gospel.

Erich Weingartner, Editor, CanKor.

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WHEN AND WHERE DID THE LAST ROUND OF BILATERAL MISSILE NEGOTIATIONS 
OCCUR BETWEEN THE USA AND THE DPRK AND WHAT WERE THE RESULTS?
*************************************************

The last round of US-DPRK missile negotiations convened in Kuala Lumpur 
in November 2000. Despite expectations of a breakthrough, the talks 
ended inconclusively and none have been held since. North Korea has 
indicated a willingness to phase out its export of missiles, but at a 
high price. In 1997, it demanded US$1 billion as payment for doing so. 
The United States offered to phase out selected economic sanctions, but 
only if North Korea also halted its ballistic missile research and 
development programmes. North Korea responded that this was expecting 
too much while offering too little.

C. Kenneth Quinones, from: "The Complete Idiot’s Guide to Understanding 
North Korea," Alpha Books, 2003, p. 298
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WHAT NOW?
Does Canada’s Conservative Harper government have a North Korea policy?

[Answers should be e-mailed to: editor at CanKor.ca]
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End CanKor # 255

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