[Cankor] Report #264

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CANADA-KOREA ELECTRONIC INFORMATION SERVICE

CanKor # 264

Friday, 20 October 2006
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Predictably, the DPRK's nuclear test has been followed by further 
sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council, with 
additional measures implemented by the USA, Japan and Australia. We 
begin this full-edition CanKor FOCUS: "UN Security Council Sanctions" 
with an historical perspective. Julia Choi and Karin Lee of the US 
National Committee on North Korea (NCNK) have produced a comprehensive 
account of UN and US sanctions dating from 1995 to 2006. This is 
followed by a BBC listing of sanctions against the DPRK that were 
already in place before the latest UNSC Resolution, and an Associated 
Press summary of sanctions being imposed after the UNSC Resolution.

Among the many statements that followed the unanimous decision on 
Resolution 1718, we present those of Canadian Foreign Minister Peter 
MacKay, the Council of the European Union, and the DPRK Foreign Ministry.

Our section on CANADIAN OPINION includes a retired admiral's reaction to 
Foreign Minister MacKay's assertion that Canada would stand with its 
allies to enforce United Nations sanctions against the DPRK; a paper by 
Canadian academic Wenran Jiang explaining why the DPRK "won't blink in 
the game of nuclear chicken"; and article explaining what North Korea 
wants by Canadian businessman Maurice Strong, former special envoy to 
the DPRK of United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan; and two letters 
to the editor of the Toronto Star one by a board member of the 
Canada-DPR Korea Association, the other by a member of Canadian 
Physicians for Global Survival.

CORRECTION: We apologize for incorrectly describing "A Nuclear North 
Korea: Where Do We Go From Here?" in the last issue of CanKor (#263). 
The author, Marcus Noland, writes as follows:
"Thank you for your interest in my work. However, I think that you have 
seriously mischaracterized my position with regard to proliferation 
risks, indeed I think that you have it exactly backwards: the threat of 
a regional arms race or proliferation to other states is HIGHER than 
with respect to non-state actors."
*************************************************

Contents:

FOCUS: UN Security Council Sanctions

1.   SANCTIONS AND US TREASURY DEPARTMENT ACTIONS 1995-2006
     http://www.ncnk.org/ncnk/resources/news-releases

2.   SUMMARY OF SANCTIONS BEFORE UNSC RESOLUTION
     http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6043610.stm

3.   SUMMARY OF SANCTIONS FOLLOWING UNSC RESOLUTION
     
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2006/10/15/asia/AS_GEN_Koreas_Sanctions_Glance.php

4.   CANADIAN FOREIGN MINISTER ON UNSC RESOLUTION
     
http://w01.international.gc.ca/MinPub/Publication.aspx?isRedirect=True&Language=E&publication_id=384468&docnumber=121

5.   EU WILL FULLY IMPLEMENT UNSC RESOLUTION
     Original direct to CanKor.

6.   DPRK FOREIGN MINISTRY TOTALLY REFUTES UNSC RESOLUTION
     http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2006/200610/news10/18.htm#1

CANADIAN OPINION
7.   CANADA WILL STAND WITH ALLIES -- BUT HOW?
     http://channels.netscape.ca/news/article.adp?id=20061015182609990002

8.   DPRK WON'T BLINK IN THE GAME OF NUCLEAR CHICKEN
     
https://secure.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/Page/document/v5/templates/hub

9.   WHAT NORTH KOREA WANTS
     
https://secure.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/LAC.20061017.COKOREA17/TPStory//?DENIED=1&brand=

10.  KIM JONG IL CRAZY ... LIKE A FOX
11.  NORTH KOREA PUTS ON A DEFIANT FACE
     
http://www.thestar.com/NASApp/cs/ContentServer?pagename=thestar/Layout/Article_Type1&c=Article&cid=1161121812506&call_pageid=968332189003&col=968350116895
*************************************************

FOCUS: UN Security Council Sanctions

*************************************************

1.   SANCTIONS AND US TREASURY DEPARTMENT ACTIONS 1995-2006
     by Julia Choi and Karin Lee, NCNK, updated 18 October 2006

[Following is the introduction of a report compiled by the US National 
Committee on North Korea (http://www.ncnk.org). Please check the NCNK 
website for regular updates to this report as well as for other 
information on USA-DPRK relations: 
http://www.ncnk.org/ncnk/resources/news-releases.  --CanKor.]

On October 9, the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK) declared 
that it had tested a nuclear weapon, once again capturing the world's 
attention -- and bringing the certainty of a UN Security Council 
response and a more stringent US sanctions regime.

