[Cankor] Report #263

[cankor at cankor.ca]

Dear Friends,

The DPRK nuclear test has put on hold a number of other stories that we
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*************************************************

CANADA-KOREA ELECTRONIC INFORMATION SERVICE

CanKor # 263

Friday, 13 October 2006
*************************************************

The DPRK announces a successful underground nuclear test on 9 October
2006. Although international experts dispute the success of this test, the
fact that the DPRK defied warnings from even its ally China represents a
deliberate "red line" crossing that directly challenges the international
community. In this full-edition FOCUS, "The Nuclear Gauntlet," CanKor
offers a selection of the wide range of reactions by politicians, experts
and commentators.

Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper sharply condemns the nuclear test,
calling it "irresponsible and dangerous." Expatriate Canadian Gwynne Dyer,
a political commentator resident in London, England, argues that sanctions
against the DPRK have proven counterproductive and that it is time to
bargain with Kim Jong Il. Another Canadian expatriate, David Frum, former
Bush speechwriter credited with the "axis of evil" phrase and currently
resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington,
suggests that China is complicit in the DPRK nuclear test and should be
punished by encouraging Japan to create its own nuclear deterrent.
Vancouver artist Irwin Oostindie, creator of the photography exhibit "Axis
to Grind", argues that because it has blindly followed the Bush
administration's failed North Korea policy, Canada must recognize its own
complicity in the nuclear test.

Marcus Noland of the Washington-based Institute for International
Economics suggests that based on historical experience and given the
position of China and the ROK, the world may have to adjust to a
nuclear-armed North Korea. The danger of regional nuclear proliferation or
the actual use of a nuclear weapon is less likely than the prospect of
North Korean sales of fissile material or actual weapons to non-state
actors, Noland concludes.

Peter Hayes and Tim Savage of the Nautilus Institute warn that the worst
option is to act precipitously with military action in response to the
test. Confrontational measures such as naval blockades would only invite
the DPRK to "turn up the volume" with additional tests.

Four leading experts of the Pacific Forum CSIS, a Honolulu-based
non-profit foreign policy research institute affiliated with the Center
for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, suggest answers to
the most pressing questions arising from the DPRK nuclear test.
*************************************************

Contents:

FOCUS: The Nuclear Gauntlet

1.   DPRK ANNOUNCES NUCLEAR TEST
     http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/0684KCNA.html

2.   CANADIAN PRIME MINISTER CONDEMNS DPRK NUCLEAR TEST
     http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=1346

3.   KIM JONG IL IS CRYING OUT FOR MORE HELP
     http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20061012a3.html

4.   MUTUALLY ASSURED DISRUPTION
     http://www.aei.org/publications/filter.all,pubID.24988/pub_detail.asp

5.   CANADA'S COMPLICITY IN DPRK NUCLEAR TEST
     Original sent to CanKor by author.

6.   A NUCLEAR NORTH KOREA: WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?
     http://www.iie.com/publications/opeds/oped.cfm?ResearchID=674

7.   DOCTOR STRANGELOVE IN PYONGYANG
     http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/0685HayesSavage.html

8.   Q & A ON DPRK NUCLEAR TEST
     www.pacforum.org
*************************************************

FOCUS: The Nuclear Gauntlet

*************************************************

1.   DPRK ANNOUNCES NUCLEAR TEST
     Korean Central News Agency, 9 October 2006

The following is the full text of the announcement carried on North
Korea's official Korean Central News Agency.

The field of scientific research in the DPRK (North Korea) successfully
conducted an underground nuclear test under secure conditions on October
9, Juche 95 (2006) at a stirring time when all the people of the country
are making a great leap forward in the building of a great, prosperous,
powerful socialist nation.

It has been confirmed that there was no such danger as radioactive
emission in the course of the nuclear test as it was carried out under a
scientific consideration and careful calculation.

The nuclear test was conducted with indigenous wisdom and technology 100%.
It marks a historic event as it greatly encouraged and pleased the KPA
(Korean People's Army) and people that have wished to have powerful
self-reliant defence capability. It will contribute to defending the peace
and stability on the Korean peninsula and in the area around it.
*************************************************

2.   CANADIAN PRIME MINISTER CONDEMNS DPRK NUCLEAR TEST
     Prime Minister's website, Ottawa, 9 October 2006

Prime Minister Stephen Harper sharply condemned the apparent nuclear test
carried out by North Korea (the Democratic People's Republic of Korea) on
October 8.

"This irresponsible and dangerous act seriously undermines both regional
peace and stability, and global efforts to halt the spread of nuclear
weapons," Mr. Harper said. He added that Canada will continue to work with
the United Nations Security Council to address the risks to Northeast Asia
and beyond caused by the North Korean nuclear test.

