[Cankor] Report #274

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CANADA-KOREA ELECTRONIC INFORMATION SERVICE

CanKor # 274

Friday, 23 February 2007
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On the one hand, the DPRK representative at the UN in New York sends 
the new Secretary General Ban Ki Moon a letter accusing the USA of 
hostile intent in pushing through an external audit of UNDP operations 
in Pyongyang. On the other, the DPRK invites the director of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency to Pyongyang for discussions 
related to the dismantling of its nuclear facilities. It is a sign 
that North Korea intends to move quickly to show good faith in 
complying with the recent Beijing Six-Party agreements, while 
maintaining a suspicious vigilance in its relationship with the USA.

Veteran journalist Donald Kirk explores the fate of concerns regarding 
the DPRK's presumed production of highly enriched uranium (HEU), 
mention of which has dropped from sight in the recent Six-Party 
document.

Russia's interest and role in the Six-Party process has been somewhat 
of a mystery to many. Were it not for the DPRK's insistence, Russia 
might not even have been invited to the table. We are pleased to 
publish a paper written for CanKor by Michael Berk, Research Fellow at 
the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, which reveals 
Russia's foreign policy perspective relating to regional security, and 
the DPRK in particular. The Russian approach to North Korean-related 
issues can be characterized as extremely pragmatic, writes Berk, based 
on a combination of economic and strategic considerations.
*************************************************

Contents:

1.   DPRK INVITES IAEA HEAD TO NUCLEAR TALKS
     http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20070223.wnkoreun0223/BNStory/International/

2.   DPRK ACCUSES USA OF HOSTILITY, LIES
     http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSN2216690220070223

3.   YES, WE HAVE NO URANIUM
     http://atimes01.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/IB24Dg01.html

OPINION
4.   RUSSIA'S PERSPECTIVE ON DPRK AND REGIONAL SECURITY
     by Michael Berk, CIIA, CanKor original

*************************************************

1.   DPRK INVITES IAEA HEAD TO NUCLEAR TALKS
     George Jahn, Associated Press, 23 February 2007

The head of the UN nuclear watchdog said Friday that North Korea has 
invited him to visit to discuss dismantling its nuclear facilities --  
a sign of the country's new willingness to subject its atomic program 
to outside scrutiny. Mohamed ElBaradei, director of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency, said he and North Korean authorities would 
discuss how to "implement the freeze of (nuclear) facilities" and 
"eventual dismantlement of these facilities." IAEA spokeswoman Melissa 
Fleming said Mr. ElBaradei would probably visit in the second week of 
March, after the agency board meets on North Korea and Iran, the other 
country of international nuclear concern.

Under a Feb. 13 agreement, the North -- which tested a nuclear weapon 
late last year -- agreed to dismantle its nuclear facilities and to 
normalize its relationships with South Korea, Japan and the United 
States in exchange for oil shipments, other aid and security 
guarantees. The deal requires North Korea to first shut down and seal 
its main nuclear reactor, accept international monitors and begin 
discussions with the United States on its other nuclear facilities. In 
return, the nations will ship the North an initial load of fuel oil. 
If North Korea then declares all its nuclear programs and begins to 
disable its nuclear facilities, it will get a much larger shipment of 
fuel oil and aid.

While Mr. ElBaradei offered no details, his announcement signalled the 
North's further willingness to open its nuclear program to outsiders 
for the first time since withdrawing from the Nonproliferation Treaty 
three years ago and ordering agency inspectors to leave. Still, it was 
only the first step in what a UN official described as "a process that 
could take years." Ideally that process would include re-establishing 
monitoring of the plutonium-producing Yongbyon nuclear facility, then 
being on site while it is mothballed and then dismantled.

"At the same time, there has to be some kind of declaration of what 
North Korea has and some way of following that up," said the diplomat, 
who asked for anonymity in exchange for discussing confidential 
information with The Associated Press.