This paper aims to present a clear discussion of the history of US and 
UN action against North Korea in order to place current and future 
measures in context. A brief summary of current events is followed by 
longer sections tracking the major changes in US and UN sanctions 
against North Korea over the past six decades. Next, a summary of the 
measures taken by other relevant governments after the July 5 missile 
test and October 9 nuclear test is provided. The paper concludes with a 
chart of US sanctions against North Korea from 2000-September 2006, as 
well as a time-line listing major events in USA-DPRK relations and the 
imposition and relaxing of US sanctions.

The July 5 2006 Missile Test and the October 9 2006 Nuclear Test Since 
2000, when the Clinton administration lifted certain sanctions in 
response to North Korea's 1999 self-imposed missile-test moratorium, US 
sanctions and the DPRK's WMD development have been intimately linked. 
Now, with the adoption of UN Resolution 1718, a tougher US sanctions 
regime may be imminent.

The USA-DPRK relationship is complex and involves many separate issues, 
but from the narrow perspective of the history of US sanctions against 
North Korea, this particular trajectory began in March 2005, when North 
Korea announced the end of its self-imposed missile test moratorium - 
thereby calling into question whether or not the Bush administration 
would re-impose sanctions lifted in 2000.

The DPRK's short-range missiles tests on May 1, 2005 and March 8, 2006, 
garnered only limited public condemnation from the United States and 
international community. However, on July 5, 2006, when the DPRK 
test-launched an array of ballistic missiles, including a long-range 
Taepodong-2, the world was watching. Intelligence reports had suggested 
for weeks that North Korea might be planning such a launch and US, South 
Korean, Japanese and Russian government officials had warned that a test 
launch would be seen as a provocative act.

Ten days after the missile test, in its first official response to North 
Korean actions since 1996, the United Nations Security Council adopted 
Resolution 1695. Departing from the more subdued responses that have 
characterized the Security Council's dealings with the DPRK for the last 
decade, Resolution 1695 condemned the missile tests, demanded North 
Korea cease all activities related to its ballistic missile program, and 
called on all Member States to comply with measures limiting North 
Korea's access to, and ability to sell, missile-related materials or 
technology. South Korea had already suspended food aid, and Japan and 
Australia had already enacted measures in response to the missile tests, 
mainly targeting the flow of finances from suspect entities to the DPRK. 
The United States had indicated that it might respond with additional 
sanctions as a means of implementing Resolution 1695, but such measures 
have not yet been implemented.

North Korea maintained that the July missile tests were its "legitimate 
right as a sovereign state," claiming that the self-imposed missile 
testing moratorium had been upheld only on condition of continuing 
USA-DPRK dialogue. Condemning the resolution as an attempt by "some 
countries to misuse the Security Council," North Korea unambiguously 
rejected Resolution 1695.

The international community responded strongly when North Korea 
announced on October 3, 2006 that it would "in the future conduct a 
nuclear test under the condition where safety is firmly guaranteed." 
Three days later the UN Security Council issued a presidential 
statement, stressing that "a nuclear test, if carried out by the DPRK, 
would represent a clear threat to international peace and security and 
that, should the DPRK ignore calls of the international community, the 
Security Council will act consistent with its responsibility under the 
Charter of the United Nations."

The UN Security Council responded relatively quickly to the October 9th 
test. The debate within the council was contentious but brisk; on 
October 14, the Council adopted UN Resolution 1718. The vote was 
unanimous, despite the fact that the statements accompanying the 
resolution reveal unsettled differences.

The new resolution is much stronger than 1695; it calls for inspection 
of DPRK cargo, bars the travel to UN Member States of North Koreans 
"responsible" for the DPRK's WMD program, requires UN Member States to 
freeze the financial assets of North Korean people or entities 
designated by the UN as engaged in DPRK WMD activities, invokes Chapter 
VII and requires the establishment of an oversight committee.

At this time member states are beginning to implement the new 
resolution. According to the New York Times, prior to the nuclear test 
an anonymous US official indicated that a North Korean test would 
trigger extensive US sanctions: "We'll end up going to full-scale 
sanctions; the only debate is what 'full-scale' means." With the 
adoption of Resolution 1718, the meaning of "full-scale" should soon 
become clear. A short history about the meaning and extent of US 
sanctions against North Korea is provided in this report. This report 
will be updated after new sanctions are announced.
*************************************************

2.   SUMMARY OF SANCTIONS BEFORE UNSC RESOLUTION
     BBC News online, 12 October 2006

[The following is a compilation on the BBC News website of the sanctions 
already in place against the DPRK as the UN Security Council considered 
further sanctions in the wake of the nuclear test. --CanKor.]

