[Cankor] Report #256

[cankor at cankor.ca]

Dear readers,

Please do not miss this week’s edition of the CanKor Report #256. You 
will find it below the inevitable CANKOR FUNDRAISING CAMPAIGN pitch -- 
cleverly designed to relieve the heavy burden of your conscience and 
your wallet.

QUIDNUNC:
We have not yet received official word from the Canadian Government 
regarding last week’s QUIDNUNC, but Canada’s Jake Buehler, who has 
personal experience as a teacher in Pyongyang, offers two Conservative 
Harper government policies on North Korea by inference -- with tongue 
firmly planted in cheek, we suspect.

TO PUT YOU IN A GENEROUS MOOD:
Here are more reader comments about CanKor.

"CanKor provides a timely and high quality coverage of key DPRK 
developments and official statements and is indispensable for the 
serious DPRK-watcher or decision-maker. At Nautilus, we rely on CanKor 
to keep us abreast of what the DPRK is saying in response to external 
events."
Dr. Peter Hayes, Director, The Nautilus Institute for Security & 
Sustainability (publisher of NAPSNet), and Professor of International 
Relations, Research and Innovation, Nautilus Royal Melbourne Institute 
of Technology, Melbourne Australia.

"I am working on my dissertation about Korean unification. For six month 
I have been subscribed your weekly newsletter. I am convinced about your 
newsletters. Every Sunday I am awaiting the CanKor Report. It provides 
specific information about North Korea which is so rare."
Stephan Gruber, Austria.

"Let me take this opportunity to say that I really appreciate the 
information I receive via CanKor. It comes from a slightly different 
angle than DPRK-related news that I get from other sources. I appreciate 
being kept up with the links to Canada as well as other international 
foci. I appreciate the way it is organized by theme and pulled together 
in a way that makes the information more useful because it is so 
organized. Keep up the good work!"
Betsy H. McCrae, East Asia Department, Mennonite Central Committee, 
Akron, PA, USA.

HERE IS A NON-FINANCIAL WAY TO HELP US:
Since we are trying to encourage institutions to contribute a somewhat 
larger amount to our effort to reach our $30,000 goal, one of our 
readers helpfully suggested we charge a substantial subscription fee to 
the Canadian International Development Agency. Indeed, as you can see 
from a communication we received from Jeff Nankivell, Director of the 
China and Northeast Asia Division in CIDA’s Asia Branch, CIDA is in the 
process of evaluating our request.

"Should you decide to set up CanKor as a service with paying 
institutional subscribers, CIDA would consider a paid subscription, with 
such a decision to be made based on an analysis of alternatives (e.g. 
electronic global clipping services such as Factiva to which we already 
subscribe corporately, but which do not provide any original analysis)."

We would like to solicit your help as we try to respond to this note. 
What arguments would you use to persuade CIDA (which has kindly financed 
a substantial part of CanKor’s work for the past six years) to take out 
a paid subscription to the CanKor Report?

Meanwhile, keep those cheques and credit card payments coming! 
Pessimists among you have warned us that we will never raise more than 
$2,000 through voluntary subscriptions. We have broken through that 
magic number!
However, we are still short CDN$27,810

FOR PAYMENTS BY CREDIT CARD:
Visit our website www.CanKor.ca, and click on the "Make a Donation" 
button. That will connect you to PayPal, a site with "military-strength 
encryption," where you will be able to pay in Canadian, US or Australian 
Dollars, as well as Euros, Pound Sterling and Yen.

FOR PAYMENTS BY CHEQUE:
Please make cheques payable to "Weingartner Consulting" (NOT/not 
"CanKor", please) and mail to:
Weingartner Consulting,
13 Westview Dr.,
Callander, ON,
Canada, P0H 1H0.

FOR INSTITUTIONAL SUBSCRIBERS:
Please let us know if you wish to receive an invoice prior to sending us 
money, and a receipt after we receive your contribution.

With much appreciation to all who have contributed thus far, and thanks 
in advance to those who will do so in the coming week,

The CanKor team.
**************************************************
CANADA-KOREA ELECTRONIC INFORMATION SERVICE

CanKor # 256

Friday, 21 July 2006
*************************************************

With international interest diverted to the Middle East this week, 
CanKor continues to FOCUS on the fallout from the DPRK's 4th of July 
missile tests. For the record, we reproduce the full text of the United 
Nations Security Council Resolution, as well as the official DPRK 
response. A Reuters article prior to the vote explains the difference 
between the Chinese and Russian draft that was unanimously approved, and 
the original Japanese draft that both China and Russia vowed to veto.

