[Cankor] Report #275

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Fri Mar 16 10:34:22 CST 2007


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CANADA-KOREA ELECTRONIC INFORMATION SERVICE

CanKor # 275

Friday, 9 March 2007
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The USA's chief nuclear negotiator Christopher Hill voices doubts 
about the reliability of intelligence regarding the DPRK's 
"production-scale" uranium enrichment programme. The highly enriched 
uranium (HEU) issue is raised by the DPRK side in the first session of 
a working group on the establishment of USA-DPRK diplomatic relations 
in New York City, which DPRK chief negotiator Kim Gye Gwan evaluates 
as "constructive and serious".

A closed seminar with Vice-Foreign Minister Kim, sponsored by the 
National Committee on American Foreign Policy at the Korea Society in 
New York, attracts major US figures involved in previous 
administrations, including former secretaries of state Madeleine 
Albright and Henry Kissinger. Kim tells Korea specialists that the USA 
should not expect China to find solutions to the nuclear issue, since 
China has its own strategic interests and has little influence on 
North Korea. On the other hand, the DPRK-China strategic alliance is 
unlikely to weaken, as evidenced by a rare visit of DPRK leader Kim 
Jong Il to the Chinese embassy in Pyongyang on the occasion of the 
lunar New Year.

According to Macau's laws, the US-instigated seizure of Banco Delta 
Asia by Chinese authorities was illegal, the bank's lawyers claim. It 
is expected that DPRK assets frozen under suspicion of counterfeiting 
and money laundering will soon be liberated, fulfilling a condition 
the DPRK has stipulated for movement in the Six-Party Talks.

Progress seems unlikely in the working group dedicated to Japan-DPRK 
relations. The DPRK's UN envoy Pak Gil Yon (also ambassador to Canada) 
formally accuses Japan of suppressing pro-DPR Korean organizations in 
a letter to UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon, arguing that Japan is 
ill fit for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. Japan's 
insistence that the abduction issue be resolved prior to any 
discussion on the normalization of relations leads to the break-up of 
bilateral talks in Hanoi after only 45 minutes.

The UNDP suspends its operations in the DPRK after more than 25 years 
in the country, following complaints from senior US officials that the 
programme was channeling hard currency to the North Korean government.

An EU "Troika" at Asian Affairs Commissioner level visits Pyongyang, 
making it clear that if positive developments continue in the 
Six-Party process, the EU would examine concrete measures to improve 
relations.

The RESOURCES section of this issue of the CanKor Report presents the 
joint press release of the 20th North-South Korean Ministerial Talks 
that took place at the end of February, following the Six-Party Talks.

In the OPINION section we reprint an article by Wade Huntley, which 
suggests that Canada is missing an opportunity to promote its 
long-standing non-proliferation policy in northeast Asia. According to 
Huntley, Canada could utilize its unique relationships with both North 
Korea and the USA to enhance dialogues aimed at keeping the recent 
progress at Six-Party Talks on track.
*************************************************

Contents:

1.   NEW DOUBTS ON DPRK URANIUM PROGRAMME
     http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/28/AR2007022801977.html

2.   DPRK RAISES URANIUM ISSUE IN TALKS WITH USA
     http://joongangdaily.joins.com/article/view.asp?aid=2873208

3.   'VERY GOOD' TALKS END IN NEW YORK
     http://english.chosun.com/w21data/html/news/200703/200703070027.html

4.   PYONGYANG ENVOY SAYS CHINA USING DPRK
     http://english.chosun.com/w21data/html/news/200703/200703090016.html

5.   KIM JONG IL VISITS CHINESE EMBASSY IN PYONGYANG
     http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2007/200703/news03/05.htm#1

6.   SEIZURE OF A TINY BANK LINKED TO DPRK MAY SOON END
     http://www.realcities.com/mld/krwashington/news/columnists/tim_johnson/16862879.htm

7.   DPRK ACCUSES JAPAN OF SUPPRESSING KOREANS
     http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/08/AR2007030800180.html

8.   UN DEVELOPMENT AGENCY SUSPENDS WORK IN DPRK
     http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/05/AR2007030501574_pf.html