In a statement issued on October 5, Peter MacKay, Minister of Foreign
Affairs and Minister of the Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency, had
urged North Korea not to proceed with a nuclear test, but rather to return
to the six-party talks. Canada believes that North Korea's security,
economic and political goals will not be served through this latest
provocation, but are best achieved through the framework of the existing
six-party talks to address the North Korean nuclear crisis.

[Additional comments assembled by CanKor from press reports:

Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper said there should be a response to
North Korea "thumbing its nose at the world community.'' He said there is
a growing consensus on how to deal with the situation, and Canada will
fulfill any obligations it has.
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/LAC.20061012.KOREAMAIN12/TPStory/TPInternational/Asia/

Prime Minister Stephen Harper, meanwhile, says there is no indication
North Korea has developed nuclear weapons capable of reaching Canada. "If
North Korea eventually developed the capacity to fire missiles at North
America, we would be in a different boat. But as alarmed as we are, North
Korea is nowhere near that objective."
http://ottsun.canoe.ca/News/2006/10/12/2007502-sun.html

Canada's foreign affairs minister said Thursday a United Nations draft
resolution is a "progressive first step" towards convincing the Communist
regime to return to six-party talks about its nuclear program. Peter
MacKay said the new proposal, for which US diplomats are trying to drum up
support, would help to gauge the intentions of North Korea.
http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2006/10/12/draft-nuclear.html

Despite escalating tensions between North Korea and the international
community following its apparent nuclear test, Prime Minister Stephen
Harper said Wednesday that Ottawa would not reopen the debate around
Canada joining the US ballistic missile defence system. "I've always said
we're not looking to open discussions of that. The only way that would be
on the table is if we received a request from the United States to
reconsider our position," Mr. Harper said. "We've received no such
request."
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20061011.wkorhar1010/BNStory/National/home]
*************************************************

3.   KIM JONG IL IS CRYING OUT FOR MORE HELP
     by Gwynne Dyer, The Japan Times, 12 October 2006

In psychobabble, what North Korea has just done would be characterized as
"a cry for help," like a teenage kid burning his parents' house down
because he's misunderstood. Granted, it's an unusually loud cry for help,
but now that North Korean dictator Kim Jong Il has got our attention, what
are we going to do about him?

North Korea's nuclear-weapon test early Monday morning makes it the ninth
nuclear power, and by far the least predictable. It probably has only a
few nuclear weapons, and it certainly cannot deliver them to any targets
beyond South Korea and Japan, but the notion of nuclear weapons in the
hands of a "crazy state" frightens people.

So relax: Kim is not crazy. Former US Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright, who has negotiated with him, says he is well informed and not at
all delusional. He pretends to be unstable because his regime's survival
depends on blackmailing foreign countries into giving it the food and fuel
that it cannot produce for itself. Rogue nukes are a big part of that
image, but like any professional blackmailer, he would hand them over for
the right price.

Put yourself in Kim's (platform) shoes. In 1994 he inherited a country
from his father, Kim Il Sung, that was already in acute crisis. The
centralized Stalinist economy had been failing for a decade, and in 1991
post-Soviet Russia cut off the flow of subsidized oil, fertilizer and
food, effectively halving North Korea's gross domestic product.

Yet Kim needed the support of the military and the party officials who
controlled North Korea's "command" economy, and derived their power and
privileges from it. Radical economic reforms would threaten their
positions. Kim's inheritance was far from secure, so he left the economy
alone and used the threat of going nuclear to extort aid from foreign
countries.

The younger Kim had been put in charge of North Korea's nuclear weapons
program by his father in the late 1980s. By 1993, Washington was so
concerned that it offered Pyongyang a deal: stop the program, and the USA
would give North Korea huge amounts of foreign aid. Kim Il Sung died in
July, 1994, and it was his son who approved the "Framework Agreement" with
the United States that October in which the USA promised to send Pyongyang
half a million tons of oil a year and eventually to build the North
Koreans two nuclear reactors.

China, South Korea and other neighbors chipped in, sending grain, other
food and medicines. Kim Jong Il won some breathing space to consolidate
his rule -- but then a series of floods and droughts overwhelmed the
country's inefficient collective farms, and up to a million North Koreans
starved. By 2002, in desperation, Kim Jong Il played the nuclear card
again.

American intelligence picked up the renewed nuclear activity, and in
October 2002 the North Koreans admitted to US Assistant Secretary of State
James Kelly that they had a secret nuclear weapons program in defiance of
the 1994 Agreed Framework. (Blackmail only works if the target is aware of
the threat.)