In this week's OPINION section, we continue our series of commentaries 
on the DPRK missile tests and what they mean in the short and long term 
for the region's security. Featured are three of CanKor's loyal readers 
and repeat contributors: Wade L. Huntley, Director of the Simons Centre 
for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Research in the Liu Institute for 
Global Issues at the University of British Columbia, Canada, C. Kenneth 
Quinones, Professor of Korean Studies at Akita International University, 
Japan, and John Feffer, Co-director of Foreign Policy In Focus at the 
International Relations Center, Washington, DC.
*************************************************

Contents:
FOCUS: United Nations Security Council Resolution

1. UN SECURITY COUNCIL CONDEMNS DPRK MISSILE TESTS
http://edition.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/asiapcf/07/15/korea.res/

2. DPRK DENOUNCES UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION
http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2006/200607/news07/18.htm#1

3. CHINA AND RUSSIA INTRODUCE SOFTER DRAFT ON MISSILES
http://go.reuters.co.uk/newsArticle.jhtml?type=worldNews&storyID=1321271&section=news&src=rss/uk/worldNews

OPINION

4. MUCH ADO ABOUT SOMETHING: DPRK MISSILE TESTS
Submitted to CanKor, copyright Wade L. Huntley

5. WHY DID THE DPRK BREAK ITS MORATORIUM ON MISSILE TESTS?
Submitted to CanKor, copyright C. Kenneth Quinones

6. NEGOTIATING SPACE WITH THE DPRK
http://www.boston.com/news/world/asia/articles/2006/07/06/negotiating_space_with_north_korea/

QUIDNUNC: Readers ask and respond to common and uncommon questions.
This week: Does Canada have a North Korea policy?
*************************************************

FOCUS: United Nations Security Council Resolution

*************************************************

1. UN SECURITY COUNCIL CONDEMNS DPRK MISSILE TESTS
Posted on CNN.com, 15 July 2006

The Security Council, Reaffirming its resolutions 825 (1993) of 11 May 
1993 and 1540 (2004) of 28 April 2004, Bearing in mind the importance of 
maintaining peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and in 
north-east Asia at large,

Reaffirming that proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological 
weapons, as well as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to 
international peace and security,

Expressing grave concern at the launch of ballistic missiles by the 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), given the potential of 
such systems to be used as a means to deliver nuclear, chemical or 
biological payloads,

Registering profound concern at the DPRK's breaking of its pledge to 
maintain its moratorium on missile launching, Expressing further concern 
that the DPRK endangered civil aviation and shipping through its failure 
to provide adequate advance notice,

Expressing its grave concern about DPRK's indication of possible 
additional launches of ballistic missiles in the near future,

Expressing also its desire for a peaceful and diplomatic solution to the 
situation and welcoming efforts by Council members as well as other 
Member States to facilitate a peaceful and comprehensive solution 
through dialogue,

Recalling that the DPRK launched an object propelled by a missile 
without prior notification to the countries in the region, which fell 
into the waters in the vicinity of Japan on 31 August 1998,

Deploring the DPRK's announcement of withdrawal from the Treaty on 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the Treaty) and its stated pursuit 
of nuclear weapons in spite of its Treaty on Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards 
obligations,

Stressing the importance of the implementation of the Joint Statement 
issued on 19 September 2005 by China, DPRK, Japan, Republic of Korea, 
the Russian Federation and the United States,

Affirming that such launches jeopardize peace, stability and security in 
the region and beyond, particularly in light of the DPRK's claim that it 
has developed nuclear weapons,

Acting under its special responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security. 5 July 2006 local time;

1. Condemns the multiple launches by the DPRK of ballistic missiles on 5 
July 2006 local time;

2. Demands that the DPRK suspend all activities related to its ballistic 
missile programme, and in this context re-establish its pre-existing 
commitments to a moratorium on missile launching;

3. Requires all Member States, in accordance with their national legal 
authorities and legislation and consistent with international law, to 
exercise vigilance and prevent missile and missile-related items, 
materials, goods and technology being transferred to DPRK's missile or 
WMD programmes;