Little is know about the North's nuclear program, leaving the outside 
world to rely mostly on North Korean claims since IAEA inspectors left 
in December 2002. Among areas of concern are what the United States 
insists is a second-track weapons program beyond the North's 
plutonium-based activities that uses uranium enrichment -- the same 
process that Washington accuses Iran of seeking to perfect in order to 
develop nuclear arms.

Chun Yung-woo, South Korea's chief nuclear envoy, told reporters in 
Seoul that whether North Koreas will relinquish existing nuclear 
weapons and material, believed enough for as many as a dozen bombs, 
will depend on the other countries involved -- China, South Korea, 
Japan, the United States and Russia.

"What is important is not to give any excuse to North Korea to delay 
its denuclearization obligations and for it to avoid implementation of 
its end of the deal," he said.

Conservatives in Washington have berated the Bush administration for 
caving in on what had been its previous tough stance on the North. The 
USA agreed to resolve financial restrictions it placed on a Macau 
bank -- accused of complicity in counterfeiting and money laundering 
by North Korea -- to pave the way for the disarmament-for-aid deal. On 
Friday during a visit to Australia, US Vice-President Dick Cheney 
expressed caution about the agreement, calling it a "first hopeful 
step."

"We go into this deal with our eyes open," said Mr. Cheney. "In light 
of North Korea's missile test last July, its nuclear test in October 
and its record of proliferation and human rights abuses, the regime in 
Pyongyang has much to prove."

Japan has also said it will not provide any aid under the deal or lift 
sanctions until the North takes concrete steps. Tokyo wants to address 
the issue of its abducted citizens that the North has admitted 
kidnapping but Japan says it has not been fully resolved.

A newspaper allied with the North Korean regime, in a Friday 
commentary, praised last week's deal as a "new milestone."

"Now the point is whether (President) Bush can make a brave decision 
to boldly switch over his policy toward the (North) and choose the 
path of historic reconciliation and peaceful coexistence," the 
Japan-based Choson Sinbo wrote.
*************************************************

2.   DPRK ACCUSES USA OF HOSTILITY, LIES
     Michelle Nichols, Reuters, 22 February 2007

An external audit of UN funds in North Korea is a hostile maneuver by 
the United States, Pyongyang said in a letter to UN Secretary-General 
Ban Ki-moon circulated on Thursday. North Korean UN Ambassador Pak Gil 
Yon also accused the United States of having "dirty" political motives 
and fabricating lies by suggesting Pyongyang might have misused funds 
from the UN Development Program for the development of nuclear 
weapons.

"The allegations of the United States are sheer fiction aimed at 
politicizing international aid to the Democratic People's Republic of 
Korea," Pak said in the letter, which was also sent to the 15 UN 
Security Council members. "We cannot doubt that the motive and purpose 
of the audit are strictly in line with the hostile maneuvers of the 
United States against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea," Pak 
said.

Late last month, the 36-member board of the UN Development Program, 
which includes the United States and North Korea, called for an audit 
and delayed any new programs for North Korea until the review was 
complete and the agency puts forward proposals in March. The board's 
move came after Mark Wallace, the US envoy for UN financial 
management, accused the UN Development Program of violating rules by 
hiring North Korean government officials to carry out its work and by 
paying salaries in cash through the government. The program has 
already revamped its operation in North Korea to make sure Pyongyang 
does not hire agency staff. The agency's projects are mainly training 
for food management and other tasks and cost about $4 million.

Pak said the program's aid projects in North Korea were carried out in 
a fair and transparent way and therefore Pyongyang did "not mind 
whether the external audit is being done or not." But he said if the 
audit "is to serve the attempt by the United States to politicize 
international aid to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, we 
will not tolerate it and the consequences will be severe."

The World Food Program and UNICEF, the UN Children's Fund, both headed 
by Americans, operate under similar restrictions in North Korea and 
have said they have no plans to change their methods. (...) Wallace 
had voiced concerns that funds had been used by North Korea for "its 
own illicit purposes."
*************************************************

3.   YES, WE HAVE NO URANIUM
     Donald Kirk, Asia Times Online, 24 February 2007

Anyone reading about nuclear programs in North Korea and Iran is 
presumably aware that highly enriched uranium -- HEU -- is about the 
most powerful explosive yet devised or tested, apparently more 
devastating in its potential impact than plutonium. Now the debate 
focuses on two questions about each country's programs. Is North Korea 
indeed developing the means to produce nuclear warheads from HEU --  
and does Iran harbor the notion of processing HEU for warheads or 
sticking to nuclear power for peaceful purposes?

