[Cankor] Report #266

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CANADA-KOREA ELECTRONIC INFORMATION SERVICE

CanKor # 266

Friday, 10 November 2006
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In a meeting hosted by China, a compromise is reached between the DPRK 
and the USA, allowing the DPRK to return to Six-Party Talks. US 
Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill, negotiating directly with 
DPRK counterpart Kim Gye Gwan, agrees that a mechanism could be created 
in the context of the 6-PT to address the issue of financial sanctions, 
a key demand of the DPRK.

One day later, the United Nations agrees on three separate lists of 
banned nuclear-related, chemical and biological-related, and 
missile-related material and equipment, and orders all countries to 
prevent the DPRK from importing or exporting these items.

Responding to statements by Japanese leaders that the resumption of 
Six-Party Talks was not premised on acceptance of the DPRK as a nuclear 
weapons state, the DPR Korean Foreign Ministry calls into question 
Japan’s participation in the 6-PT. Drawing up a list of luxury items to 
be banned from export to the DPRK (in line with Security Council 
Resolution 1718), Japan targets culinary goods known to be favoured by 
DPRK leader Kim Jong Il. But as columnist Yeh Young-june points out, 
sanctions can cut both ways. The Japanese people have a special, 
historical attachment to songi, or matsutake mushrooms. The banning of 
imports from the DPRK will deprive Japan of 783 tons (worth $142.4 
million) of North Korean mushrooms annually.

A report by the US Congressional Research Service entitled "North 
Korea's Nuclear Test: Motivations, Implications, and US Options," 
concludes that none of three options provides a satisfactory scenario: a 
"status quo" approach, direct talks with Pyongyang, or accepting the 
DPRK as a nuclear power.

In this week’s OPINION section, veteran Indian diplomat M K Bhadrakumar 
examines US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s October jaunt to 
Northeast Asian capitals, where she received a less than enthusiastic 
response to her stated objective of "collectively isolating" the DPRK. 
Bhadrakumar explains why Rice got a "Taste of Tough Love". Isolation is 
a completely counterproductive strategy, agrees New York Times columnist 
Nicholas Kristof, playing into the hands of totalitarians in any part of 
the world. Instead, he suggests sending in "the fat guys", i.e. dieting 
business executives promoting trade, listening to love songs on iPods 
and watching decadent television comedies.
*************************************************

Contents:

1. DPRK FOREIGN MINISTRY ON RESUMPTION OF SIX-PARTY TALKS
http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2006/200611/news11/02.htm#1

2. UN CREATES DPRK SANCTIONS LIST
http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/world/AP-UN-NKorea-Sanctions.html

3. DPRK FAULTS JAPAN'S ATTITUDE ON RESUMPTION OF 6-PT
http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2006/200611/news11/06.htm#1

4. JAPAN TARGETS SANCTIONS AT KIM JONG IL’S STOMACH
http://english.chosun.com/w21data/html/news/200611/200611080021.html

5. A MUSHROOMING CLOUD
http://joongangdaily.joins.com/200610/15/200610152246114439900090809081.html

6. CRS REPORT: NO SATISFACTORY OPTION ON DPRK
http://english.yna.co.kr/Engnews/20061107/304400000020061107134745E6.html

OPINION
7. RICE GETS A TASTE OF TOUGH LOVE
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/HJ27Dg01.html

8. SEND IN THE FAT GUYS
http://select.nytimes.com/2006/10/22/opinion/22kristof.html
*************************************************

1. DPRK FOREIGN MINISTRY ON RESUMPTION OF SIX-PARTY TALKS
Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) 1 November 2006

A spokesman for the DPRK Foreign Ministry gave the following answer to a 
question put by KCNA on Nov. 1 as regards the bilateral and 
multi-lateral contacts made in Beijing with main emphasis on the 
DPRK-USA contact:

The DPRK recently took a self-defensive counter-measure against the US 
daily increasing nuclear threat and financial sanctions against it. 
Bilateral and multi-lateral contacts took place in Beijing on Oct. 31 
with main emphasis on the contact between the DPRK and the USA. 
Discussed there were issues of seeking ways for the resumption of the 
six-party talks. The DPRK decided to return to the six-party talks on 
the premise that the issue of lifting financial sanctions will be 
discussed and settled between the DPRK and the USA within the framework 
of the six-party talks.
*************************************************