4. Requires all Member States, in accordance with their national legal 
authorities and legislation and consistent with international law, to 
exercise vigilance and prevent the procurement of missiles or missile 
related-items, materials, goods and technology from the DPRK, and the 
transfer of any financial resources in relation to DPRK's missile or WMD 
programmes;

5. Underlines, in particular to the DPRK, the need to show restraint and 
refrain from any action that might aggravate tension, and to continue to 
work on the resolution of non-proliferation concerns through political 
and diplomatic efforts;

6. Strongly urges the DPRK to return immediately to the Six-Party Talks 
without precondition, to work towards the expeditious implementation of 
19 September 2005 Joint Statement, in particular to abandon all nuclear 
weapons and existing nuclear programmes, and to return at an early date 
to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and International 
Atomic Energy Agency safeguards;

7. Supports the six-party talks, calls for their early resumption, and 
urges all the participants to intensify their efforts on the full 
implementation of the 19 September 2005 Joint Statement with a view to 
achieving the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a 
peaceful manner and to maintaining peace and stability on the Korean 
Peninsula and in north-east Asia;

8. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

*************************************************

2. DPRK DENOUNCES UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION
Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), 16 July 2006

The Foreign Ministry of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea issued 
today the following statement vehemently denouncing and totally refuting 
the "resolution" of the UN Security Council against the DPRK, a product 
of the US hostile policy toward it: The vicious hostile policy of the 
United States towards the DPRK and the irresponsibility of the UN 
Security Council have created an extremely dangerous situation on the 
Korean Peninsula where the sovereignty of the Korean nation and the 
security of the state have been seriously infringed.

The USA has recently kicked up much row after bringing the issue of the 
missile launches conducted by our army as part of the routine military 
training for self-defence to the UN under the motto of reacting to it in 
one voice. It was against this backdrop that the USA forced the UN to 
adopt a UN Security Council resolution taking a serious note of our 
exercise of its right to self-defence on July 15.

The US-sponsored "resolution" called for an international pressure for 
disarming the DPRK and stifling it, terming the missile launches 
pertaining to its right to self-defence "a threat to international peace 
and security". By doing so the USA sought to describe the issue between 
the DPRK and the USA as an issue between the DPRK and the UN and form an 
international alliance against the DPRK. This has brought such serious 
consequences as gravely violating the dignity and sovereignty of the 
DPRK and driving the situation to an extreme pitch of tension, thereby 
seriously disturbing peace and security on the peninsula and in 
Northeast Asia.

It was an entirely unreasonable and brigandish act that the USA brought 
to the UN the DPRK's missile launches nothing contradictory to any 
international law after branding them as a violation. This time the USA 
attempted till the last moment to apply Chapter 7 of the UN Charter 
legalizing a military action against the DPRK. This indicates that the 
"resolution" constitutes a prelude to the provocation of the second 
Korean war. It is a brigandish logic to claim that missile launches 
conducted by the USA and Japan are legal while the training of missile 
launches conducted by the DPRK to defend itself is illegal. Any missile 
fire or any nuclear test approved by the USA is connived at and they are 
not subject to discussion at the UN.

This is the reality today.

The USA has made mockery of the DPRK's true heart and sincere efforts to 
realize the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful 
manner through dialogue and negotiations. Yet the USA is now asserting 
that it will not punish the DPRK once it come out for the six-party 
talks but punish it if it fails to do so. This is sheer sophism, which 
can never be justified.

Only the strong can defend justice in the world today where the jungle 
law prevails. Neither the UN nor anyone else can protect us. The past 
history and the present reality show that only a country with its 
powerful force can defend the national dignity and its sovereignty and 
independence.

It is a daydream to calculate that our principle will alter due to the 
change of the world. We have already clarified that we will have no 
option but to take stronger physical actions should someone take issue 
with our army's training of missile launches for self-defence and put 
pressure on it.

The Foreign Ministry of the DPRK is authorized to clarify as follows in 
view of the grave situation prevailing on the peninsula:

First, our Republic vehemently denounces and roundly refutes the UNSC 
"resolution", a product of the US hostile policy towards the DPRK, and 
will not be bound to it in the least.

Second, our Republic will bolster its war deterrent for self-defence in 
every way by all means and methods now that the situation has reached 
the worst phase due to the extremely hostile act of the USA

We will firmly defend our own way the ideology and system chosen by our 
people, true to the Songun policy, a treasured sword.
*************************************************

3. CHINA AND RUSSIA INTRODUCE SOFTER DRAFT ON MISSILES
by Evelyn Leopold, Reuters, 12 July 2006

China and Russia introduced a UN Security Council resolution on 
Wednesday that would urge North Korea to suspend its nuclear program but 
avoid mandatory weapons-related sanctions as sought by Japan. Japan, 
backed by the United States, Britain and France welcomed the new draft 
and said it moved closer to their position but fell short.