USA
Despite easing 50-year-old sanctions against North Korea in 2000, the 
USA has had limited trading relations with Pyongyang amid suspicion over 
its nuclear plans. Since 2002, when relations began to seriously 
deteriorate, the USA has been calling for a much tougher stance by the 
international community against North Korea. In 2003, it launched the 
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) with the aim of interdicting 
weapons from North Korea, Iran and other countries of concern. 
Participating countries were called on to search aircraft and ships 
suspected of carrying weapons-related material.

In September 2005, Washington imposed financial sanctions on North 
Korea, accusing it of involvement in the laundering of drug money and 
counterfeit currency. It froze the assets of eight firms it believed to 
be linked to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and acted 
against a bank in Macau accused of helping launder money and of having 
links with the North Korean leadership.

Following North Korea's test launching of seven missiles in July 2006, 
the UN Security Council condemned North Korea and called on all members 
to stop missiles and missile-related technology being transferred to 
North Korea. The USA took action against 12 companies and one individual 
under these sanctions.

Following North Korea's claimed nuclear test, the USA pushed for a new 
UN condemnation of North Korea, including reference to the UN's Chapter 
Seven, which could eventually allow for military action.

JAPAN
Two days after the nuclear test, Japan announced new bilateral sanctions 
banning all North Korean imports and prohibiting North Korean ships from 
entering Japanese ports. North Korean nationals, with a few exceptions, 
were also barred entry into Japan.

The import ban will hit vital North Korean money-making exports such as 
mushrooms and clams, as well as coal. Cars, trucks and buses are Japan's 
main exports to North Korea. The sanctions came on top of those already 
imposed after North Korea's missile tests in July 2006. Japan was 
instrumental in pushing through that UN resolution, which called on all 
member states to prevent imports from or exports to North Korea of 
materials that could be used in weapons of mass destruction. Tokyo also 
suspended food aid to North Korea, introduced limited financial 
sanctions and banned the main North Korean ferry service between the two 
countries.

THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
South Korea has been actively trying to engage the North under its 
so-called "Sunshine Policy" and has stepped up economic, political and 
humanitarian contacts. But the policy has drawn criticism from its main 
ally, the USA, and a growing number of people at home who demand a 
stronger line towards Pyongyang.

After July's missile tests, South Korea cut off regular humanitarian 
aid, including rice and fertilizer to the North. But it has been 
reluctant to support stronger measures for fear of raising tensions with 
its neighbour. It also fears political or economic collapse in North 
Korea since this could lead to millions of refugees crossing its border. 
For these and other reasons, South Korea had been reluctant to join the 
US-led Proliferation Security Initiative. However, following North 
Korea's claimed nuclear test, Vice-Foreign Minister Yoo Myeong-hwan said 
the South planned to join "on a partial and case-by-case basis."

CHINA
China is Pyongyang's largest trading partner and closest ally, and 
played a key role in the now stalled negotiations over North Korea's 
nuclear programme. Beijing has flatly condemned North Korea over its 
nuclear test, but like South Korea it wants to see a stable neighbour 
and has resisted tough measures called for by the USA. It voted for the 
UN resolution in July banning missile-related imports, but only after 
any mention of Chapter Seven was removed. China has supported "some 
punitive actions" against North Korea following its nuclear test and has 
not ruled out sanctions, but says military action would be "unimaginable".

RUSSIA
Russia had strong ties with North Korea during the Soviet era and sees 
the country as a potential transit route for energy pipelines. Like 
China -- another veto-wielding member of the UN Security Council -- 
Russia has been inclined towards coaxing the North rather than punishing 
it. Russia has also condemned North Korea's nuclear test but said 
military action is not the answer and again called for the issue to be 
resolved through diplomatic means Moscow has not publicly stated what, 
if any, sanctions it would agree too.

AUSTRALIA
Australia, along with Japan, followed the USA by announcing financial 
sanctions against North Korea in September 2006. The sanctions involved 
freezing the transfer of money to North Korea by 12 groups and one 
person suspected of having links to its nuclear or missile programmes, 
Canberra said.

UNITED KINGDOM
The UK has a similar position to the USA. Following the nuclear test, 
Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett said the UK would be pushing strongly 
for sanctions and for Chapter Seven to be invoked in the UN. She said 
any new UN resolution must go further than the sanctions on 
missile-related imports and exports already in place.
*************************************************

3.   SUMMARY OF SANCTIONS FOLLOWING UNSC RESOLUTION
     The Associated Press, 15 October 2006

The Security Council voted Saturday to impose the following sanctions on 
North Korea, in response to its claim that it has conducted a nuclear test:

-- an embargo on major weapons hardware such as tanks, warships, combat 
aircraft and missiles.
-- the freezing of the assets of people or businesses connected to 
weapons programs.
-- a travel ban for anyone involved in weapons program.
-- a ban on the sale of luxury goods to North Korea.
-- a ban on the importing of materials that could be used in 
unconventional weapons or ballistic missiles.
-- a call for inspections of all cargo leaving and arriving in North 
Korea to prevent any illegal trafficking in unconventional weapons or 
ballistic missiles.