2. UN CREATES DPRK SANCTIONS LIST
Associated Press, 2 November 2006

The UN Security Council agreed Wednesday on a list of banned items that 
could be used to make nuclear, chemical and biological weapons or 
ballistic missiles and ordered all countries to prevent North Korea from 
importing or exporting the items. The Security Council resolution 
adopted on Oct. 14 to punish North Korea for conducting a nuclear test 
requires all countries to keep North Korea from selling or buying any 
material for weapons of mass destruction or ballistic missiles. It also 
orders nations to freeze assets of people or businesses connected to 
these programs, and ban the individuals from traveling.

The new council committee monitoring the sanctions drew up three 
separate lists of nuclear-related, chemical and biological-related, and 
missile-related material and equipment which the 15 council members 
approved.

Slovakia's UN Ambassador Peter Burian, the sanctions committee chairman, 
said he sent a note to all 192 UN member states on Wednesday informing 
them that the lists had been approved and reminding them to send a 
report to the committee on their compliance with the sanctions by Nov. 
13. He said the lists have hundreds of items ''but if you are 
translating them into concrete products, it's really thousands.'' Burian 
said the lists would likely be updated with additional items.

At a meeting of the sanctions committee on Wednesday, he said, members 
would start discussing the individuals and entities that will face 
sanctions, and they would also start putting together a list of luxury 
items that North Korea will be banned from importing.
*************************************************

3. DPRK FAULTS JAPAN'S ATTITUDE ON RESUMPTION OF 6-PT
Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), 4 November 2006

A spokesman for the DPRK Foreign Ministry gave the following answer to a 
question put by KCNA on Nov. 4 as regards Japan's senseless behavior 
regarding the resumption of the six-party talks:

As already reported, bilateral and multi-lateral contacts with main 
emphasis on the contact between the DPRK and the USA took place in 
Beijing on Oct. 31. The DPRK, accordingly, decided to return to the 
six-party talks on the premise that the issue of lifting the financial 
sanctions would be discussed and settled at an early date between the 
DPRK and the USA within the framework of the six-party talks. The 
international community is now unanimous in hailing the agreement on the 
resumption of the six-party talks, while highly praising the DPRK's 
invariable stand and sincere efforts for the denuclearization of the 
Korean Peninsula.

But it is only Japan that expressed its wicked intention, letting loose 
with a spate of balderdashes. No sooner had the agreement on the 
resumption of the six-party talks been made public than the Japanese 
prime minister, foreign minister, chief cabinet secretary and others are 
behaving impudently, asserting "Japan has no idea of accepting north 
Korea's return to the six-party talks on the premise that it is a 
nuclear weapons state."

The Japanese authorities have thus clearly proved themselves that they 
are political imbeciles incapable of judging the trend of the situation 
and their deplorable position. The DPRK has never asked Japan to 
participate in the six-party talks. In fact, it was displeased with 
Japan's participation in the six-party talks, but has properly treated 
it, taking the relations with other participating countries into 
consideration. It is the view of the DPRK that since the USA attends the 
six-party talks, there is no need for Japan to participate in them as a 
local delegate because it is no more than a state of the USA and it is 
enough for Tokyo just to be informed of the results of the talks by 
Washington.

The Japanese government, quite new as it is, must have a lot to do 
internally. It had better, therefore, mind its own business instead of 
poking its nose into the work of the talks to its inconvenience. It 
would be much better for Japan to refrain from participating in the 
six-party talks and less attendants would be not bad for making the 
talks fruitful.
*************************************************

4. JAPAN TARGETS SANCTIONS AT KIM JONG IL’S STOMACH
Chosun Ilbo, 8 November 2006

The Japanese government is taking its responsibilities under a UN 
resolution to block the export of luxury goods to North Korea seriously, 
the Asahi Shimbun reported. But policy makers are having a hard time 
determining what products should be banned to best make Kim Jong Il and 
the North Korean elite feel the pinch. The daily said the government’s 
main guide on the issue is a book titled "I Was Kim Jong Il's Cook," 
written by Kenji Fujimoto, who was Kim’s personal chef for 13 years 
before escaping. According to the book, Kim enjoys bluefin tuna from the 
Tsukiji Fish Market in Tokyo. For stews, it has to be Matsuzaka beef 
from Mie Prefecture must be used, a prime product that sells for W 
25,000 (US$1=W939) per 100g.