No vote has been scheduled on either draft after China threatened to 
veto the Japanese document, especially while a high-level Beijing 
delegation was negotiating in Pyongyang over North Korea's seven missile 
launches on July 5. China's delegation has told North Koreans what they 
should do to ensure diplomacy succeeded, said China's UN ambassador, 
Wang Guangya. But he said Beijing had not yet received an answer.

Japan's UN Ambassador Kenzo Oshima welcomed the Chinese-Russian 
initiative but said "a quick glance shows that there are very serious 
gaps on very important issues... But I doubt very much whether it will 
be a text that will meet the support of the co-sponsors," Oshima said. 
"I think it will be difficult for us to accept that as it is."

The Chinese-Russia text "strongly deplores" the multiple missile 
launches by North Korea and urges, rather than demands, that Pyongyang 
re-establish a moratorium. It also softens the sanctions provision by 
calling on UN members to "exercise vigilance," rather than insisting 
that they prevent the supply of materials, goods and technologies that 
could contribute to North Korea's missile program.

Russia's UN Ambassador Vitaly Churkin said the Russian-Chinese draft 
resolution went "a long way" towards meeting concerns of those who back 
the Japanese resolution. In Moscow, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei 
Lavrov criticized Japan as saying "that all countries have to vote as 
Japan wants," Interfax news agency reported. "I think this is absolutely 
unacceptable."

China's Wang said he would veto the Japanese proposal. "If that draft is 
put to a vote, without any modifications, the instructions to me is to 
veto it," he told reporters, the first time he has announced such plans.

US Ambassador John Bolton agreed with Oshima and said he and others were 
prepared to put the Japanese resolution to a vote at the appropriate 
time. Asked what would happen if China cast a veto, Bolton said, "There 
are times when you just need to make people raise their hands and show 
where they stand."

The delegation of senior Chinese officials remains in Pyongyang until 
Friday holding talks on the international standoff. It is seeking to end 
missile launches from North Korea and draw the isolated Communist state 
back to six-party disarmament talks aimed at stopping its nuclear ambitions.

US Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill told reporters in Paris 
that Washington and Beijing held a common purpose. "China's really 
trying, we're trying, everyone's trying, except unfortunately the DPRK," 
Hill said, referring to North Korea by its official name, the Democratic 
People's Republic of Korea. He was speaking in Beijing after meetings 
with Chinese officials who have urged North Korea back to talks. The 
six-party talks between the two Koreas, China, Japan, Russia and the 
United States have been stalled since November because Pyongyang 
objected to US financial sanctions based on claims North Korea 
counterfeited US currency and trafficked drugs.

In the latest sign of strains over North Korea, Beijing Wednesday urged 
Washington to resolve its dispute with Pyongyang over the financial 
sanctions. "It's affecting the progress of the six-party talks and we 
hope that it will be clarified and resolved as quickly as possible," 
China's Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao told reporters.
*************************************************

OPINION

*************************************************

4. MUCH ADO ABOUT SOMETHING: NORTH KOREA'S MISSILE TESTS
by Wade L. Huntley, 5 July 2006

North Korea's missile tests triggered condemnations from capitals 
worldwide and may soon be taken up by the UN Security Council. But do 
these launches really represent an escalation of North Korea's threat to 
global security? The answer is both yes and no.

First the facts:

The launch of the long-range Taepodong missile had been anticipated for 
weeks; the United States and Japan had already threatened dire 
consequences if North Korea followed through. While its estimated range 
includes Alaska, the rocket had never been tested, and Tuesday's failure 
early in its flight offers no evidence it's ready for prime time. The 
1998 test of an earlier Taepodong version was more successful, 
overflying Japan before failing in its third stage. North Korea has 
successfully developed and deployed the shorter-range Nodong (Rodong) 
missile, several of which were also launched on Tuesday. But the 
accuracy and reliability of these missiles is mediocre.