In the case of each of these countries, proud charter members of 
President George W Bush's "axis of evil", denials fly out of the 
mouths of political leaders, diplomats, spokesmen and propaganda 
machines like anti-aircraft bullets firing volleys at attacking 
planes.

No, no, North Korea keeps saying, We have no HEU program, and the 
United States has been lying ever since James Kelly, then assistant 
secretary of state for East Asia and the Pacific, claimed for sure 
North Korea's first deputy foreign minister, Kang Sok-ju, had 
acknowledged the existence of one when they met in Pyongyang in 
October 2002.

No, no, say Iranian leaders, we are not in the least interested in 
building nuclear warheads, and the whole reason for our fully 
acknowledged, highly publicized HEU program is to produce fuel for 
nuclear power, just like all the advanced countries that are bullying 
us.

Neither debate is likely to be resolved soon, in part because US 
forces are not poised to invade either country and find out what's 
really going on. The other reason, at least in the case of North 
Korea, is that the experts, politicos and diplomats are in utter 
disagreement, if not disarray, over what North Korea is up to -- and, 
regardless of expertise, their views generally reflect their political 
viewpoints.

Differences rage from Seoul to Washington, where one of the louder 
voices in the debate is that of David Albright, who first became known 
for his criticism of US policy on nuclear warheads when he charged 
several years ago that US claims about Iraqi nukes were highly 
questionable. Albright, founder and president of the Institute for 
Science and International Security, based his remarks in part on his 
background as a United Nations weapons inspector there. Now Albright, 
back from Pyongyang, which he visited along with Joel Wit, another 
Washington think-tanker and former State Department expert on North 
Korea, is saying official US claims about the existence of North 
Korea's HEU program are about as bogus as were the US claims of any 
Iraqi nuclear program at all. As in the case of the rationale or 
pretext that that precipitated the invasion of Iraq, he says, the US 
view of the North Korean HEU program may be "another case of lack of 
evidence".

Not that Albright really knows. Although he's regarded as a physicist 
on the basis of master's degrees in physics and math from Midwestern 
US universities, neither he nor Wit was able to use their expertise 
while in Pyongyang in the run-up to the latest six-party talks that 
culminated in the deal for North Korea to give up its nukes, 
eventually, in return for a vast infusion of energy aid. Instead, they 
were treated to a great briefing at which they heard North Korea's 
envoy to the talks, Kim Kye Gwan, deny, for the umpteenth time, that 
North Korea had an HEU program -- the message on which Albright 
embellished this week.

A certain difference, though, exists between North Korea's earlier 
denials and the latest word from Kim Kye Gwan. This time around, in 
accordance with the talks in Beijing and his earlier meetings with 
Christopher Hill, the veteran diplomat who succeeded Kelly, North 
Korea is willing to try to "clarify" misunderstandings. That's an 
assurance that Hill is picking up on in defending the US decision, 
which he personally advocated, to go along with the agreement of 
February 13, which he duly signed, that neglects all mention of 
"uranium" -- one of those turn-off words, like "human rights", that 
are guaranteed to drive North Korean negotiators into stony silence, 
nasty vituperations or both.

Thus Hill, at about the time that Albright was spreading doubts about 
the existence of North Korea's HEU program, covered his tracks by 
assuring another audience in Washington that yes indeed, "they", 
meaning Kim Kye Gwan, "have been willing to discuss what we know". The 
joker in that remark is that Hill isn't quite saying "what we know", 
suggesting that perhaps, just possibly, the United States might 
eventually back off an inch or so from the HEU claim. How else, one 
might ask, would it be conceivable "to try to resolve this", as he put 
it, "with the idea to resolve this to mutual satisfaction"?