Kim is also a big fan of chicken from Nagoya, Kikkoman soy sauce, 
Bunmeido Castella sponge cake, Suntory Imperial whisky, and Nissin Cup 
Ramen. But cracking down on the instant noodles would also hit the 
people of North Korea, so Kim will not be deprived of the pleasure just 
yet. "It looks like banning the cup ramen won’t be possible, and in the 
case of the bluefin tuna, we aren’t sure if we need to ban it altogether 
or just the belly flesh," a thoughtful official said.

It is understood that Kim enjoys riding his CB 250 Honda motorcycle and 
his Toyota Celsior car and is cooled by a Daikin air-conditioner. A 
tentative set of provisions put forth by Switzerland on Oct. 25 is also 
used as reference. It bans high-priced cosmetics, shoes and wristwatches.
*************************************************

5. A MUSHROOMING CLOUD
by Yeh Young-june, JoongAng Daily, 16 October 2006

The Japanese have special attachment to songi mushrooms, or matsutake. 
"Have you had your matsutake?" is a graceful greeting in autumn. They 
value the aroma of the mushroom more than the taste. They also have a 
tradition of carrying the songi mushroom, torn into a certain size and 
wrapped in the classic high-quality paper called washi. The 
1,200-year-old poetry collection "Manyoshu," or "Collection of Ten 
Thousand Leaves," contains a poem praising the aroma of matsutake. The 
love for the mushroom might be engraved in the Japanese genes.

To North Korea, the songi mushroom is not only a lucrative product 
bringing in much-needed foreign currency but also an indispensable 
diplomatic resource. Chairman Kim Jong Il promised former President Kim 
Dae Jung that he would send songi mushrooms in the fall at the summit 
meeting in June 2000. Three months later, a special envoy visiting Seoul 
in September brought 300 boxes of songi mushrooms picked from Mt. 
Chilbo. The unexpected gift was distributed among influential Koreans, 
who sampled the taste of a "symbol of inter-Korean reconciliation."

A summit meeting between Japan and North Korea was held in September 
2002, and when then Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi was 
returning to Tokyo, Chairman Kim presented 300 boxes of songi mushrooms. 
However, as soon as Mr. Koizumi arrived in Japan, the generous gift from 
the North Korean strongman turned into a headache. When the image of the 
boxes was aired on television, parliament members condemned Mr. Koizumi 
for receiving such gifts without resolving the abduction issue. The 
Japanese government initially refused to confirm the contents, but in 
the end, acknowledged that they were fresh food and had been disposed of 
already. The whereabouts of the mushrooms are still unknown.

The North Korean songi mushrooms are undergoing trials again. As 
Pyongyang conducted nuclear tests despite international concerns, 
imports of North Korean products have been banned to block the flow of 
money to the North Korean regime. Last year, 17 billion yen ($142.4 
million) worth of North Korean mushrooms, about 783 tons, were consumed 
in Japan, a quarter of the matsutake consumption there.

The explosion of a nuclear bomb results in gigantic mushroom clouds in 
the sky. Such catastrophes have already been witnessed in Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki. I do not want to be reminded of a nuclear test by Chairman 
Kim's well-intended mushroom gifts. Everybody can enjoy the flavor and 
nutrition of mushrooms, but nobody wants to see a mushroom cloud ever again.
*************************************************

6. CRS REPORT: NO SATISFACTORY OPTION ON DPRK
Yonhap News Agency, Washington, 6 November 2006

The United States may have several options in dealing with 
nuclear-ambitious North Korea, but none of them provides a satisfactory 
scenario, a congressional research report suggested. Emma Chanlett-Avery 
and Sharon Squassoni, specialists at the Congressional Research Service 
(CRS), said Washington could seek a status quo, start bilateral talks 
with Pyongyang, or accept the communist state as a nuclear power. A 
hardline option would be to sanction North Korea's illicit activities, 
officially adopt a policy of regime change, or take military actions, 
they said.