North Korea almost certainly has enough fissile material for six to ten 
nuclear weapons and has probably fashioned at least one explosive 
device. The 1994 agreement with the United States freezing North Korea's 
nuclear program (the "Agreed Framework") collapsed at the end of 2002, 
freeing North Korea to expand these capabilities. But North Korea is not 
known to have conducted a nuclear test and is not likely to have yet 
fashioned a nuclear warhead small, light and durable enough to ride any 
of its missiles.

In short, a credible North Korean nuclear threat to North America is a 
long way off. Vancouver is safe.

So why all the fuss?

First, if left unchecked, North Korea is on course to develop these 
capabilities eventually. While this prospect may be at least a decade 
away, uncertainty over North Korea's technological prowess shortens the 
"worst-case" time estimates.

Second, North Korea's missiles can now reach Japan, a core Western ally; 
and North Korea continues to sustain considerable conventional 
capabilities, including thousands of artillery tubes at the 
demilitarized zone that could devastate Seoul, South Korea's capital. 
North Korea has little rational reason to unleash these forces 
offensively; but their existence is threatening nonetheless.

Most importantly, though, the missile tests are a demonstration of 
Pyongyang's sustained will and current mood. While the North Korean 
regime does not respond predictably to either confrontation or 
overtures, its one consistent behaviour over the past fifteen years has 
been to act provocatively whenever engagement is stalled and US 
interests are focused elsewhere. Such has been the circumstance this spring.

Pyongyang's diplomatic brinkmanship has born fruit in the past. The 1998 
missile test deepened short-term tensions but got Washington's 
attention: resuscitated engagement led to North Korea's 1999 unilateral 
moratorium on missile tests, US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's 
visit to Pyongyang in 2000, and negotiations (not concluded) to 
eliminate North Korea's missile program entirely. In 2002-3, with such 
engagement shunned by the more hostile Bush Administration, Pyongyang 
exercised a more aggressive brinkmanship, breaking out of the nuclear 
freeze agreement just as Washington was gearing up for war with Iraq, 
thereby maximizing prospects for minimal US response. The Bush 
Administration blinked, and North Korea's nuclear capabilities have been 
expanding since.

Similar conditions prevail now. A renewed engagement effort in 2005 
through the so-called "Six-Party Talks" led to a statement of agreed 
principles in September, but when that consensus proved fleeting, the 
Bush administration retreated to a posture of slow siege, applying 
economic and political pressure where it could (such as on 
counterfeiting operations) but resisting direct engagement. Meanwhile, 
the Pyongyang regime has undoubtedly noticed how Iran, skilfully 
following North Korea's own playbook, has parlayed a far less advanced 
nuclear program into increasing attention and sweetened offers -- now 
including the prospect of light-water reactors similar to those promised 
to North Korea under the Agreed Framework but terminated when that deal 
collapsed. A new provocation from Pyongyang was almost inevitable.

What's the best response?

North Korea's frantic gesticulations do demand attention -- ignoring 
them would simply encourage Pyongyang to escalate down the road. The 
question is not how seriously to take the missile tests, but rather how 
to take them seriously. Knee-jerk counter-threats and aggressive 
posturing hardly answer the need. Indeed, the compounding failure of the 
recent policies of the United States and its allies must be a principal 
focal point.

Many Bush officials came to power highly critical of their predecessors' 
1994 deal with North Korea, convinced it was giving up too much for too 
little, and were at best ambivalent to that deal's subsequent collapse. 
But they have now presided over North Korea withdrawing from the Nuclear 
Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), expelling International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) monitoring, recommencing nuclear fuel reprocessing, 
declaring itself to be nuclear armed, and breaching its moratorium on 
missile tests -- in effect giving up much more for much less.

The call by ex-Clinton defence officials Ashton Carter and William Perry 
for a pre-emptive US attack on the Taepodong expressed a frustration 
with the ineffectualness of current US policy as much as with North 
Korea itself. This restiveness is increasingly shared by knowledgeable 
Republicans in both houses of the US Congress, some of whom have 
renounced the Bush Administration's refusal to meet North Korea 
directly. But what would a fresh approach entail?

A first step is to recognize clearly that the collapse of the 1994 
nuclear freeze agreement allowed North Korea to cross key thresholds in 
its ambitions: what had been a national proliferation problem has 
metastasized into a regional security problem with important economic, 
energy and social dimensions. Previously, solving the North Korean 
nuclear issue has been seen as a way to catalyze greater East Asian 
regional security cooperation; now, such cooperation is a prerequisite. 
Abating North Korea's nuclear ambitions requires, more than ever, 
grappling with the "hermit kingdom's" long-term regional role.