In addition to the UN resolution, the United States maintains its own 
sanctions on North Korea, including:

-- a ban on US defense exports and sales to the country.
-- a ban on US aid, including a halt in food deliveries through the 
World Food Program, though not all food assistance has been banned.
-- several financial restrictions that oppose support for North Korea 
from international financial institutions and restrict business with 
banks that the USA alleges have helped the regime counterfeit and 
launder money.
-- strict limits on the amount of trade between the two countries.

Japan has imposed the following additional measures and is considering 
several more:

-- a ban on the entry of North Korean ships to its ports.
-- a trade embargo.
-- a continued ban on the Mangyongbong-92 ferry's entry into Japanese 
waters. Japan has restricted the movement of the ferry, which once 
served a major conduit for trade, since July when North Korea test-fired 
seven missiles into the waters between the two countries.

Australia is considering the following additional sanctions:

-- a ban on the entry of North Korean ships to its ports.

[For full text of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718, 
please go to: 
http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/0688UNSCStatement.html  --CanKor.]
*************************************************

4.   CANADIAN FOREIGN MINISTER ON UNSC RESOLUTION
     Foreign Affairs Canada Press Release, 14 October 2006

The Honourable Peter MacKay, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of 
the Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency, today issued the following 
statement concerning the announcement by the United Nations Security 
Council that it has voted unanimously to impose sanctions on North Korea 
in response to that country's claimed nuclear test:

"Canada is pleased that the UN Security Council has responded to the 
provocative action of the nuclear test by North Korea on October 9 and 
approved Resolution 1718, which we strongly support."

"Today's unanimous vote demonstrates that the international community is 
united in demanding that North Korea abandon its nuclear programs. 
Canada will fulfill its obligations under UN Security Council Resolution 
1718, and urges North Korea to return to the six-party talks, without 
condition, as the best forum to address its economic, political and 
security goals."
*************************************************

5.   EU WILL FULLY IMPLEMENT UNSC RESOLUTION
     Council of the European Union, Luxembourg, 17 October 2006

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

"The Council strongly condemns the test of a nuclear explosive device 
proclaimed by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) on 9 
October 2006. This test, carried out in disregard of appeals from the 
international community, poses a danger to regional stability and 
represents a clear threat to international peace and security. It is a 
further violation by the DPRK of its non-proliferation obligations. It 
reinforces the DPRK's isolation and does nothing to help the miserable 
situation of the North Korean people.

The EU will fully implement the provisions of all relevant UNSC 
Resolutions and notably of Resolution 1718 adopted on 14 October 2006 
and of Resolution 1695 adopted on 15 July 2006. The Council shall 
immediately take the necessary steps to that end.

The Council strongly urges the DPRK, in compliance with UNSC Resolutions 
1718 and 1695, to return immediately to the Six-Party talks, to work 
towards expeditious implementation of the Joint Statement of September 
2005, in particular to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear 
programmes, and to comply with its obligations under the NPT, which 
include submitting all its nuclear activities to IAEA verification. The 
EU further calls on the DPRK to sign and ratify the Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, to refrain from conducting any further nuclear 
test or missile launch, and to re-establish its commitments to a 
moratorium on missile launching.

DPRK's actions add to the risks of proliferation worldwide. The Council 
calls for redoubling of efforts to strengthen all aspects of the 
international system against proliferation of WMD."
*************************************************

6.   DPRK FOREIGN MINISTRY TOTALLY REFUTES UNSC RESOLUTION
     Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), 17 October 2006

A spokesman for the Foreign Ministry of the Democratic People's Republic 
of Korea Tuesday issued the following statement: On Oct. 14 the United 
States instigated the UN Security Council to pass another "resolution" 
calling for harsh international sanctions and blockade against the DPRK, 
unreasonably describing its nuclear test for self-defence as a "threat" 
to international peace and security.

The successful nuclear test in the DPRK was an exercise of its 
independent and legitimate right as a sovereign state as it was a 
positive defensive countermeasure to protect the sovereignty of the 
country and life and security of the people from the US escalated 
nuclear war threat and sanctions and pressure.