This time, the USA refused to yield to blackmail, so the past four years
have seen North Korea withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty,
throw out International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors, test-fire
missiles near South Korea and Japan on several occasions, and now test an
actual nuclear weapon. Kim Jong Il only has one card, and he keeps trying
to play it.

Kim's crude tactics were always intensely irritating to the other parties
to the six-power talks on North Korea's nuclear weapons (the USA, Russia,
China, Japan and South Korea), and now they are furious with the little
dictator. Even China, North Korea's only ally, called Pyongyang's test
"stupid." But what are they actually going to do about it?

Sanctions, I hear you cry. But the USA has had sanctions against North
Korea since 1953, and Japan has had them for more than a decade already --
and if China stops sending aid, the entire economy will collapse, millions
will starve, and millions more will flee the country. I was at the Foreign
Ministry in Seoul in 1994 on the day that Kim Il Sung died, and I remember
the panic that reigned as South Korea's diplomatic elite contemplated the
prospect of 25 million starving North Koreans suddenly landing in their
laps.

The regime in Beijing is equally appalled at the notion of millions of
North Korean refugees pouring across its border, so there may be
sanctions, but they will not be life threatening for Pyongyang. Which
brings us back to the distasteful business of bargaining with
blackmailers.

Kim would probably relinquish his nuclear weapons if he were offered
enough food and oil aid, an end to trade embargoes, and a firm US promise
not to try to overthrow him. None of that would cost very much, and the
USA is not going to attack him anyway. Nor has Kim any intention of
attacking anybody, especially with nuclear weapons: He would have no hope
of surviving the instant and crushing retaliation by American nuclear
weapons. So it's just a question of persuading him to stop the nonsense.

But what about the principle of the thing? Won't other countries be
tempted to follow North Korea's example if we don't punish it for
developing nuclear weapons? You know, like we did when Israel, India and
Pakistan developed theirs.
*************************************************

4.   MUTUALLY ASSURED DISRUPTION
     by David Frum, American Enterprise Institute, 10 October 2006

The North Korean nuclear test--if that indeed is what it was--signals the
catastrophic collapse of a dozen years of American policy. Over that
period, two of the world's most dangerous regimes, Pakistan and North
Korea, have developed nuclear weapons and the missiles to launch them.
Iran, arguably the most dangerous of them all, will surely follow, unless
some dramatic action is soon taken.

It is, alas, an iron law of modern diplomacy that the failure of any
diplomatic process only proves the need for more of the process that has
just failed. Thus those who have long supported negotiating with North
Korea are now calling for the Bush administration to begin direct talks
with the Kim Jong Il regime. Sorry, but all this would accomplish would be
to reward an actual proliferator in order to preserve the illusion that
the world still has a meaningful nonproliferation regime.

Some even suggest, in worried tones, that the North Korean test might
provoke Japan to go nuclear, as if the worst possible consequence of
nuclear weapons in the hands of one of America's direst enemies would be
the acquisition of nuclear weapons by one of America's best friends.

A new approach is needed. America has three key strategic goals in the
wake of the North Korean nuclear test. The first is to enhance the
security of those American allies most directly threatened by North Korean
nuclear weapons: Japan and South Korea.

The second is to exact a price from North Korea for its nuclear program
severe enough to frighten Iran and any other rogue regimes considering
following the North Korean path.

The last is to punish China. North Korea could not have completed its bomb
if China, which provides the country an immense amount of food and energy
aid, had strongly opposed it. Apparently, Beijing sees some potential gain
in the uncertainty that North Korea's status brings. If China can engage
in such conduct cost-free, what will deter Russia from aiding the Iranian
nuclear program, or Pakistan someday aiding a Saudi or Egyptian one?

To meet these three goals, the United States should adopt four swift
policy responses:

Step up the development and deployment of existing missile defense systems.

The United States has already fielded 11 missile interceptors, nine in
Alaska and two in California. The Navy has designed ship-based
interceptors as well. As we well know, they are not perfect--but they are
something.

Until now this lack of perfection has been allowed to block full
deployment of the technology. But missile defenses do not need to be
perfect to complicate any aggressive action by a comparatively weak power
like North Korea against the United States or its allies.

And deploying a missile defense of growing effectiveness also helps
achieve another goal -- it would indirectly punish China by corroding the
power of the missiles China uses to intimidate Taiwan.

End humanitarian aid to North Korea and pressure South Korea to do the same.