Such double-talk and questions also suffuse the debate in Seoul, where 
fairly high-ranking officials seem to be vying alternately to play 
down HEU and to show off their resolve to do something about it. 
Hill's opposite number from South Korea, Chun Young-woo, has danced 
around the issue with equal grace and equilibrium.

Yes, "North Korea has been obtaining materials for HEU", said Chun. 
"That's a known fact." No, he went on, with careful ambiguity, "we do 
not have full information where the program is now". That said, Chun 
poured tepid if not cool water on the whole notion of HEU in North 
Korea. "Nobody," said Chun, "believes they have an enriched program up 
and running." Those remarks compound the puzzlement of other 
pronouncements from Chun, who said earlier this week that North Korea, 
while reporting on the plutonium it has produced, should also give 
some idea "how much progress the country has made on its uranium 
program".

Chun's remarks, however veiled, would appear to put him in possible 
conflict with his boss, Foreign Minister Song Min-soon. Word here is 
that Song specifically asked US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in 
a telephone conversation to authorize Hill to agree to dropping the 
offending "uranium" reference from the deal even though Hill had 
wanted it in. Rice assented when Song -- and Hill too, no doubt --  
told her the deal was just not going to happen if "uranium" was 
anywhere in there. And for good measure, just to seal the deal, the US 
also agreed to begin work on dropping North Korea from the State 
Department's list of states sponsoring terrorism, much to the chagrin 
of Japanese leaders still holding out on giving aid to North Korea as 
long as it refuses to come clean on the fate of all Japanese abducted 
to that country.

Actually, if Albright's remarks are any guide, the Japanese have a lot 
more to worry about when it comes to North Korean terrorism. Albright 
quoted Kim Kye Gwan as asking, in a rhetorical flourish, "Does the 
underground explosion signify much?" The clear inference, Albright 
suggested, was that North Korea has the capability of miniaturizing 
nuclear warheads and mounting them on missiles with ranges anywhere in 
the region.

He and analyst Paul Brannan expanded on the theme in a widely quoted 
report -- based, it seemed, on little beyond their own lively 
imaginations -- that speculated that North Korea could conduct another 
nuclear test and "may detonate a warhead over the sea as a further 
demonstration". And if such "warning shots" didn't work, they said, 
North Korean nukes might hit "military targets and population centers" 
in Japan and South Korea.

At about this stage in the debate, South Korea's Defense Ministry 
weighed in with a sobering reminder of its own -- in implicit 
remonstrance of the soft talk from the Foreign Ministry and the Blue 
House of President Roh Moo-hyun.

"The US nuclear umbrella will be continued under the two countries' 
alliance treaty" despite plans to transfer overall command in event of 
war from an American to a South Korean general, said a Defense 
Ministry statement. "So the nuclear threat from North Korea will be 
controlled."
*************************************************

OPINION

*************************************************

4.   RUSSIA'S PERSPECTIVE ON DPRK AND REGIONAL SECURITY
     Michael Berk, CIIA, 23 February 2007

[Michael Berk is Research Fellow and Director of Branch Development at 
the Canadian Institute of International Affairs (www.ciia.org). He 
wrote this paper exclusively for CanKor.]

As the latest round of Six-Party Talks negotiations on the issue of 
North Korean nuclear disarmament has come to an end, most of the 
international analysis has now shifted focus to the real or perceived 
gains of the 'first-tier' negotiators, the US and DPRK. Although some 
attention has been given to 'second-tier' members in the Six-Party 
dialogue (South Korea, China, Japan and Russia), questions as to the 
role of Russia have chiefly surrounded what it actually brought to the 
table. Furthermore, given apparent economic and political difficulties 
faced by Russia in the aftermath of the Soviet Union's breakup, some 
question whether Russian interests in the North East Asian region have 
to be taken seriously at all. This short commentary will address these 
questions and outline the Russian position on the issue of North 
Korean nuclear disarmament in the context of Russian foreign policy 
interests in North East Asia.

RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN NORTH EAST ASIA

In order to understand the Russian position at the Six-Party Talks, or 
its foreign policy goals in North East Asia at large, one has to take 
into account two major factors that create the context for such 
policies. First, the internal socio-political developments which took 
place in Russia over the last 16 years, and second, the external 
political and economic pressures that have framed the range and scope 
of possible Russian reactions. The two are intrinsically tied and have 
to be considered simultaneously in order to achieve a sensible 
understanding of how Russian foreign policy has been shaped thus far.

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union and until the late 1990s, 
the primary focus of consecutive Russian administrations was mostly 
directed inwards -- aimed at avoiding further disintegration of the 
Federation, managing affairs in the post-Soviet space through CIS and 
securing its immediate survival. During this period, the attention 
towards international affairs was quite limited and focused on 
counterbalancing the perceived Western encroachment, the expansion of 
Islamic extremism on its southern borders, and cooperation with the 
international community on issues related to non-proliferation of WMD 
and disarmament.

Overall, guided by people dubbed "Westerners", Russian foreign policy 
focused on 'reconciliation' with the West by building bridges across 
the North Atlantic community, as well as resolving issues related to 
borders demarcation in the 'near abroad'. [1] Throughout this period, 
Russian foreign policy in North East Asia was modest and dealt with 
issues that required immediate attention, mostly related to ensuring 
the socio-economic stability of its Far East region: building economic 
ties with China and Japan, and increasing the in-flow of foreign 
investments.

Since the late 1990s, with the steady rise of the East and South Asian 
economies in global trade and finance, the economic imperative of 
developing vast Russian territories in Siberia and the Far East 
dictated that more attention be given to forging stronger links to 
Asian markets. From the regional security standpoint, Russia's foreign 
policy agenda focused on two major issues: the long-standing 
Russo-Japanese territorial dispute and North Korea. Both were part of 
a larger plan to bring stability and predictability to the region and 
ensure the status quo in times of an apparent Russian retreat from the 
global arena.

Since 2000 this image of Russia has changed considerably. The analysis 
of a current Russian resurgence attempting to regain its traditional 
influence in global affairs must be examined through a combination of 
internal and external factors:

     1) President Putin's resolute leadership in comparison to his two 
predecessors, manifested through the resuscitation of the mechanisms 
of power inside the country and its rising prominence outside of it;
     2) The current administration's firm handling of the economy, 
resulting in a situation where Russia is expected to amass 
approximately US$159.23 billion by late 2007 in foreign exchange 
reserves; [2]
     3) Russia's steady oil and gas production and abundant oil 
revenues due to a rise in global oil prices; and
     4) The post 9/11 US-led encroachment on traditional Russian 
"spheres of influence" in Central Asia and Eastern Europe in stark 
contradiction to mutual agreements and realization that an unabated 
unilateralism in the current global security structure leads to a 
narrowing Russian 'breathing space' and policy options. [3]

The pragmatic analysis of these factors led the Russian leadership to 
diversify its objectives and pursue flexible diplomacy. Alongside 
traditional approaches through multilateral institutions (UN, SCO, 
ASEAN, APEC, G8, etc), Russia is attempting to build strong economic 
and military alliances with rising powers (China, India, Brazil), as 
well as other strategic partners in the Middle East, Europe and South 
America. In this light, the invitation extended to Russia to join in 
the Six-Party Talks by China and North Korea seemed natural due to 
Russia's geographic proximity, its long-standing economic and military 
relationship with the DPRK, and its rising political and military 
status on the international arena. From the Russian point of view, the 
Six-Party Talks were an opportunity to engage all the principal 
players in the North East Asian theatre on questions related to 
regional security, and to employ an additional strategic card in its 
bilateral dealings with the USA, Japan and China.