The DPRK was compelled to legitimately pull out of the NPT according to 
its relevant provision and manufactured nuclear weapons after undergoing 
the most fair and aboveboard and transparent processes as the USA 
seriously encroached upon the supreme security of the DPRK and the 
fundamental interests of the Korean nation under the pretext of the 
nuclear issue.

The DPRK conducted the test proving its possession of nukes in a 
legitimate manner after fairly announcing it in advance, something 
unprecedented in view of international practice.

It conducted the nuclear test under the conditions where its security is 
fully guaranteed and clearly declared that the DPRK, a responsible 
nuclear weapons state, would never use nukes first and will not allow 
nuclear transfer.

It also clarified that it would make every possible effort to promote 
the worldwide nuclear disarmament and the final elimination of nuclear 
weapons and invariably adhere to the principle to realize the 
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula through dialogue and negotiations.

However, the USA, the very one that has driven the DPRK to the nuclear 
test, is describing the DPRK's nuclear test as a "threat" to 
international peace and security, while shelving what it has done like a 
thief crying "Stop the thief!" This totally preposterous act is intolerable.

The nuclear test in the DPRK was a great deed that greatly contributed 
to defending peace and stability not only on the Korean Peninsula but in 
the rest of Northeast Asia as it demonstrated powerful deterrent for 
coping with the US nuclear threat and blackmail and foiling its attempt 
to ignite a new war.

The UNSC, paying no heed to all these facts, feigned ignorance of the US 
hostile policy toward the DPRK, the policy that spurned the nuclear 
issue on the Korean Peninsula, and is now incriminating the DPRK's 
exercise of its sovereign right to defend the sovereignty of the 
country, while trumpeting about the denuclearization of the peninsula. 
This is an immoral behavior utterly devoid of impartiality.

The UNSC "resolution," needless to say, cannot be construed otherwise 
than a declaration of a war against the DPRK because it was based on the 
scenario of the USA keen to destroy the socialist system of Korean-style 
centered on the popular masses.

The DPRK vehemently denounces the "resolution," a product of the US 
hostile policy toward the DPRK, and totally refutes it.

The adoption of this "resolution" made it impossible for the UNSC to 
evade the historic responsibility for having patronized and connived at 
the USA which caused the division of Korea, the root cause of all 
misfortunes of the Korean nation, in violation of the UN Charter the 
cornerstone of which is the principle of sovereignty, equality and 
self-determination and has systematically perpetrated undisguised moves 
to "bring down the system" in the DPRK.

The present development clearly proves once again that the DPRK was 
entirely right when it decided to have access to nuclear weapons, its 
people's choice.

The USA would be well advised not to miscalculate the DPRK.

If the Bush group, oblivious of the lessons drawn from the shameful 
setbacks recorded in the history of the relations between the preceding 
US administrations and the DPRK, calculates it can bring the DPRK to its 
knees through sanctions and pressure, pursuant to the already bankrupt 
hostile policy toward it, there would be nothing more ridiculous and 
foolish than its behavior.

The DPRK had remained unfazed in any storm and stress in the past when 
it had no nuclear weapons. It is quite nonsensical to expect the DPRK to 
yield to the pressure and threat of someone at this time when it has 
become a nuclear weapons state.

The DPRK wants peace but is not afraid of war. It wants dialogue but is 
always ready for confrontation.

As already clarified by the DPRK, it will fulfil its responsibility for 
realizing the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. But if anyone 
attempts to infringe upon the DPRK's sovereignty and right to existence 
even a bit under the signboard of the UNSC "resolution," it will deal 
merciless blows at him through strong actions.

The DPRK will closely follow the future US attitude and take 
corresponding measures.
*************************************************

CANADIAN OPINION

*************************************************

7.   CANADA WILL STAND WITH ALLIES -- BUT HOW?
     by Murray Brewster, Canadian Press, 16 October 2006

Foreign Affairs Minister Peter MacKay scolded defiant North Korean 
leaders Sunday and pledged Canada would stand with its allies to enforce 
United Nations sanctions against the isolated communist state. He said 
Ottawa has a "direct interest" in halting the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons material in the Pacific Rim.

But a retired admiral said the Conservative government could have a 
tough time assembling a naval task force to carry out an arms blockade 
against Kim Jong II's regime, given its other commitments and promises.

MacKay -- speaking from his riding in New Glasgow, NOVA SCOTIA -- 
stopped short of committing Canadian warships to the possible 
interception of North Korean ships. "We're not there at this point, but 
let's not forget we are a Pacific nation," he told CTV's Question 
Period. "We have a direct interest in seeing that these resolutions 
(and) sanctions are adhered to and taken seriously." (...)