Since 1995, the United States has provided more than two million tons of
food aid to North Korea, plus considerable energy assistance. Officially,
Washington says it has ''delinked'' its humanitarian aid from strategic
concerns. Many United States officials believe that continuing this aid
will sustain hopes for a better American-North Korean relationship in the
future. Yet if the United States continues to send such aid even after an
illicit nuclear test, North Korean leaders may well conclude that their
aggressive actions have won them almost absolute impunity.

An end to humanitarian aid would not only exact a considerable direct
price from North Korea, but it would also hurt China. Chinese leaders
often justify their refusal to pressure North Korea by citing the risk of
an economic collapse that would send millions of refugees northward into
China. We could call that bluff: if a North Korean economic collapse is a
thing China fears, why should the United States and South Korea shoulder
the cost of helping to avert it? Let China pay the full cost of
underwriting its aggressive client state.

Invite Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand and Singapore to join
NATO--and even invite Taiwan to send observers to NATO meetings.

Perhaps North Korea and China imagine that the nuclear test has tilted the
strategic balance in the Pacific in their favors. Now would be a good time
to disabuse each of them of any such illusion. We need a tighter and
stronger security arrangement in the Pacific region, one from which rogue
states and those who support them are pointedly excluded. The NATO allies
have agreed to expand the organization well beyond Western Europe; now we
need to persuade them to make it global.

Encourage Japan to renounce the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and create
its own nuclear deterrent.

World War II ended long ago, and it's time to put an end to the silly
pretense that today's democratic Japan owes a burden of guilt to today's
rising China. A nuclear Japan is the thing China and North Korea dread
most (after, perhaps, a nuclear South Korea or Taiwan).

Not only would the nuclearization of Japan be a punishment of China and
North Korea, but it would go far to meet our goal of dissuading Iran--it
would show Tehran that the United States and its friends will aggressively
seek to correct any attempt by rogue states to unsettle any regional
nuclear balance. The analogue for Iran, of course, would be the threat of
American aid to improve Israel's capacity to hit targets with nuclear
weapons.

Countries like North Korea and Iran seek nuclear weapons because they
imagine that those weapons will enhance their security and power. The way
to contain them is to convince them otherwise. When nonproliferation can
be prevented by negotiation, that is always preferred. But when
negotiation fails, as it has failed in North Korea and is failing in Iran,
rogue regimes must be made to suffer for their dangerous nuclear
ambitions.
*************************************************

5.   CANADA'S COMPLICITY IN DPRK NUCLEAR TEST
     by Irwin Oostindie, Vancouver, 9 October 2006

[The author is a Canadian photographer and creator of "Axis to Grind",
available online at http://www.axistogrind.com/ --CanKor.]

North Korea's nuclear test did not surprise anyone who has actually been
listening to the statements of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
(DPRK). In doing my photography work, I have traveled to both sides of the
Korean DMZ, the line that keeps the Korean peninsula artificially divided.
I have come to see an enormous gap in how Canada's media reports on North
Korea, and the damage this causes to advancing peace and security in the
region and in developing an intelligent Canadian foreign policy.

Sadly, since January 2002, the war hawks in the Bush administration have
relied on the North to react from the very corner the west has stuck them
in. Without the 'axis of evil' bogey man popularized by the US media (and
Canada's alike) there would be less sales of US weapons systems in Asia,
and little rationale for the Star Wars program. Do Canada's media report
on DPRK reaction to joint US/South Korea war games and their routine 'mock
invasion' of the North? Instead we get sensational and inaccurate reports
of the 'Dear Leader' living a playboy life, his Hollywood fetish and
crazed dictator tendencies.

Can someone gently remind Canadians that we are still technically at war
with Korea? North Korea is doing old-fashioned gunboat diplomacy because
that's the only avenue left for them. If Canadians genuinely cared for the
plight of the Korean people, we would promote peace and security of the
Korean peninsula. It was 53 years ago 45,000 Canadian troops came back
from the Korean War, and we still have not signed a peace treaty and
brought security to the region. Ottawa and Washington are complicit in
this nuclear proliferation. It is time Canada breaks with the US embargo
rhetoric and end this cold war deep freeze. Despite starting diplomatic
relations with the DPRK in 2003, Canada continues to deny their request
for an embassy in Ottawa.

The US could have avoided all this by agreeing to North Korea's
decades-long request for bilateral talks. The capitalist west should stop
the double standard of supporting only select developing countries, while
trying to overthrow ones with a different economic system. By advancing
development loans the DPRK has requested to deal with its severe famines,
we would engage them to join the global community as a sovereign nation.
By following through on the 1994 US-DPRK agreement to normalize relations,
the DPRK could finally redirect its precious resources from military
defenses, to the real needs of the Korean people.