The report, titled "North Korea's Nuclear Test: Motivations, 
Implications, and US Options," is dated 24 October and was released just 
before the mid-term elections in which the Democrats are predicted to 
take over the House, and possibly the Senate as well. CRS reports, 
compiled for members of the Congress and their aides, are distributed to 
them first before they are made public a week or so later.

The "status quo" approach would, as critics claim, be a continuation of 
an internal division between those who favour a negotiated solution and 
those who want a regime change, and a passive policy that sidelines 
North Korea compared to US attention on the Middle East, the report said.

Engaging in direct talks assumes Pyongyang is willing to give up its 
nuclear weapons or that a multilateral coalition would be stronger if 
the US at least tries it as a sign of good faith. But this approach 
risks rewarding bad behaviour, and "North Korea may wish to maximize the 
propaganda benefits of the negotiations, including painting the US 
officials as grovelling and pleading for peace before (North Korea's top 
leader) Kim Jong Il," said the report.

The US is unlikely to accept North Korea as a nuclear power because its 
regime is unpredictable and dangerous, the authors argued. "Moreover, 
unlike Pakistan and India, North Korea, like Iran, joined the 
non-proliferation treaty and then violated it," they said. "While this 
distinction may have no practical value, it appears to have diplomatic 
significance."

Sanctions targeting North Korea's illicit activities, such as 
counterfeiting and drug smuggling, carry the danger that they would push 
Pyongyang to proliferate weapons out of economic desperation, the report 
pointed out. Moreover, just how much Kim and his elite rely on proceeds 
from illicit activities is still disputed, it said.

Officially seeking a regime change requires full support of Seoul and 
Beijing, the two main aid donors to Pyongyang, who are averse to 
destabilizing the Korean Peninsula, the report pointed out. The US could 
"threaten" South Korea and China that the bilateral relations with 
Washington would be undermined if they do not cooperate, but such an 
approach would seriously hurt Washington's economic and security 
positions in the region, it said. Military options entail massive 
casualties, and the argument for "surgical strikes" against North 
Korea's known nuclear facilities falls apart because of Pyongyang's 
penchant for concealing activities underground and lack of information, 
it said.

Commenting on a potential nuclear race in Asia spurred by Pyongyang, the 
report questioned what South Korea would do with the North's nuclear 
weapons after the country's reunification. "In an eventual reunification 
of the peninsula under Seoul's control... [ellipsis as carried] more 
questions arise about whether the Korean government would be willing to 
relinquish its nuclear weapons, given the uncertain geopolitical 
conditions that the region would face," said the report.
*************************************************

OPINION

*************************************************

7. RICE GETS A TASTE OF TOUGH LOVE
by M K Bhadrakumar, Asia Times, 27 October 2006

[M K Bhadrakumar served as a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign 
Service for more than 29 years, with postings including ambassador to 
Uzbekistan (1995-98) and to Turkey (1998-2001).]

More than one interpretation can be given to the visible failure of the 
diplomatic mission undertaken by US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice 
to Northeast Asian capitals last week. The North Korea nuclear impasse 
has become intractable. The latest indications are that a resumption of 
the six-party talks involving Pyongyang and China, Russia, the US, South 
Korea and Japan need not be expected within this year. Yet in a curious 
way, the dust is beginning to settle already on the collective outrage 
of the international community over North Korea's nuclear test this 
month. A strange, ethereal calm is taking over reminiscent of the 
"morning calm" that Koreans write songs about.

After the rude awakening on October 9, the six protagonists are no doubt 
beginning to mull over things as national interests jostle for primacy 
amid regional concerns. Cracks have appeared in the phalanx of the 
international community that cannot be plastered over. China, South 
Korea and Russia on one side are advocating restraint, patience and 
prudence. They want none of the "proactivism" that the United States and 
Japan might like.