 From a human security perspective, this also means facing honestly the 
difficult dilemmas posed by the poverty and oppression millions endure 
just because they happen to live on the northern portion of the Korean 
Peninsula. Neither human rights resolutions nor unqualified food aid are 
long-term answers -- the human security imperative compels a 
comprehensive solution.

An immediate need is for the United States and China to find an enduring 
common ground. And, indeed, the missile tests may make China more 
amenable to US calls for more coercive pressures. Decision-makers in 
Beijing are no doubt frustrated and angry, not least because Tuesday's 
launches (as in 1998) will bolster support for US-Japan missile defence 
cooperation many Chinese regard as really aimed at them. The tests were 
also a slap in the face, coming on the heels of the announcement that 
China and North Korea would soon exchange top-level visits.

But US and Chinese concerns in Korea are far from convergent; in 
particular, Beijing won't support actions aimed at "regime change" in 
Pyongyang. In Washington, though, the missile tests are likely to 
reinforce hardline positions that view regime change -- through either 
pressure or patience -- as a necessary prerequisite to a final solution. 
Many of this persuasion are also most vocal in concerns over a "rising 
China." Hence, the further ascendance of this approach will tend to push 
China farther from, rather than closer to, US positions on North Korea, 
neutralizing the effect of the missile tests themselves. Less directly 
involved states, such as Canada, can play important roles to smooth 
these frictions in US-China coordination.

Another pressing need is to find a way to sustain meaningful engagement 
between North Korea and the United States even when public diplomacy is 
stymied. When circumstances prevent engagement through the front door, 
it should be pursued around the back. Canada, with both diplomatic ties 
to Pyongyang and a trusted voice in Washington, is uniquely situated to 
facilitate such private contacts.

What is not needed are more grandiose overstatements of the threat North 
Korea currently poses or more chest-pounding warnings of further dire 
consequences to follow. That's North Korea's game. It's time to change 
the rules.

[Wade Huntley is Director of the Simons Centre for Disarmament and 
Non-Proliferation Research at Liu Institute for Global Issues, 
University of British Columbia.]
*************************************************

5. WHY DID THE DPRK BREAK ITS MORATORIUM ON MISSILE TESTS?
by C. Kenneth Quinones, Mainichi Shimbun, 6 July 2006

North Korea once again has captured the attention of the international 
community by launching several ballistic missiles on July 4, 2006. This 
ends Pyongyang's self-imposed moratorium on the testing of ballistic 
missiles. It first promised the United States in 2000 that it would not 
test its ballistic missiles so long as the United States engaged in 
diplomatic dialogue with it. North Korea's leader then promised Japanese 
Prime Minister Koizumi at their September 2002 summit to continue the 
ballistic missile moratorium. Those promises have been cancelled.

Once again, speculation is rampant about how North Korea's leadership 
thinks. The attention focuses on one person: Kim Jong Il. Some 
personalize Kim's decision. They claim he is mentally unbalanced, 
impulsive or hungry for attention. Other observers claim that Kim Jong 
Il is trying to frighten or force the United States to engage in 
diplomatic negotiations with North Korea.

We should broaden our focus and look beyond Kim Jong Il as we try to 
better understand North Korea's actions. We would only trick ourselves 
if we believe Kim Jong Il rules North Korea alone. Policymaking and 
politics in North Korea is much more complicated than the mind and 
actions of a single man. Kim Jong Il holds the title "supreme leader," 
but he cannot maintain his power alone. Nor can he make decisions 
without listening to information and advice from others.

The recent missile launches suggest several important things about North 
Korea's policy priorities and its domestic politics. North Korea is 
paying a huge diplomatic price for ending its missile test moratorium. 
Washington, Tokyo, Seoul and finally even Beijing pressed Pyongyang not 
to launch its missiles. Now that North Korea has done this, even Beijing 
and Moscow cannot defend it against the growing chorus of international 
criticism.

Kim Jong Il's decision to launch the ballistic missiles suggests that he 
is less concerned about international criticism and pressure than other 
considerations. His greater priority appears to have been to demonstrate 
his firm resolve not to bow to international pressure and to preserve 
North Korea's "national sovereignty." Who then is Kim Jong Il trying to 
impress and why?