Perhaps the silver lining in the DPRK nuclear test is that more Americans
will see the dismal failure of the Bush administration's pre-emptive
strike policy, and possibly vote him out of office.
*************************************************

6.   A NUCLEAR NORTH KOREA: WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?
     by Marcus Noland, The Straits Times, 11 October 2006

If nuclear weapons could be hermetically confined to the Korean peninsula,
the North Korean nuclear test would be a regrettable development but a
manageable one. For more than half a century the North Koreans have held
South Korea's capital city Seoul hostage with forward-deployed artillery,
but deterrence has held. For years any prudent military planner had to
assume that the North Koreans had a small number of nuclear weapons.
Today's development merely affirms the correctness of this assumption.

The problem, of course, is that the impact of North Korea's nuclear test
cannot be limited to the Korean peninsula. In the long run, North Korea's
action threatens to set off an arms race in Northeast Asia, a region of
rich, technologically advanced states. In Japan the North Korean action
will strengthen political elements wishing to see it become more of a
"normal country" with a more robust military capability and assertive
foreign policy. From the standpoint of new Prime Minister Shinzo Abe,
North Korea's nuclear test is an unwelcome development, but the timing
could hardly be better.

Given its history and specific sensitivities as the only country to ever
be victimized by their use, Japan will not immediately "go nuclear" though
it has the nuclear, technical, and financial resources to do so. Rather,
in the short run, Japan will respond by increasing its defense budget and
enhancing cooperation with the United States. However, if North Korean
belligerency intensifies, it is not inconceivable that Japan would permit
the stationing of short-range nuclear missiles under US control on its
soil. Such missiles would be intended as a deterrent against North Korea,
with the maintenance of US control meant to reassure the rest of Asia that
such a development did not represent the resurgence of unchecked Japanese
militarism. In the long run, Japan could develop its own independent
capability. The only constraint is political.

Another party that will watch these developments closely is Taiwan. In
some ways in an analogous position to North Korea -- feeling threatened
militarily by a much larger power -- if North Korea is able to develop a
nuclear weapons capability without suffering severe penalties, the
Taiwanese will surely consider emulation. Of course, China would not
handle such a situation with the phlegmatic appeasement that Seoul has
shown.

Which raises the issue of South Korea itself. Again, South Korea is
capable of producing nuclear weapons and only foreswore their development
under US pressure. South Korea also may be eventually tempted to emulate,
especially if Japan goes nuclear.

In the end, China may find itself surrounded by nuclear powers.

The North Korean nuclear test has implications at the global level as
well. North Korea presents the frightening specter of a broke, decrepit
nuclear power. It has been involved in military cooperation with virtually
every oil exporter and unsavory regime in the world, including Iran and
Syria, to cite but two examples. Its state involvement in criminal
activity such as counterfeiting and drug trafficking has been extensively
documented, and the North Korean government has extensive contacts with
criminal organizations globally.

The fear is that an alienated North Korean regime, with no stake in the
existing order of international relations, will further its nuclear
cooperation with other states with nuclear ambitions or nonstate actors
such as al Qaeda, or worse yet, actually export fissile material or an
actual weapon.

History suggests that abandonment of nuclear weapons or an advanced
nuclear weapons program is usually preceded by political regime change: In
three of the four cases where states gave up nuclear weapons (Ukraine,
Belarus, and Kazakhstan), newly installed governments seeking to assert
democratic credentials and gain international acceptance voluntarily
surrendered weapons left over from the Soviet Union. The situation was a
little more complicated in the South African case: The apartheid-era
government made the decision to surrender its weapons prior to a regime
change in the context of a reduced external threat from Soviet proxies in
southern Africa following the collapse of the Soviet Union, concerns about
the use of weapons by a postapartheid successor regime, and a bid to gain
international legitimacy.

Similarly, the joint decision in 1988 by Argentina and Brazil to halt
their programs occurred in the context of newly installed democratic
regimes asserting their authority over their militaries by reversing
decisions undertaken by preceding military governments.

The most recent case, that of Libya, occurring in the context of changing
external circumstances and a broad Libyan attempt resolve longstanding
diplomatic irritants, is interesting in that it appears to deviate from
the pattern of terminating nuclear weapons programs following internal
regime change. Libya did not possess nuclear weapons, however, only a
nuclear weapons program, so presumably the value of the program -- and
hence the cost of surrendering it -- was less to the government as
compared with actual weapons.