Perhaps Rice's mission to Northeast Asia was doomed to fail. She pitched 
unreasonably high expectations of her mission. Talking to the media at 
the State Department on October 16, she claimed that during her 
forthcoming consultations in Tokyo, Seoul, Beijing and Moscow, she would 
seek additional measures against North Korea and that the US would 
strive to "collectively isolate" North Korea. That was, of course, 
setting a most ambitious target for her mission -- almost unattainable. 
But such grandstanding was needed before the US domestic audience at a 
time when foreign-policy successes have become extremely rare.

Second, Rice promised she would "affirm" to Japan and South Korea the 
security commitment held out by the United States over the years. That 
was a reasonable enough intention and relatively easy to fulfill. In 
Japan, Rice's assurances of continuing US protection helped nip any 
incipient discussion whether in response to the North Korean threat 
perception Japan too should go down the nuclear path. Whether the 
nuclear file has been conclusively closed in Tokyo for all time, 
however, time only can tell. But for the present, Rice could hope to 
allay China's fears of a nuclear-armed Japan and aspire to build on the 
resultant commonality of interest between Washington and Beijing on this 
tricky front of Japanese nationalism.

Having said that, it remains to be seen how Beijing might react if 
Washington and Tokyo proceed from this point to accelerate their 
cooperation over missile defense. The missile-defense deployment in 
Japan is ostensibly directed against "rogue states", which is what 
Washington claims, but that is not how China (or Russia) sees it. 
Beijing has been reticent in voicing its disquiet, unlike Russia, which 
has been stridently opposed to the likely deployment of the 
missile-defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic.

Third, Rice cleverly brought in the Iran nuclear issue. She urged the 
uncontrollable leadership in Tehran to take careful note of Pyongyang's 
punishment. Rice claimed she could visualize that the "Iranian 
government is watching, and it can now see that the international 
community will respond to threats of nuclear proliferation". This was a 
fair assessment insofar as Iranians are indeed shrewd observers. But 
Rice went on to say, "So the Iranian government should consider the 
course it is on, which could lead simply to further isolation." Clearly, 
that was an excessive claim - to link the North Korean sanctions and 
Iran. And injudicious too.

The Russian reaction was swift. Talking to the Kuwait News Agency, 
Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov pointed out that "there is no evidence 
that Iran is developing a nuclear-weapon program" and that even after 
conducting an "unprecedented number of inspections, including those at 
short notice ... IAEA [the International Atomic Energy Agency] has no 
grounds to assert that the Iranian nuclear program has a military 
component".

Lavrov took note of "suspicions and questions" that lingered around the 
Iranian nuclear program born out of Iran's 20 years of clandestine work. 
"But all this does not mean," Lavrov stressed, "that it is possible to 
speak of there being a threat to peace and security. And it is only such 
a threat that can warrant the use of sanctions." At any rate, Lavrov 
then went on to rebuff the US attempt to draw a parallel between the 
sanctions against North Korea and the Iran nuclear issue. He said: 
"Measures of influence can well be discussed. They may be most diverse. 
But we firmly adhere to the only true understanding which has been 
reached both in the UN Security Council and in the six [party talks] 
that any measures of influence should encourage conditions for talks. We 
won't be able to support and will oppose any attempts to use the 
Security Council to punish Iran or use Iran's program in order to 
promote the ideas of regime change there."

Fourth, Rice claimed in her press briefing at the State Department that 
the US had never been in a "stronger position" to counter Pyongyang's 
nuclear program. Possibly this remark was aimed at the US domestic 
audience, given the sharp criticism there that the administration of 
President George W Bush had altogether bungled the North Korean problem 
from the very beginning. Rice's claim, however, was far off the mark as 
far as the Northeast Asian capitals were concerned.

In the event, as the New York Times later summed up, "The Bush 
administration's struggle to rethink a faltering Iraq strategy hung over 
her entire trip like a shadow ... The administration may simply be in no 
position to press its partners in a tougher way over North Korea. To 
paraphrase a comment -- not entirely well received -- by Defense 
Secretary Donald H Rumsfeld, Ms Rice's cabinet colleague at the 
Pentagon, a nation goes off to diplomatic negotiations with the 
bargaining chips it has, not the ones it might like to have or will be 
able to have at a later date."