Under the 1953 armistice, which ended the Korean War, Canada and its 
allies are committed to support South Korea militarily if the north 
attacks. Pyongyang has said it would consider sanctions to be an act of war.

"Let's hope some form of rational thinking will prevail in the capital 
of North Korea," said MacKay. "They can't behave as if they're an 
island, completely isolated from their neighbours. Japan, China, Russia 
and South Korea, of course, all have a very serious concern" about the 
claimed recent test.

A retired admiral warned Sunday that a meaningful military contribution 
to sanctions enforcement likely means Prime Minister Stephen Harper's 
government will have to drop its naval contribution to the war on terror 
-- or scale back its campaign promise to improve Canada's hold on the 
Arctic.

"If we were to commit ourselves to be part of the naval to blockade 
North Korea, we'd have to withdraw our activity in the Arabian Sea," 
said Fred Crickard, a former rear admiral and also a retired member of 
Dalhousie University's Centre for Foreign Policy Studies. "We couldn't 
do both."

Crickard, who has authored several academic papers on maritime naval 
strategy, said the navy doesn't have enough ships or sailors to maintain 
continuous deployments. In addition, the vastness of the Pacific Ocean 
would make maintaining a task force in waters off the Korean peninsula 
difficult without the presence of a supply vessel.

Currently, the navy has only one operational replenishment ship, which 
is based in Halifax. The Pacific fleet's supply vessel --HMCS Protecteur 
-- is in dry-dock undergoing a refit and will not be ready to sail until 
early next year. Since the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, the navy 
has contributed a number of ships to the war on terror, intercepting 
civilian vessels in and around the Arabian Peninsula. HMCS Ottawa is 
deployed in the region. (...)
*************************************************

8.   DPRK WON'T BLINK IN THE GAME OF NUCLEAR CHICKEN
     Wenran Jiang, Globe and Mail, 10 October 2006

[Wenran Jiang is director of the China Institute at the University of 
Alberta.]

In defiance of warnings from the international community, Pyongyang 
carried out its long-threatened nuclear weapons test yesterday, setting 
off worldwide condemnation and concern over nuclear arms proliferation 
in the region and around the globe.

Like Pyongyang's launch of seven missiles on July 4, its choice of 
timing in going nuclear was no accident. The United States has recently 
tightened its sanctions against North Korea, which views the measures as 
a declaration of war, and Beijing appears to be shifting away from its 
traditional support of the regime of Kim Jong-il. As well, South Korea's 
foreign minister is about to be voted in as the new United Nations 
Secretary-General, and Japan's new prime minister, a hard-liner against 
Pyongyang, is being welcomed in both Beijing and Seoul this week to 
resume long-interrupted summit diplomacy. Left behind, North Korea's own 
demands have failed to register a sympathetic hearing in the world.

For years, many believed that North Korea was just bluffing. How could 
an isolated, technologically backward, small Communist dictatorship with 
a starving population pull off a sophisticated nuclear arms operation 
that only half a dozen states could achieve. Such an attitude only 
propelled Pyongyang to be more resolute in proving its credentials. By 
failing to address repeated warning signs seriously, the world now must 
pay the price of either living with a nuclear North Korea or living 
without it.

For the United States, the test represents another foreign policy 
blunder of the Bush administration. Since 2000, Washington has been more 
obsessed with ending the Kim regime than ending its nuclear program. It 
discontinued the Clinton administration's 1994 "framework agreement" 
that provided aid to Pyongyang in exchange for the latter's suspension 
of its nuclear program. The Bush team labelled North Korea a "rogue 
state," part of an "axis of evil" and an "outpost of tyranny." After the 
US invasion of Iraq, Pyongyang reactivated its nuclear operation hoping 
to avoid the fate of Saddam Hussein.

In the ensuing six-party talks designed to resolve the crisis, involving 
South Korea, China, Japan and Russia, the USA took a hard-line position. 
Instead of fully engaging North Korea and providing security guarantees, 
Washington sought to press Pyongyang to give up its nuclear ambition 
without preconditions. Mr. Kim, convinced that the current US government 
has no intention of normalizing relations with North Korea, has refused 
to return to the negotiating table.

Yesterday's test is a wakeup call for the Bush hawks. Instead of a 
regime collapse, Pyongyang now has a nuclear arsenal of some seven to 10 
weapons (in contrast with having a suspended nuclear facility and, at 
most, one or two nuclear bombs back in 2000). The cost of now reversing 
the course, either by carrot or stick, will be much higher.

For China, Pyongyang's nuclear escalation is a slap in the face at the 
worst time. Chinese leaders have spent much energy in playing host to 
the six-party talks over the past few years, trying to broker a 
compromise between North Korea and the United States, only to be 
frustrated by both sides. Beijing is facing mounting domestic challenges 
and needs a stable international environment, especially good relations 
with its trading partners -- the USA, Japan and South Korea.