9.   EUROPEAN UNION TROIKA IN PYONGYANG FOR TALKS
     http://www.eu2007.de/en/News/Press_Releases/March/0308Nordkorea.html 
08.03.2007

RESOURCES
10.  AGREEMENT OF 20TH NORTH-SOUTH MINISTERIAL TALKS
     http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2007/200703/news03/03.htm#1

OPINION
11.  CANADA COULD HELP KEEP SIX-PARTY PROCESS ON TRACK
     http://www.thestar.com/opinion/article/181844

*************************************************

1.   NEW DOUBTS ON DPRK URANIUM PROGRAMME
     Glenn Kessler, Washington Post, 1 March 2007

The Bush administration is backing away from its long-held assertions 
that North Korea has an active clandestine program to enrich uranium, 
leading some experts to believe that the original US intelligence that 
started the crisis over Pyongyang's nuclear ambitions may have been 
flawed.

The chief intelligence officer for North Korea, Joseph R. DeTrani, 
told Congress on Tuesday that while there is "high confidence" North 
Korea acquired materials that could be used in a "production-scale" 
uranium program, there is only "mid-confidence" such a program exists. 
Meanwhile, Assistant Secretary of State Christopher R. Hill, the chief 
negotiator for disarmament talks, told a conference last week in 
Washington that it is unclear whether North Korea ever mastered the 
production techniques necessary for such a program.

If the materials North Korea bought "did not go into a highly enriched 
uranium program, maybe they went somewhere else," Hill said. "Fine. We 
can have a discussion about where they are and where they've gone."

The administration's stance today stands in sharp contrast to the 
certainty expressed by top officials in 2002, when the administration 
accused Pyongyang of running a secret uranium program -- and demanded 
it be dismantled at once. President Bush told a news conference that 
November: "We discovered that, contrary to an agreement they had with 
the United States, they're enriching uranium, with a desire of 
developing a weapon." The accusation about the alleged uranium program 
backfired, sparking a series of events that ultimately led to North 
Korea's first nuclear test -- using another material, plutonium --  
nearly five months ago.

In 2002, the United States led a drive to suspend shipments of fuel 
oil promised to Pyongyang under a 1994 accord that froze a North 
Korean plutonium facility. The collapse of the 1994 agreement freed 
North Korea to build up a stockpile of plutonium for as many as a 
dozen nuclear weapons. Pyongyang conducted its test with some of that 
plutonium -- while the alleged uranium facility faded in importance.

Plutonium and highly enriched uranium provide different routes to 
building nuclear weapons. The North Koreans were able to reprocess 
spent fuel rods -- which had been monitored by UN inspectors under the 
1994 agreement -- to obtain the weapons-grade plutonium for a nuclear 
test last year. A uranium-enrichment program would have required 
Pyongyang to build a facility with thousands of uranium-spinning 
centrifuges to obtain the highly enriched uranium needed for a weapon. 
Iran's nuclear program, which the United States alleges is intended 
for weapons, involves enriched uranium.

When Bush took office in 2001, a number of top administration 
officials openly expressed grave doubts about the 1994 accord, which 
was negotiated by the Clinton administration, and they seized on the 
intelligence about the uranium facility to terminate the agreement. 
The CIA provided an unclassified estimate to Congress in November 2002 
that North Korea had begun constructing a plant that would produce 
enough "weapons-grade uranium for two or more nuclear weapons per year 
.. as soon as mid-decade."

David Albright, a respected former UN inspector and president of the 
Institute for Science and International Security, issued a report last 
week in which he likened the intelligence on North Korea's uranium 
facility to the discredited intelligence before the invasion of Iraq 
that Baghdad was building a nuclear program. "The analysis about North 
Korea's program also appears to be flawed," he wrote.

In the upcoming issue of the Washington Quarterly, Joel S. Wit, a 
former State Department official who, with Albright, recently met with 
North Korean officials in Pyongyang, also raises questions about the 
intelligence estimate.