Except in Tokyo, Rice's mission, aiming at drumming up support for 
robust action against North Korea, failed to produce results. This 
became most glaring in Seoul and Moscow, somewhat less so in Beijing, 
where the Chinese leadership would seem to have taken on board the style 
of Rice's mission even if circumspection remained as regards its substance.

China wouldn't have been surprised by the United States' newfound 
collegial approach in international diplomacy. And China possesses the 
accumulated wisdom of millennia to know that the new approach is more a 
necessity than a virtue for the Bush administration. But China would 
consider it in bad taste to proclaim publicly that it could distinguish 
such sophistry. Conceivably, Beijing would have been greatly amused to 
see the spin that Rice's entourage repeatedly gave to the effect that 
one profound fallout of the North Korea crisis would be that, at the end 
of the day, by working together so closely on the vexed issues of 
Northeast Asia's security, Washington and Beijing might end up in each 
other's arms sharing thoughts and dreams.

An unnamed US official was quoted as saying that Washington and Beijing 
were finding themselves "on the same page". Rice herself encouraged such 
a belief when she claimed she saw "some data points" that China is 
becoming more of a partner on issues of importance to the United States, 
though this transformation might not "happen in one fell swoop".

Indeed, of late Washington commentators have been wistfully recalling 
the late president Richard Nixon's opening to China in 1972, and hinting 
at repeating the same sort of "polarization" in the present-day 
circumstances between Washington and Beijing that would help the US deal 
forcefully (and, one might hope, effectively) with its increasingly 
difficult Russian partner buoyant with the surging income coming out of 
its oil sales in recent years. Indeed, Rice herself displayed an overt 
enthusiasm about the new role China could play in the United States' 
geostrategy. In the media briefings given by Rice and other unnamed US 
officials, there has been a studied attempt to depict the Chinese 
leadership as willing to play an increasingly central role in the Bush 
administration's myriad foreign-policy problems.

The contrived nature of Rice's enthusiasm for China was plain to see. 
Taking a barely disguised swipe at her distinguished predecessor, 
Madeleine Albright, she said, "I don't care how many times you visited 
Pyongyang. China had to be part of this regime to deal with the North 
Korea nuclear problem, and you're seeing it. Thirty years ago, you 
wouldn't have been able to get a Security Council resolution on North 
Korea, and when you get one, it's Chapter 7, it's 15-0 and China is at 
the center of it. Not bad for a couple years' work."

Elsewhere, Rice revealed that a high-level delegation from China had 
given a "strong message" to North Korea about the nuclear test. Chinese 
accounts of Beijing's interaction with Rice, however, give more sober 
picture.

The Chinese reports quoted President Hu Jintao as conveying to Rice that 
China has always been an advocate of "denuclearization" of the Korean 
Peninsula; China opposes nuclear-weapon proliferation; China firmly 
opposes North Korea's nuclear test and adheres to the United Nations 
Security Council resolution; China will consistently pursue a peaceful 
resolution through dialogue and negotiation; the problem must be handled 
"calmly and with restraint"; the situation should not be allowed to 
deteriorate or get out of control; conditions must be created for the 
early resumption of six-party talks.

The Chinese commentaries have been quite explicit about Rice's mission. 
The official China Daily commented that Rice had a three-point agenda. 
First, Washington harbored doubts about how forcefully China would carry 
out the UN sanctions, and Rice's consultations aimed at urging Beijing 
to "substantially enforce" the sanctions. Second, Rice wanted to 
reassure China that Japan would not "overreact" to the North Korean 
test. Third, Rice hoped to kick-start the stalled six-party talks.

People's Daily separately dealt with the broader parameters of any 
emergent Sino-American cooperation that the US commentators have been 
lately speculating on. The Daily did some blunt talking. First, it said 
Washington's gunboat diplomacy is unsuitable for the post-Cold War 
setting. The containment strategy toward the ex-Soviet Union itself was 
a failure despite all propaganda hype and US triumphalism to the 
contrary, as in real terms the Soviet Union collapsed primarily because 
of "its own internal factors".