Such considerations suggest that there is a slight chance of putting the
genie back into the bottle through the Six Party Talks. More likely is
that the world will have to adjust to a nuclear-armed North Korea. The
example of Pakistan demonstrates that while countries may initially
respond to a nuclear test by imposing sanctions, both internal and
diplomatic considerations eventually encourage their removal. In the case
at hand, the imposition of significant economic sanctions are expected,
but it is doubtful that such sanctions will be sufficient to reverse North
Korea's course of action. The prospect of subjecting its people to
hardship is unlikely to deter North Korea's government from its chosen
path. As Pyongyang has surely deduced, the sanctions threat is not
entirely credible. China and South Korea, its primary economic patrons,
fear political instability on the Korean peninsula more than they fear a
nuclear-armed North Korea. In the end, they will resume support for the
regime. From the standpoint of the North Korean government, a couple years
of "arduous marching" and the world will have to come to accept North
Korea as a nuclear power.
*************************************************

7.   DOCTOR STRANGELOVE IN PYONGYANG
     by Peter Hayes and Tim Savage, Nautilus Institute, 10 October 2006

Stanley Kubrick's 1964 film about nuclear war, "Dr. Strangelove," was
subtitled, "How I learned to stop worrying and love the bomb." Like
Strangelove, North Korea's Kim Jong Il wants his neighbors to love North
Korea's bomb. In announcing the test, the (North) Korean Central News
Agency argued, "It will contribute to defending the peace and stability on
the Korean Peninsula and the surrounding areas."

His neighbors, however, do not see it that way. South Korea, Japan, and
even China have condemned the nuclear test. All three countries, after
all, are within range of North Korea's missiles. The United States says
that the world cannot live with a nuclear North Korea.

Few people know that Kim was first a filmmaker, only later, a leader of a
nuclear weapons state. Chapter 7 of his turgid text on moviemaking reads:
"The Art of Directing Cinema Lies with the Director." This may be a bad
movie, but there's no doubt that Kim is choreographing this drama.

The demonic genius of the nuclear Doomsday Machine is that it gives your
opponent a stake in your survival. As unpalatable as the world may find
Kim Jong Il with nuclear weapons, the alternatives are worse. Regime
collapse, the long-cherished dream of the hardliners in Washington and
Tokyo, poses the prospect of loose nukes ending up in the hands of
power-mad generals in the midst of a war in Korea, or being spirited out
of the country to find their way into the hands of terrorists.

South Korea, China and Russia all understand this, which is why they won't
go along with any US plans to bring Pyongyang to its knees through
financial pressure. Both may retreat from engagement in the short-term,
but they will re-engage North Korea in short order.

So how to respond to the nuclear test? Right now, the best response is to
do little and say nothing, in order to devalue the Kim's bomb.
Confrontational actions such as a naval blockade or other military
measures under Chapter 7 UN Security Council sanctions would only validate
North Korea's claim that it needed a nuclear force to defend itself from
the "hostile policy" of the United States.

Moreover, the situation is too dangerous to risk precipitate military
action. Almost nothing is known about North Korea's nuclear weapons,
including what command and control systems are in place, how they are
safeguarded (if at all), and what kind of prospective deployment and
operational doctrine will govern their use. No one needs North Korea to be
improvising its nuclear strategy in the midst of a crisis on the
Demilitarized Zone where only last week, bullets were fired in anger.

The United States and China should also avoid falling into the "blame
game" about who failed to prevent North Korea from testing. The Six Party
Talks are now dead. As the two great powers involved directly with the
North, they have to work together to develop a viable strategy to engage
North Korea and restart negotiations, possibly in a new tripartite forum.
If the United States baulks at engaging North Korea, then China and Russia
will simply cut their own deals with Kim Jong Il in order to re-stabilize
the situation.

Finally, the United States should work to prevent its allies, Japan and
South Korea, from building their own nuclear weapons in response. The mere
existence of American nuclear weapons is a powerful deterrent to first-use
by Pyongyang. Redeploying American nuclear weapons in Japan, South Korea,
or the surface waters of the western Pacific would add no strategic
advantage to America's retaliatory capability.

Japan is the linchpin in this regard. The United States must do everything
possible to avoid any prospect of Japanese proliferation outcome that
would inflame China and both Koreas alike. Issuing ultimatums or new
nuclear threats to Pyongyang invites Kim to turn up the volume and conduct
a second test and will not lead to anywhere but confrontation.

While everyone figures out how to respond to Strangelove's latest
appearance, this time in Pyongyang, they should recall the US president's
admonition from the film: "Gentlemen, there's no fighting in the war
room!"
*************************************************

8.   Q & A ON DPRK NUCLEAR TEST
     PacNews Bulletin 1-06, Pacific Forum CSIS, 10 October 2006

The following on-the-record comments by Pacific Forum CSIS specialists, in
question/response format, are provided for your information and possible
use as we all closely monitor events surrounding the Oct, 9, 2006 North
Korean announcement that it successfully detonated a nuclear device.