RUSSIAN INTERESTS IN NORTH KOREA

The Russian approach to North Korean-related issues can be 
characterized as extremely pragmatic, based on a combination of 
economic and strategic considerations:

     1) Geographic Proximity, Regional Economic Integration, Security 
& Stability

Two thirds of Russia's territory and much of the country's 
considerable resources are located in Asia. Enormous reserves of oil, 
natural gas, coal, non-ferrous metals and hydro-energy resources in 
Siberia and the Far East are a major factor in determining Russia's 
long-term economic development. The geographic proximity to the Asia 
Pacific region (home to around 60% of the world's production, 50% of 
its trade and 48% of foreign investment) dictates that establishing 
direct and uninterrupted communications and trade with these nations 
is absolutely imperative for successful Russian development. It is 
here that Russian economic ties are made with some of the biggest 
world economies -- the USA, China, Japan, India, ASEAN and the rapidly 
developing Latin American countries. Russia's long-term strategy is to 
dynamically develop versatile cooperation with Asian and Pacific 
nations. [4]

Regarding regional security, Russia does not in principal want the 
DPRK to gain a military nuclear capability, as this could cause a 
"chain-reaction" leading Japan and South Korea to do so as well.

     2) Specific economic projects and long-standing collaboration 
between Russia and the DPRK

Cooperation between Russia and North Korea in various areas --  
including economic, technological and military -- goes back many 
decades and has periodically fallen in and out of favour on both 
sides. The following are few examples of specific projects of interest 
to both sides at the moment:

     -- Extension of the Trans-Siberian railway

In August 2001, Russia and the DPRK signed an agreement to develop 
plans connecting North Korea with the Trans-Siberian railway system. 
The plan was conceived with two primary objectives in mind: first, to 
allow for direct access of Russian oil to the DPRK's port city of 
Rajin with its Soviet-built Sungri refinery; and second, to use the 
railway for the transit of goods from Europe to South Korea and back, 
thus tying the two Koreas into an economically inter-dependent 
cluster.

     -- Energy Supply

There have been long-standing attempts by Russia and the DPRK to have 
energy produced in eastern Russian and shipped directly to North 
Korea. One such plan entailed the construction of a nuclear energy 
facility in the Primorsk region -- which would have answered the needs 
for North Korean nuclear energy pursuits. Unfortunately, the seismic 
activities in the Primorsk region make such a solution exceptionally 
costly, and require a considerable foreign investment and time to 
construct it with all the necessary environmental precautions. Beyond 
this, Russia's electricity monopoly RAO UES is interested in supplying 
both North and South Korea with surplus electricity from the Far East. 
If implemented, North Korea could receive transfer fees and the 
project would connect the entire peninsula through a joint electricity 
grid -- making it another strategic link connecting North and South.

     -- DPRK Debt Relief

According to numerous reports, Russia has decided to write off some 80 
percent of the US$8 billion it is owed by North Korea -- some of which 
was borrowed to build power plants. Some sources indicated in early 
December 2006 that North Korea offered Russia exclusive rights for the 
use of its uranium mines in exchange for Russian support at the Six 
Party Talks, writing off its debt, and a potential pay-off for Russian 
supplies of electricity and other needed equipment for which North 
Korea has no cash to pay. [5]

THE RUSSIAN APPROACH TO THE DPRK NUCLEAR ISSUE

The official Russian foreign policy position on North Korean nuclear 
capability, as it developed throughout the Six-Party Talks, was based 
on the following principles:

     1) Russia considers DPRK attempts to develop military nuclear 
capability to be a local issue and not a global threat. Therefore, the 
issue must be resolved through international legal and regional 
security negotiations.
     2) The issue must be resolved through diplomacy, involving 
security assurances and economic incentives, not military pressure 
and/or sanctions.
     3) The Korean peninsula must remain a nuclear weapons free zone.
     4) As part of the settlement, the DPRK must agree to NPT rules; 
its partners in negotiations must guarantee North Korean security and 
stop threatening military action.
     5) All countries have the right to access advanced technologies 
for their development -- including nuclear energy technology. Many 
experts agree that it will be impossible to solve energy scarcity 
without the use of nuclear energy. This, however, must be done under 
the control of the IAEA.