Since inheriting power from his father in 1994, Kim Jong Il's foremost 
priority has been to preserve North Korea's "national sovereignty." 
Toward this end, he has faced a dilemma. Should he emphasize diplomacy 
and give up his military capability in exchange for the normalization of 
diplomatic and commercial relations with the United States and its 
allies? Or should he accent the building of a nuclear deterrence based 
on nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles? Kim Jong Il's decision to 
break the missile moratorium suggests that he has given up on diplomacy 
to preserve his nation's sovereignty through either the Six Party Talks 
or direct negotiations with the United States.

Instead, the resumption of missile tests strongly indicates that Kim 
Jong Il has decided to emphasize military methods to preserve North 
Korea's "national sovereignty." It also suggests that he will rely 
primarily on his military generals' advice, and that he will give them 
the materials and political support they need to continue building an 
arsenal of weapons of mass destruction. Such a stance is consistent with 
Kim's "military first politics" which he first adopted in 1998. It is 
also compatible with his avowed goal to build a "strong and rich nation."

At the same time, this would mean that North Korea will rely on 
diplomacy only as a secondary strategy. In other words, the end of the 
missile test moratorium suggests that Kim has little interest in 
returning to the Six Party Talks. He appears to have concluded that 
these talks would limit his "sovereignty" with little gain for North 
Korea. If North Korea does eventually return to the talks, Kim and his 
closest advisers can be expected to demand huge concessions, both in 
terms of security guarantees and economic assistance, from the 
international community in exchange for giving up North Korea's nuclear 
deterrence capability.

Finally, Kim Jong Il's decision to restart missile testing indicates 
that he has a political weakness. He must maintain his father's 
tradition of not bowing to international pressure, especially from the 
United States. His father's long history of fighting against the 
Japanese and United States occupation of Korea earned Kim Il Sung the 
full loyalty and support of the Korean People's Army. This allowed Kim 
Il Sung some flexibility during diplomatic negotiations. But Kim Jong Il 
cannot claim such a record because he never fought against foreign 
imperialism. The only way for him to earn the respect of the Korean 
People's Army is to demonstrate his resolve not to bow to international 
pressure.

In short, Kim is caught in the middle between the need to satisfy his 
generals, on the one hand, and the international community on the other 
hand. The end of the ballistic missile moratorium strongly suggests that 
Kim has decided that he needs the loyalty of his generals more than the 
respect of the international community to maintain his control over 
North Korea.

[C. Kenneth Quinones is Professor of Korean Studies at Akita 
International University, Japan.]
*************************************************

6. NEGOTIATING SPACE WITH THE DPRK
by John Feffer, Boston Globe, 6 July 2006

Even though North Korea's long-range missile turned out to be a dud, 
Pyongyang has nevertheless achieved its aim by getting the world's 
attention. Governments around the world have rushed to condemn 
Pyongyang. Japan and the United States want to bring the full weight of 
the United Nations against the country. North Korea, meanwhile, has 
argued that it would consider comprehensive sanctions an act of war. 
It's threatening a nuclear strike if attacked.

Though North Korea's test moratorium was self-imposed and its launches 
broke no international agreements, the fireworks in East Asia are 
certainly provocative. Pyongyang has managed to infuriate even its 
closest ally, China.

Instead of ratcheting up the tension, the Bush administration should 
consider turning this crisis into an opportunity. It should do something 
radical in its simplicity. It should listen to North Korea.

Yes, North Korean leader Kim Jong Il wants to get our attention. He 
wants direct talks with the United States. He wants a better deal at the 
negotiating table in exchange for his country's nuclear program. But the 
rocket launch should remind us that Kim wants something specific: a 
satellite. In 1998, when it launched its last rocket, Pyongyang claimed 
to be trying to put a satellite into orbit that would, among other 
things, broadcast propaganda songs praising its leadership. The launch 
failed, and the satellite never made it into orbit.

Since a satellite is considerably more benign than nuclear weapons or 
the missiles to deliver them, the Bush administration should consider 
making an offer. The United States will launch satellites for North 
Korea. This is not an original idea. In 2000, the US government put 
together a proposal to end North Korea's missile program. Part of the 
proposal included the offer to launch satellites for North Korea. The 
offer was still on the table when the Bush administration took office. 
There was no follow-up.