Administration officials insist they had valid suspicions at the time 
about North Korean purchases -- including 150 tons of aluminum tubes 
from Russia in June 2002 -- to halt any possible cooperative talks 
with Pyongyang. Officials also say that a senior North Korean official 
admitted to the program in October 2002, when Hill's predecessor, 
James Kelly, confronted North Korean officials over the US 
intelligence findings at a meeting in Pyongyang. North Korea 
subsequently denied that any such admission took place. Kelly told 
reporters at the time he had informed the North Koreans that "this was 
a big problem and that they needed to dismantle it right away, before 
we could fully engage in a whole range of things that might well be 
mutually beneficial."

US participants at the meeting said in interviews there was little 
dispute at the time North Korea appeared to be admitting the program, 
though one said the admission was more "tonal" -- such as the North 
Korean official's belligerent attitude -- than would appear in the 
transcript of the discussion.

During the early years of the crisis, the United States took a firm 
stand that North Korea must first admit to the uranium facility, 
rejecting proposals from other nations that it was more important to 
freeze the plutonium facility in order to halt North Korea's 
production. In May 2004, DeTrani -- then with the State Department --  
was dispatched to give the North Koreans a detailed, 90-minute 
presentation of all the materials that Pyongyang had procured 
overseas, including aluminum tubes, chemicals and even a centrifuge 
kit from a Pakistani nuclear smuggling network, a US official said.

The North Koreans have consistently denied having a uranium-enrichment 
program, and US officials say suspected procurement activities have 
largely ceased in the past two years for unknown reasons. Some 
speculate that Pyongyang found a uranium program too difficult, 
especially since the plutonium facility was active. Others say 
DeTrani's presentation spooked them and they either ended the 
purchases or became more discreet.

Hill has said he has raised the uranium program at every meeting with 
the North Koreans, but the recent deal struck with Pyongyang focuses 
on the plutonium program. Under the agreement, North Korea will close 
and "seal" its plutonium nuclear reactor at Yongbyon within 60 days in 
return for 50,000 tons of fuel oil. Pyongyang must eventually disclose 
and dismantle its programs in order to receive significant aid and 
other benefits, including normalizing relations with the United 
States.
*************************************************

2.   DPRK RAISES URANIUM ISSUE IN TALKS WITH USA
     Brian Lee, Joongang Ilbo, 8 March 2007

In historic one-on-one talks between North Korea and the United 
States, Pyongyang brought up on its own the controversial issue of its 
alleged uranium-based nuclear program, Christopher Hill said 
yesterday. "We had a lengthy discussion of the HEU [highly enriched 
uranium] matter," said Mr. Hill, Washington's chief representative to 
the North Korean nuclear talks, according to a transcript of his 
remarks. "And we also discussed the need to resolve this matter to 
mutual satisfaction prior to the final declaration."

At the same time, North Korea proposed tying the diplomatic knot 
directly with the United States, skipping the step of establishing 
liaison offices in each country, as the Americans suggested. In the 
press conference, Mr. Hill said he made it clear to his North Korean 
counterpart, Kim Gye Gwan, that unless North Korea holds up its end of 
the bargain, "complete denuclearization," establishment of diplomatic 
relations will not happen. "We certainly believe that the faster we 
go, the steadier we'll be," Mr. Hill said. "But I can't predict to you 
exactly when the last piece of fissile material will be taken out of 
North Korea. Mr. Hill said they discussed the political and legal 
aspects of the issue, but declined to give further details.

The two-day meeting in New York came about after the Feb. 13 
agreement, in which North Korea agreed to move toward getting rid of 
its nuclear weapons in return for economic and energy aid, and the 
restoration of diplomatic relations. Mr. Hill and Mr. Kim met as one 
of five working groups set up by that agreement. As part of the 
process, North Korea also wants to get off Washington's list of 
countries designated as state sponsors of terrorism while ending the 
application of the Trading with the Enemy Act, which restricts trade 
to countries considered hostile to the United States.