Second, the People's Daily said the UN resolution on North Korea 
"constitutes a successful practice of multilateral diplomacy" and by no 
means lends itself to interpretation as the element of a containment 
strategy.

Third, "the relative power of the United States in the world has been 
falling" despite its awesome military might, and therefore the option of 
unilateralism is no longer available in US global policies.

Fourth and most important, the Chinese commentary said the US must 
resort to diplomacy and the UN forum in dealing with international 
crises, especially involving the "nations of the axis of evil" vis-à-vis 
whom the United States can "hardly shake off its responsibility 
respectively for the turmoil in Iraq, and impasses in DPRK and Iran 
nuclear issues".

The commentary concluded that now that the US "has learned some lessons" 
and shows the readiness to return to the path of UN diplomacy, the 
international community will not be found wanting to cooperate since 
that constitutes the "fundamental path to the maintenance and management 
of security in the present era".

It remains to be seen whether Washington's expectations of serious 
differences arising in China-North Korea relations are justified or not. 
China, of course, has a relationship with North Korea that far exceeds 
the sweep of the current nuclear issue - even if it is no longer as 
intimate as between "lips and teeth". Thus China has swiftly denied 
reports that North Korean leader Kim Jong Il apologized for this month's 
nuclear tests.

The Chinese spokesman added in an implicit reference to Rice's mission: 
"All parties should not willfully interpret or expand the sanctions ... 
Sanctions are not the end. They should serve the goal of peacefully 
settling the crisis through dialogue and consultation." The Chinese 
statement has in essence indicated that Beijing is unwilling to go 
anywhere near as far as Washington seeks in punishing Pyongyang.

Meanwhile, Washington's "velvet diplomacy" toward China in drawing the 
latter into a sort of condominium against a resurgent Russia doesn't 
seem to be working either. China as a civilization rather than a 
nation-state would conceivably have an altogether different notion of 
time and space. Also, Moscow is certainly watching. Not surprisingly, 
some of the harshest words on Washington's North Korea policy came out 
of Moscow even as Rice was touring the Asian capitals. Foreign Minister 
Lavrov gave a detailed analysis of the dimensions of the North Korea 
problem. He said the core issue is North Korea's sense of insecurity, 
which is only natural in an environment where "the factor of force in 
international relations is manifesting itself", apart from "a very 
serious ideologization" -- read "Bush Doctrine" -- of international 
relations under way.

Lavrov said the solution to the North Korea nuclear issue therefore lies 
in offering "firm and convincing guarantees" regarding Pyongyang's 
anxieties over security. Specifically, Lavrov called for the "settlement 
of financial problems" between the US and North Korea and flexibility in 
the US stance.

It cannot be a coincidence that even as Rice had just about departed the 
region and gotten back to Washington, the Chinese Foreign Ministry 
announced that Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov would visit China 
on November 9-10. Russian media reported that Russia's state-owned oil 
company Rosneft and China National Petroleum Corp have signed a protocol 
to set up a joint venture called Vostok Energy for the joint development 
of the oil deposits in eastern Siberia, in refining and petrochemical 
production as well as paving the way for Russian entry into China's 
lucrative domestic retail chain.

But far more significant has been the Russian report of a massive arms 
deal between the two countries in the pipeline. The report said Russia's 
state arms-export monopoly Rosoboronexport (against which the US had 
imposed sanctions in August) is completing talks on the sale to China of 
about 50 Sukhoi-33 naval Flanker fighters worth US$2.5 billion.

The Russian report highlighted that the deal to be signed in Beijing in 
December will be the second-most-expensive arms deal ever clinched by 
Russia. Significantly, the Russian aircraft are meant for equipping 
China's first aircraft carrier, due to be launched in 2010. It appears 
Beijing also plans to design its own version of the Su-33 with the help 
of Russian technology. The Russian report added, "China plans to build 
three aircraft carriers by 2016; and Moscow may count on an expanded 
contract if Beijing has difficulty developing its own deck planes."
*************************************************

8. SEND IN THE FAT GUYS
by Nicholas D. Kristof, New York Times, 23 October 2006

North Korean visiting South Korea once sniffed that all the cars must 
have been brought in from around the country just to make a good 
impression for his visit. His South Korean host added dryly that it had 
been even more difficult to bring in all the tall buildings.