But unlike what is often portrayed in the press or argued by Bush 
administration supporters, Beijing's leverage over the secluded North 
Korea is not unlimited. Yes, China lost more than one million lives to 
save the North from being wiped out by US forces in the Korean War in 
the early 1950s, and, yes, it is the de facto ally of the Kim regime, 
economically sustaining it from collapse.

But this doesn't automatically make North Korea a Chinese patron. In 
fact, Pyongyang has been angered by China's recent decision to join 
Washington's financial sanctions against the North, by China's siding 
with others in the UN in condemning the North Korean missiles test in 
July and by Beijing's warming relations with Japan's hawkish prime 
minister, Shinzo Abe, who came to prominence in Japanese politics 
largely through bashing Pyongyang. By moving away from its neutral 
position between Pyongyang and Washington, Beijing's leverage over North 
Korea, limited in the first place, is weakened rather than strengthened.

And sandwiched between the big powers, South Korea is the most 
vulnerable of all due to its close geographic location to the North.

Seoul has pursued a "sunshine policy" of economic co-operation and 
political engagement with Pyongyang for some time. The lack of support 
from the Bush administration has strained its allied relationship with 
Washington. Now, amidst the outrage and disappointment, the South must 
soberly reflect on what to do next.

Christopher Hill, the US assistant secretary of state for Asia Pacific 
affairs, warned recently that North Korea can have either nuclear 
weapons or a future, but not both. Pyongyang, backed into a corner and 
desperate for regime survival, is not blinking in this high-stake game 
of chicken. The challenge for the Security Council, including the United 
States, is to go beyond tough words and come up with a well-thought-out 
solution to the crisis.
*************************************************

9.   WHAT NORTH KOREA WANTS
     by Maurice Strong, Globe & Mail, 17 October 2006

[Maurice Strong, the former special envoy of United Nations 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan for North Korea, is currently residing in 
China and working on the Korea issue at the recently established 
Institute for Security and Sustainability in Northeast Asia at Peking 
University.]

The most surprising thing to me about world reaction to the announcement 
by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea that it had carried out an 
underground nuclear test is that it has invoked such surprise. While 
North Korea has been unpredictable and, in Western eyes, eccentric in 
its negotiating tactics, it has been very focused and relentless in 
pursuing its objectives.

I am no advocate for the North Koreans but I believe it is important, 
indeed essential, that the world, and particularly their many 
adversaries, understand the basis for their actions as they perceive it. 
As they have insisted in their discussions with me and in public 
announcements, they, too, want to see a nuclear-free Korean peninsula 
and are prepared to co-operate in achieving this -- but only if the 
threat they perceive from the world's superpower, the United States, and 
its hostile policies toward them are also removed. This would include 
sanctions and impediments that deny membership to North Korea in 
international development institutions and access to the international 
trade, investment and assistance it requires to rebuild its shattered 
economy.

An a priori requirement for this would be the establishment of 
diplomatic relations with Washington, which refuses to engage in any but 
the most marginal direct discussions with Pyongyang. The USA has 
insisted that North Korea commit to the dismantling of its nuclear 
facilities as a precondition to negotiating other key issues. North 
Korea's objection to this has contributed to the impasse that has 
enabled it to develop its nuclear capacity to the point of testing of it.

Pyongyang gives the highest priority to ensuring its security. It would 
not be realistic to expect it to abandon its nuclear weapons program and 
leave it at the mercy of the Americans and their allies until its 
security concerns have been addressed. North Korea has no doubt weighed 
the issue carefully and is prepared to accept the risks it takes in 
conducting this nuclear test over the objections of its closest allies, 
China and South Korea.

Nevertheless, North Korea has crossed the Rubicon. The quiet frustration 
that China has long had with its neighbour has now been brought out in 
the open. Support for South Korea's "sunshine policy" and engagement 
with the North have also been dealt a severe setback. Though both 
Beijing and Seoul joined with Washington, Tokyo, Moscow and others in 
condemning the nuclear test, neither is likely to support military 
action or any of the extreme measures that could precipitate internal 
chaos in North Korea or military action on its part.

It's also not plausible to expect that regime change would lead to the 
abandonment of the positions that have been deeply entrenched in the 
attitudes and structures of North Korea. And military action could 
unleash a vast and destructive conflict that would be difficult, if not 
impossible, to contain and would make Iraq look like a picnic.