Under the agreement reached in the six-party talks last month, 
Pyongyang will shut down and seal its Yongbyon nuclear reactor and 
allow inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency to verify 
and monitor such moves. It will also discuss all of its nuclear 
programs. Having achieved such steps within 60 days of the date the 
agreement was signed, it will receive 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil. 
The next phase calls for a declaration and disablement of its nuclear 
programs and facilities. Upon completion, it would receive 950,000 
tons of additional fuel. Mr. Hill said the issue of financial 
sanctions imposed on a Macao-based bank would soon be resolved.
*************************************************

3.   'VERY GOOD' TALKS END IN NEW YORK
     Chosun Ilbo, 7 March 2007

When a woman wearing sunglasses hurried into the Korea Society 
building on Manhattan's 57th Street in New York on Monday morning, 
even reporters at the scene failed to identify her immediately as 
former US secretary of state Madeleine Albright. Albright famously 
visited Pyongyang in October 2000, just over a month after North 
Korean vice marshal Cho Myong Rok's visit to Washington, and met Kim 
Jong Il to negotiate normalizing USA-North Korea diplomatic ties. Now 
North Korea's Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye Gwan is in New York to 
attend a working group to normalize bilateral ties, and on Monday Kim 
met a flock of America's North Korea experts. They were mostly senior 
officials in the Clinton administration who dealt with North Korea and 
take a moderate line on the Stalinist country.

Also attending the closed-door seminar sponsored by the National 
Committee on American Foreign Policy at the Korea Society was Wendy 
Sherman, a former US envoy to North Korea, who accompanied Albright in 
her Pyongyang visit. She had been Kim Kye Gwan's negotiation partner 
during the Clinton administration. Jack Prichard, the US special envoy 
to North Korea in the Clinton years and during the initial period of 
the Bush administration, was also present. In the past six years, all 
of them have taken the lead in criticizing the Bush administration's 
hard line on the North.

Donald Zagoria, a professor at Hunter College in New York who takes 
charge of the NCAFP's Northeast Asia project, attended the seminar 
too. He maintains close relations with Pyongyang to the extent of 
hosting annual seminars where he invites the North Korean Foreign 
Ministry's US chief Li Gun. Evans Revere, the president of the Korea 
Society, resigned last year as principal assistant deputy secretary of 
State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs after advocating 
reconciliation with North Korea. He was a member of the dove-ish Colin 
Powell group in the State Department.

What Kim Kye Gwan said at the four-hour-long seminar was not 
disclosed, but the atmosphere was "friendly," according to Revere. 
Also present were former secretary of state Henry Kissinger and Don 
Oberdorfer, a professor at Johns Hopkins University. Kissinger is said 
to have advised President George W. Bush to plumb for dialogue with 
North Korea.

On Sunday, Kim had breakfast with Charles Kartman, former director of 
the now defunct Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, and 
Joel Wit, a former State Department consultant on North Korea, at his 
hotel. On Sunday evening, he had a dinner with Kartman and Pritchard 
at a Korean restaurant.

On Tuesday, the USA and North Korea ended the first session of a 
working group on the normalization of bilateral diplomatic ties. After 
the talks, Kim told reporters he discussed normalization as well as 
several other issues with his counterpart Christopher Hill. Kim called 
the atmosphere of the talks "constructive and serious." He declined to 
elaborate on the meeting but appeared upbeat.

Hill told reporters there was "a sense of optimism on both sides that 
we will get through this 60-day period and we will achieve all of our 
objectives that are set out in the Feb. 13 agreement" reached in the 
six-nation nuclear talks in Beijing. Under the accord, North Korea 
will be provided with a first shipment of heavy fuel oil if it takes 
initial action to shut down its nuclear facilities. The assistant 
secretary of state said the two sides agreed on the need to settle the 
issue of North Korea's suspected uranium-based nuclear program and 
will hold expert consultations on the issue. Hill added he and Kim 
shared the view that in making the Korean Peninsula nuclear free, 
North Korea will have to give a full explanation of its uranium 
enrichment program and extra technical consultations will be helpful. 
Washington and Pyongyang will hold the second round of working group 
talks in Beijing before the next round of the six-party nuclear talks, 
which begin on March 19, Hill said. The two talked for altogether 
eight hours on Monday and Tuesday.
*************************************************

4.   PYONGYANG ENVOY SAYS CHINA USING DPRK
     Chosun Ilbo, 9 March 2007

North Korea's Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye Gwan reportedly told North 
Korea specialists in the United States that China is "only trying to 
use" North Korea. Kim was in the USA for talks on normalizing 
bilateral ties. According to a diplomatic source, Kim made the remark 
during a welcome luncheon last Saturday and in a seminar on Monday, 
sponsored by the National Committee on American Foreign Policy (NCAFP) 
and the Korea Society.