Such interactions with the outside world are the best hope to chip away 
at North Korean totalitarianism, but we’ve missed the opportunity 
because for decades we’ve conspired with Kim Jong Il to isolate his people.

Lately Americans have been quarreling over who is more to blame for 
North Korea’s nuclear test, Bill Clinton or George W. Bush. Well, Mr. 
Clinton inherited a situation that, if it had continued, would have 
resulted in North Korea having hundreds of nuclear weapons by now, and 
producing an additional 50 each year. Instead, Mr. Clinton negotiated a 
deal with North Korea that resulted in it producing not a single ounce 
of new plutonium in his eight years in office.

In contrast, President Bush inherited that North Korean nuclear freeze 
and, if he had just left it alone, North Korea wouldn’t have produced 
any new plutonium. But Mr. Bush overruled Colin Powell’s efforts to 
continue the engagement -- and so North Korea has churned out enough 
plutonium on Mr. Bush’s watch for perhaps eight nuclear weapons. But in 
a larger sense, the North Korean nuclear test -- and the fact that Kim 
Jong Il is still in power -- represent a failure not so much of either 
Mr. Bush or Mr. Clinton, but of decades of bipartisan American policy 
that aimed to isolate the North.

Look around the world at the regimes we despise: North Korea, Cuba, 
Burma and Iran. Those are among the world’s most long-lived regimes, and 
that’s partly because the sanctions and isolation we have imposed on 
them have actually propped them up -- by giving those countries’ leaders 
an excuse for their economic failures and a chance to cloak themselves 
in nationalism.

Kim Jong Il sees that the best way to preserve North Korean 
totalitarianism is in the formaldehyde of its own isolation. In effect, 
Mr. Kim has placed sanctions on his own country, and we’re abetting him. 
In the 1970’s, North Korea poked its head out of its shell, negotiating 
with South Korea, seeking foreign investors and sending letters to Jimmy 
Carter seeking talks. Mr. Carter considered inviting the leaders of 
North and South Korea to a summit meeting at a place like Camp David -- 
but dropped the idea when his own aides reacted with horror.

Yet if we had held such a meeting, and gradually encouraged trade and 
other contacts, North Korea’s regime might well have collapsed by now. 
At least, it would have moderated enough that the country would look 
like China or Vietnam.

I lived in China in the 1980’s and 1990’s when Communist ideology was 
collapsing there, and I’m convinced that the best way to undermine North 
Korea’s government would be to send in business executives -- overweight 
ones, if possible. In a country like North Korea, where the government 
responded to famine by broadcasting a cautionary "documentary" about a 
man who exploded after eating too much rice, nothing would be more 
subversive than tubby foreigners.

Mr. Bush is right that we have to punish North Korea for its brazen 
nuclear test, and the administration has been sensible and prudent in 
the last few weeks in devising a series of penalties. But after North 
Korea drags itself back to six-party talks, we should begin to move away 
from our long, failed strategy of trying to isolate the world’s most 
isolated country.

In particular, it’s a mistake for us to reproach the South Koreans -- 
who have more of a stake than anybody, and who understand the North 
Koreans better than we do -- for operating factories in the Kaesong 
industrial zone in North Korea. It’s true that those North Korean 
workers have no rights, and that North Korea will use the hard currency 
to bolster its military. But those South Korean factories are expected 
to employ 700,000 workers by 2012.

While North Korea can survive punitive sanctions, I don’t think the 
regime can survive the shock of having 700,000 of its citizens working 
for South Korean capitalists -- and realizing that the southerners are 
so rich and spoiled that they refuse to eat rice with gravel in it.

The biggest threat to North Korea’s regime isn’t from American warships, 
but from the sight of other Koreans dieting, or listening on iPods to 
love songs, or watching decadent television comedies.

So let’s stop helping the Dear Leader isolate his own people.
*************************************************

End CanKor # 266

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