QUESTION: Is the DPRK nuclear test likely to prompt a nuclear arms race in
Asia?

RESPONSE:
Pacific Forum President Ralph A. Cossa: "It depends on how promptly and
firmly the international community responds. If Pyongyang is perceived to
be paying a large price for its action, this will dissuade others. If the
consequences are few, others will be emboldened. North Koreans frequently
point to Pakistan as an example of a country that gained new international
prominence and respect (in their eyes) after conducting its 1998 test,
with little or no lasting consequences. My biggest concern is that the
test will be used, not by nuclear wannabe's, but by current nuclear
weapons states, as an excuse to resume testing. I believe there are many
both in the US Pentagon and in the Chinese PLA (and perhaps in India and
elsewhere) who want to resume weapons testing and may be tempted to use
the DPRK test as an excuse to push this line of thinking."

QUESTION: If it does promote an arms race, which are the most likely
dominos to fall?

RESPONSE:
Ralph Cossa: "If any leader is inclined to follow Kim Jong Il's example,
it would be Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian. If NK is 'justified' because
it faces a threat from a bully superpower, Taiwan can make the same
argument. Since Taiwan, at PRC insistence, is not under IAEA supervision
(since it is not a country, according to Beijing), it has more flexibility
and opportunity to cheat. I would place Seoul a distant second on the
domino list, given it's desire for an 'independent' defense posture and
current (and presumed future) disagreements with Washington over regional
security priorities. Again, the firmer the international response to North
Korea's test, the less likely it is that either (or others) will be
tempted to follow suit. Outside Asia, Tehran is obviously watching closely
to see how firm the international response will be."

QUESTION: Will Japan become a nuclear domino?

RESPONSE:
Brad Glosserman, Pacific Forum Executive Director: "No. North Korea's test
complicates Japanese national security planning, compounds popular
insecurities, and provides ample fodder for conservatives and nationalists
who demand a more robust defense posture. It will certainly be cited by
Prime Minister Abe Shinzo and others as they campaign to revise Japan's
constitution. And over a decade ago then Prime Minister Hata Tsutomu
admitted that "Japan has the capability to possess nuclear weapons." But
Japan still lacks the will to develop nuclear weapons. The nuclear taboo
remains strong in Japan. The Japanese public remains highly allergic to
the thought of developing its own nuclear weapons capability. Japanese
security planners recognize that a national nuclear arsenal would be
destabilizing and would actually diminish Japanese security. Building a
Japanese bomb would further erode the global nonproliferation order,
generate greater mistrust among neighbors, and raise questions from the US
about its strategic intentions."

QUESTION: What sort of military response will Japan make?

RESPONSE:
Brad Glosserman. "Japan will press forward with the development of a
missile defense program, an effort that is already underway in cooperation
with the US. There will be debate over the merits of a policy of
preemptive strikes, but Japan does not have the capacity to take such
action today. Japan may acquire cruise missiles that allow it to make
preemptive strikes, but only after considerable debate -- and more
potentially offensive weaponry will remain off limits. Conservatives will
use the North Korean test to push for revision of their Peace
Constitutional and revamping the national security bureaucracy, such as
elevating the Defense Agency to a full-fledged ministry. More money will
be put into satellite programs."

QUESTION: How should South Korea respond?

RESPONSE:
Junbeom Pyon, Pacific Forum Vasey Fellow: "South Korea ought to engage in
multilateral talks with the USA and China, and not make any agreements
with the North without the others. Seoul should send an official statement
to the North, making it explicit that the regime's refusal to return to
the Six-Party Talks will result in termination of all prior agreements
between the two Koreas and of energy and food assistance from the South.
President Roh should also announce his full support for international
condemnation of the North Korean regime, including UN sanctions, if
Pyongyang refuses international demands. This will help alleviate US
criticism of the South's stance on North Korea and protect its
credibility; for nearly four years, South Korea has said that it will not
tolerate a nuclear North Korea. Equally important, Seoul must ensure that
humanitarian aid is provided to the North under the auspices of the United
Nations. South Korea should call an urgent meeting with the four parties
and discuss the possibility of an eventual collapse of the North Korean
regime. Although this outcome may be unlikely in the near future, without
such planning, states involved in the crisis may face immense difficulties
with economic, political, and humanitarian problems following the regime's
end. Equally important for Seoul is to study the possibility and the
consequences of North Korea's refusal to return to the Six-Party Talks. To
prevent further escalation and any military conflict on the Peninsula,
Korea, in coordination with China, must also exert pressure on Washington
for it to study other possibilities of engaging North Korea."

QUESTION: How should China respond?