China has no great influence on North Korea, he was quoted as saying, 
adding the USA should not pin too great hopes on China in finding 
solutions to the nuclear problem. The chief nuclear negotiator said 
the USA over the last six years relied on China for the solution to 
the nuclear issue. "What has it achieved? We have test-fired missiles 
and conducted a nuclear test, doing what we wanted to do. China has 
solved nothing," the source quoted him as saying.

Pundits say Kim apparently wanted to stress to US officials the 
importance of bilateral talks between Washington and Pyongyang. One 
North Korea expert in China said Kim finally got a chance to say what 
the North has long wanted to tell the USA about China. "This was a 
strong message that North Korea wants direct talks with the USA," the 
expert said.

Still, experts say Kim would not have made the remarks if North Korea 
didn't have reason to be miffed at China, possibly because Beijing 
consulted Washington first in preparing the six-party agreement 
reached on Feb. 13 and only tried to persuade North Korea afterwards. 
The North also apparently feels piqued that China, the real owner of 
the Macau-based Banco Delta Asia, cooperated with the USA in freezing 
North Korean assets worth $24 million in BDA accounts.

Some analysts point out that North Korean diplomats including Kim Kye 
Gwan base their thinking on the Juche or self-reliance ideology of 
former North Korean leader Kim Il Sung. They say Kim Kye Gwan may 
simply have been expressing his own feelings in a somewhat crude 
manner during the meetings. Thus North Korea has also made it clear to 
China at every opportunity that it will refuse aid if it comes with 
political conditions attached. But the North Korea-Chinese strategic 
alliance is unlikely to weaken. Only this week, the reclusive North 
Korean leader Kim Jong Il very publicly attended a party at the 
Chinese Embassy in Pyongyang.
*************************************************

5.   KIM JONG IL VISITS CHINESE EMBASSY IN PYONGYANG
     Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), 4 March 2007

General Secretary Kim Jong Il, Sunday visited the Chinese embassy here 
at the invitation of the Chinese ambassador e.p. on the occasion of 
the 15th of January (according to lunar calendar), the folklore 
holiday of Korea and China. He was accompanied by Secretary of the WPK 
Central Committee Kim Ki Nam, First Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Kang Sok Ju, First Vice-Department Director of the WPK Central 
Committee Ri Yong Chol, Councilor of the DPRK National Defence 
Commission Kim Yang Gon, KPA Generals Kim Jong Gak and Hyon Chol Hae, 
Col. General Choe Pu Il, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Kim Yong Il 
and Vice-Department Director of the WPK Central Committee Pak Kyong 
Son.

He was greeted by Chinese Ambassador E.P. to the DPRK Liu Xiaoming and 
leading officials of the embassy on the spot. A staff member of the 
embassy presented him with a bouquet and all its staff members warmly 
welcomed him.

He thanked them for the invitation and congratulated them on the 
holiday. The Chinese ambassador conveyed to Kim Jong Il the verbal 
personal message to him from Hu Jintao, General Secretary of the 
Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and President of 
China. The ambassador presented Kim Jong Il with his gift. Kim Jong Il 
had a talk with the ambassador. The ambassador arranged a banquet in 
honor of Kim Jong Il.

Kim Jong Il had a photo session with all the staff members of the 
Chinese embassy.
*************************************************

6.   SEIZURE OF A TINY BANK LINKED TO DPRK MAY SOON END
     Tim Johnson, McClatchy Newspapers, 8 March 2007

Within weeks, authorities in this Chinese enclave near Hong Kong may 
end the 18-month takeover of a tiny private bank that the Bush 
administration has accused of laundering money for North Korea and 
serving as a conduit for counterfeit cash. Whether the government will 
return the bank to its original owner, a colorful gold trader with 
longstanding ties to North Korea, isn't clear. But regulators have 
told one of the bank's key clients that they'll soon release some 
frozen assets and end their seizure of the bank's operations.