In view of the above, one can see how close the Russian position on 
this issue is to that of the Chinese: Moscow strongly opposes the 
DPRK's acquisition of nuclear arms and further escalation of tensions 
on the Korean peninsula. Overall, Russian objectives are to ensure 
stability in the East and defend its legitimate economic and strategic 
interests in the area. Russian authorities clearly realize the 
potential humanitarian and ecological disasters that could occur in 
escalating a conflict on the peninsula. However, a nuclear North Korea 
is considered to be most dangerous due to its impact on nuclear 
non-proliferation -- inciting Japan, South Korea and others to develop 
their own nuclear weapons capacity.

Over the last decade, through direct negotiations with North Korean 
counterparts on the issue, the Russian position has called for the 
return of North Korea to the NPT and for IAEA inspectors to be allowed 
to inspect all the facilities suspected to be used for the development 
of DPRK nuclear capabilities. At the same time, Russia never opposed 
the development of North Korean nuclear energy technology to provide a 
local solution for the energy crisis. Indeed, Russian constructive 
proposals to facilitate the construction of light-water reactors in 
the late 1990s and the idea proposed at the Strelna G8 Summit of 
establishing several international uranium enrichment centers under 
IAEA control have met with considerable international support.

However, while the official Russian position remains the same, under 
another strategic scenario the North Korean development of limited 
nuclear capabilities and a subsequent similar response from both Japan 
and South Korea may encourage these countries to seek increasing 
independence from the US military and political tutelage. Such 
analysis suggests that even if the DPRK were to possess small-scale 
nuclear devices, it is unlikely they would be used against either 
Japan or South Korea unless as a means of 'last resort.'

CONCLUSION

As a signatory to the latest agreement between the DPRK and its 
counterparts at the Six-Party Talks, Russia will contribute to the 
alleviation of the North Korean energy crisis and chair one of the 
five working groups aimed at addressing specific policy questions. 
Whether or not the DPRK and USA will deliver on their promises before 
the process moves forward in March remains to be seen. However, with 
respect to Russian objectives, the prospects can be described as 
'cautious, but positive'.

In the absence of an established collective security regime in North 
East Asia (Russia and Japan still haven't signed a peace treaty over 
WWII), the formation of such a working group allows Russia to increase 
its influence in the region. As the least threatening partner to the 
DPRK (relative to China), Russia has positioned itself as the go-to 
party whose quiet but persistent and pragmatic approach is appreciated 
by Pyongyang, and allows Russia to advance its immediate interests.

Finally, the signing of the agreement in Beijing added another 
considerable achievement for Russian foreign policy: an important 
precedent was established, proving that the issue of nuclear 
development can be resolved through negotiations as opposed to force. 
It showed that diplomacy can be an effective alternative to military 
intervention as a method for resolving conflicts -- perhaps suggesting 
future similar efforts in Iran.

ENDNOTES:

[1] The two most important processes during this period were Russian 
attempts to create regional security mechanisms on its Western and 
Southern borders through multilateral engagement with the important 
players to secure Russian territorial integrity. With Europe this was 
exemplified by the activities of the North Atlantic Cooperation 
Council formed in 1991 and later, Russia's joining NATO's PfP 
programme in 1994. In the south, this was done through creation of the 
precursor to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization -- the Shanghai 
Five group in 1994.

[2] A government commission for budget projections estimates reported 
that as of December 15 2006, the Stabilization Fund totaled 2.19 
trillion rubles (about US$83.43 billion) and is expected to reach 5.46 
trillion rubles (about US$207.4 billion) in 2008 and 6.73 trillion 
rubles (about US$255.48 billion) in 2009.

[3] See President Putin's speech at the 43rd Munich Conference on 
Security Policy, 9-11 February 2007. 
(http://www.securityconference.de/konferenzen/rede.php?menu_2007=&menu_konferenzen=&sprache=en&id=179&)

[4] See "Putin Hopes Hosting APEC Summit Will Spur Development Around 
Vladivostok" by Sergei Blagov, 5 February 2007, Eurasia Daily Monitor. 
(http://jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article_id=2371876)

[5] "N Korea offer debt deal to Russia", Donga Ilbo, 24 January 2007. 
(http://english.donga.com/srv/service.php3?biid=2007012491918)
*************************************************

End CanKor # 274

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