What, then, is the answer? It is difficult to know whether North Korea 
anticipated the harsh response of the world community through the UN 
with the support of usually more friendly regimes. Equally, the 
effectiveness of the sanctions is unknown. If there is any good that can 
come out of the world community's reaction to North Korea's nuclear 
test, it is that it could provide the basis for a new approach to 
resolving the ominous cloud that has threatened the region's peace and 
security for more than half a century.

Negotiations will be long and difficult, and will require a degree of 
engagement that has not yet occurred. Consistency of purposes by the 
parties to these negotiations will also require much more flexibility in 
the tactics and means for achieving these purposes. The USA has already 
shown some flexibility in its approach but more will be needed by all 
parties to ensure the kind of serious engagement necessary to resolve 
this festering conflict peacefully. Indeed, I would suggest that greater 
flexibility in tactics and means will be immensely helpful, even 
imperative, to achieve success in negotiations, particularly as it is in 
the larger interest of all parties to attain peace and security in the 
Korean peninsula. The ultimate objective must be to reach agreement on a 
peace treaty, which was envisaged when the armistice was signed in 1953 
but has never been achieved or even seriously negotiated.

The Korean War is the only one that has been conducted explicitly under 
a United Nations mandate. The troops deployed south of the demilitarized 
zone under US command continue to operate under the UN's blue flag, 
although it exercises no control over them. The unresolved crisis on the 
Korean peninsula is thus of special importance to the UN. This is why 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan took the initiative to support continuing 
efforts for a peaceful settlement of the dispute. It included extensive 
research into developing the economic capacities and alternative means 
of providing the energy supplies so essential to the revitalization of 
North Korea's economy and a necessary component of any peaceful 
settlement. South Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon, who, as the newly 
elected UN Secretary-General, brings a deep interest in and knowledge of 
these issues, has already indicated that he will give high priority to 
them. This in itself is a reason for hope and encouragement.
*************************************************

10.  KIM JONG IL CRAZY ... LIKE A FOX
     Toronto Star, Letters to the Editor, 18 October 2006

Under an oversized portrait of Kim Jong Il, Sunday's front page posed 
the question, "Does North Korea's Dear Leader want nuclear capability 
for fun or profit?" Like most articles, it overlooked the option that 
North Korea may want nuclear capability for protection.

An ardent North Korea watcher, I don't deny that Kim is a nut, who is 
not known for his rational decisions. However, to attempt to understand 
Kim's actions, we must ask ourselves, "Why does he care more about bombs 
than food?" A question to which there are many answers. Primarily, Kim 
Jong-Il is paranoid about what he perceives to be an imminent US attack. 
Technically, North Korea is still at war with the USA, as only a 
military armistice, not a peace treaty, was signed in 1953. Yet, despite 
Condoleezza Rice's efforts to begin negotiations on a peace treaty back 
in May 2006 and George W. Bush's recent promise that the USA will not 
attack, America refuses to put a formal end to the perpetual state of war.

This situation, combined with the harsh rhetoric of Bush and John 
Bolton, the Iraq war, and annual American/South Korean military 
exercises staged just south of the North Korean border, do nothing to 
assuage Kim's paranoia. I understand the viewpoint of Pak Gil-yon, North 
Korea's UN ambassador whom I met in Toronto last year, when he insists 
that nuclear capabilities are for self-defence.

After all, didn't Bush get exactly what he wants? A nuclear North Korea 
gives him countless reasons to justify pouring money into his growing 
nuclear arsenal and missile defence systems.

Ilene Solomon, Canada-DPR Korea Association, Toronto
*************************************************

11.  NORTH KOREA PUTS ON A DEFIANT FACE
     Toronto Star, Letters to the Editor, 18 October 2006

The UN Security Council has no legal or moral right to impose sanctions 
against North Korea. Under international law, based on article XI of the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty and the judgment of the International Court of 
Justice in The Hague, the declared nuclear powers, all of whom sit on 
the Security Council, are legally obligated to abolish their own nuclear 
weapons. They have, however, decided they are allowed to keep them and 
that some "good" states are allowed to join either overtly (India) or 
covertly (Israel) their apocalyptic club. The other "rogue" states are 
labelled "bad" by demonizing their leaders through propaganda. It is the 
oldest shell game of war. Unfortunately, with nuclear weapons, the 
planet can no longer abide it.

The only solution that will prevent nuclear war, and thus destruction of 
the earth, is global nuclear disarmament. What is happening now is 
moving us ever closer to the final nuclear endgame. It is high time the 
Western press demanded, loudly and clearly, nuclear abolition, to save 
themselves and the rest of us.

Mark Leith, MD, Toronto Chapter, Canadian Physicians for Global Survival
*************************************************

End CanKor # 264

*************************************************

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