RESPONSE:
Qinghong Wang, Pacific Forum Vasey Fellow: "China's priority after the
test is to maintain regional stability. Beijing will do its best to bring
Pyongyang back to the Six-Party Talks or other diplomatic negotiations.
Beijing might send high-level Chinese diplomats to Pyongyang. China will
definitely send troops to secure the PRC-DPRK borders. China's decision to
resume economic aid to North Korea will depend on Pyongyang's response to
Beijing's demands. In the meantime, Beijing should ask the UN Security
Council to take the leading role on the North Korea nuclear issue if
Pyongyang refuses to return to the Six-Party Talks. Pyongyang will again
play "divide and conquer" by trying to cut a deal with Seoul, Beijing,
Moscow, and even Tokyo and add more pressure on Washington. So Beijing
should cooperate with other parties on how to uniformly, not bilaterally,
make a deal with Pyongyang. China should support potential economic
sanctions on North Korea by the UN. But China should continue providing
humanitarian aid to North Korea. Beijing should also be prepared for other
social, political, and military negative effects in case the Pyongyang
regime suddenly collapses. Beijing should cooperate with organs of the UN,
starting the discussion with relevant countries on the possibility of
building refugee camps in the Far Eastern region of Russia to deal with
North Korean refugees if the Pyongyang regime collapses."

Ralph Cossa: "If Beijing really wants to get Pyongyang's attention, it
should announce that it is considering, in the context of stricter
economic sanctions, an 'open border' policy and the establishment of
UN-sponsored refugee camps on the Chinese side of the Yalu River to
provide 'temporary refuge' for North Korean citizens until the current
leadership takes steps to reverse its nuclear course. China, at North
Korea's insistence, presently forces most refugees to return, where they
meet a most unpleasant fate - this policy must change. Neighboring Russia
and Mongolia can also provide safe havens and the ROK (along with the USA,
Japan, and others) should be prepared to support refugee relocation if it
comes to that."

QUESTION: How should Japan respond?

RESPONSE:
Brad Glosserman: "As after North Korea's July missile tests, Japan should
be leading the diplomatic effort at the United Nations. It should work to
create tough language for a resolution that all key parties - the ROK and
the PRC included - can agree to. It should continue close consultations
with Washington, Beijing, and Seoul to ensure that the four governments
maintain a united front. At the same time, Japan should also be ready to
discuss directly with North Korea how to normalize their troubling
relationship. This test should not cut off all dialogue. Japan has already
cut many of the financial links between it and North Korea. It should
strive to ensure that it complies with previous UN resolutions that call
for the suspension of all trade that supports DPRK missile or WMD
programs."

QUESTION: How should the USA respond?

RESPONSE:
Ralph Cossa: "Washington should lower its voice and work more quietly
behind the scenes, letting Japan drive the diplomatic effort at the UNSC
and encouraging China and South Korea to speak more firmly, to underscore
that this is an international crisis, not a bilateral US-North Korea
problem. Washington also needs to provide specific assurances that it
would not take advantage of any UN resolutions invoking Article VII to
launch a unilateral military response."

QUESTION: Will the USA be tempted to move atomic weapons back into South
Korea as a result of the test?

RESPONSE:
Ralph Cossa: "I doubt it. Movement of air defenses and perhaps
conventional offensive systems is more likely. Nuclear weapons do not have
to be placed in close proximity, at least not for military reasons;
perhaps for psychological reasons, but announcing that they were in place
would run contrary to present US "neither confirm nor deny" policy and
also create a big target both for DPRK missiles and for ROK protesters. It
also could not happen without ROK request or consent, and this does not
appear likely."

QUESTION: Whose fault is this? Why wasn't the test prevented?

RESPONSE:
Ralph Cossa: "The 'blame game' has already begun, with Bush administration
critics (foreign and domestic) blaming Washington for its 'inflexibility,'
while others blame Seoul and Beijing for being too soft, Tokyo for being
too hard, or Russia for doing hardly nothing at all. In truth, all deserve
a share of the secondary blame - each could have pursued more effective
policies - but the primary blame rests with one person only: North Korea
'Dear Leader' Kim Jong Il. Even when the Clinton administration was
sending high-level envoys and then-ROK President Kim Dae-jung was driving
down the airport highway lined with pom-pom girls for his historic 2000
summit in Pyongyang, North Korea was already hedging its bets and pursuing
clandestine nuclear weapons programs. Let's not allow the 'blame game' to
draw attention away from the real problem: North Korea's nuclear weapons
ambitions, which I would argue were sparked as much by the 'Pakistan
example' as by anything that has happened since."
*************************************************

End CanKor # 263

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