North Korea wants a satellite for the same reasons as its neighbors. A 
robust satellite program points the way toward the world-class economy 
that North Korea hopes will rise, phoenix-like, out of the ashes of its 
current situation. Satellites offer a quantum leap in communications. 
And it's a big business with good export potential. The satellite market 
has recently passed the $100 billion mark. Japan has a thriving 
satellite industry. The South Korean government is subsidizing the 
industry to break into the global top ten in the near future. China 
plans nine satellite launches this year. Who can blame North Korea for 
wanting in on the action?

Critics point out that North Korea's satellite ambitions conceal 
military aims. Pyongyang could use its satellite to spy on other 
countries. It could use a satellite to help with targeting its weapons. 
But the United States, in helping get North Korea into space, could 
ensure that the program is strictly commercial. Also, a US-assisted 
launch could be traded for North Korea's missile program, making the 
targeting question moot. Even a commercial satellite program might be a 
tough sell for the United States. The Bush administration has expressed 
little interest in helping North Korea revive its economy. Hardliners in 
the administration believe that economic engagement amounts to a 
lifeline for the autocratic government.

To exit the impasse with North Korea, however, the United States has to 
focus on its essential goals -- to dismantle North Korea's nuclear 
program and eliminate its missile program. The only way to do this is to 
offer the country a way to become an economic power, rather than a 
nuclear power. And satellites can play a role in North Korea's economic 
revival.

Those who dislike the idea of a North Korean satellite circling the 
globe should remember that the transmission of Pyongyang's propaganda is 
certainly not the worst kind of proliferation. Let's pay attention to 
North Korea's fireworks now with a satellite counteroffer. It's better 
than dealing with a genuine nuclear threat in the future.

[John Feffer, author of "North Korea/South Korea," is co-director of 
Foreign Policy In Focus at the International Relations Center.]
*************************************************

QUIDNUNC
In this section of CanKor, we invite readers to send questions, answers, 
or responses. Answers should be under 150 words and may be edited for 
space.

*************************************************
DOES CANADA HAVE A NORTH KOREA POLICY?
*************************************************

"Harper sees, Harper does" policy on North Korea: If the United States 
of America has a North Korean policy, so do [Canadian Prime Minister 
Stephen] Harper and the Conservatives"

"Delayed Reaction" policy on North Korea: Harper's policy on North Korea 
is American policy -- 5 minutes later.

Jake Buhler, Canada
*************************************************

WHAT NOW?

Is there a role for Canada in the Korean dilemma? As readers of CanKor 
will be aware, Canada established diplomatic relations with the DPRK in 
February 2001, but has been able to do little with this relationship 
since the outbreak of the current nuclear crisis in 2002. On the 
assumption that the Conservative government of Canada has not yet 
defined a stated policy on the DPRK, we invite readers -- both Canadian 
and non-Canadian -- to suggest a role for Canada in resolving the 
multiple problems on the Korean peninsula, thus supplying an appropriate 
policy for Canada. (For an example, see the penultimate paragraph of 
Wade Huntley's paper in this issue of CanKor.) We will begin to list 
your suggestions and add to them week by week for further debate and 
refinement. Please limit your suggestions to clear individual sentences. 
If you feel the need to explain your submission, please do not exceed 
150 words.

[Answers should be e-mailed to: editor at CanKor.ca]
*************************************************

End CanKor # 256

*************************************************
CanKor is an electronic information service for readers interested in 
the issues of peace and security on the Korean peninsula, published by 
Weingartner Consulting. Views expressed on the CanKor website or weekly 
digest are those of the respective authors, and do not necessarily 
reflect the official policies or positions of CanKor or Weingartner 
Consulting. CanKor accepts no liability for inaccuracies, errors or 
omissions. Copyright of all items listed or reprinted rests with the 
original publishers. CanKor provides links to originals when available. 
To subscribe or unsubscribe, and for all other communication, please 
address the CanKor editorial team by e-mail at editor at CanKor.ca.
CanKor is a reader-supported e-publication and website. Contributions 
may be made with credit cards by clicking on the "Make a Donation" 
button on our website (www.CanKor.ca), or by sending a cheque payable to 
"Weingartner Consulting" to 13 Westview Dr. Callander, ON, Canada P0H 1H0.
Editor: Erich Weingartner; Managing Editor: Miranda Weingartner; 
Research: Marion Current, Ilene Solomon, Danielle Goldfinger; Web 
developer: David Seguin. Our website (www.CanKor.ca) is hosted free of 
charge courtesy of Kaizen Denki Incorporated (http://www.kaizendenki.com).
*************************************************