Officials in Macau won't say whether the US-instigated seizure of 
Banco Delta Asia turned up any evidence to substantiate Bush 
administration claims of illicit activity. (An Ernst & Young audit did 
not, according to the bank's lawyers.) But signs are emerging that the 
government's seizure of the bank occurred in an irregular fashion, not 
following Macau's laws.

"Was there ever a court order? I've never seen one," said a Macau 
lawyer, who declined to give his name, fearing retribution. He noted 
that bank records can be released only under such orders and must be 
published in local newspapers.

Curiously, the bank's founder, Stanley Au, doesn't appear to have been 
tainted by the seizure. He's been in Beijing this week rubbing elbows 
with Chinese leaders as an honored delegate to an annual consultative 
meeting. Friends say Au might regain control of the bank as soon as 
March 28, when the term of three government-appointed delegates 
overseeing the bank's operations ends.

At least one British client of Banco Delta Asia is angry and charges 
that the Bush administration pursued "trumped-up" allegations to 
pressure North Korea. Colin McAskill, whose company is acquiring 
Daedong Credit Bank, a foreign-operated bank in Pyongyang, said the 
bank had more than $6 million frozen at Banco Delta Asia at the behest 
of the US Treasury Department. McAskill, speaking from London, said he 
proved to Macanese and US officials that Daedong's deposits were from 
legitimate business dealings in North Korea.

"We believe we've broken the back of the accusations the Americans 
have made and that we should get the money back," McAskill said. He 
added that Herculano de Sousa, the Macau banker who's temporarily 
running Banco Delta Asia's business, told him at a Feb. 28 meeting 
that his assets would soon be freed and the bank intervention ended. 
But McAskill said he's worried that US officials may launch new 
volleys against North Korea, impairing the ability of his bank to do 
business.

"The main focus now has to be to get the US Treasury to stop 
interfering -- as it has been doing -- to prevent (North Korea) from 
using the international banking system for its legal and legitimate 
business," McAskill said.

A freewheeling territory that reverted from Portugal to China in 1999, 
Macau has long been a favored spot for North Korean agents and 
traders. Au, who's in his 60s, saw opportunity with the North Koreans 
when he moved from Hong Kong to Macau in the 1970s and built a 
gold-trading business and a bank. Ricardo Pinto, publisher of a 
Portuguese-language newspaper, Ponto Final, said Au "thinks he has the 
full support of Beijing." In an extensive report last year, Pinto 
revealed that Au's bank had brokered gold transactions for North Korea 
from 2002 to 2005, selling 9.2 tons that amounted to North Korea's 
entire gold production. Such business isn't illegal under Macau law, 
and no public official has provided evidence to back up the US 
accusations of money laundering and trafficking in counterfeit 
currency.

McAskill, the British banker, said Daedong Credit Bank moved $49 
million in cash through Banco Delta Asia in recent years and of that, 
"only three individual old $100 bills were labeled as suspect. Not 
counterfeit, only suspect."

In late January, Daniel Glaser, US deputy assistant treasury secretary 
for terrorist financing and financial crimes, said his team had combed 
300,000 pages of Banco Delta Asia records. The documents "confirm what 
we've been saying, that there's been a lot of troubling activity going 
on at that bank," he said. Glaser declined to say under what authority 
he obtained the bank records.

Macau authorities haven't said how they'll dispose of the bank if they 
pull out as scheduled at the end of the month. "The government doesn't 
want to give the bank back to Stanley Au," Pinto said. But friends 
said Au craves for the bank to be returned to his control.

"He'll be able to say, 'See, it's over and I have the bank back. And 
they should give me an apology,'" said one government official, who 
spoke on condition of anonymity because he wasn't authorized to speak 
on the record. Au declined to speak about that prospect: "I will give 
you an interview after I have settled my differences with the US 
Treasury," Au said in a written response to an e-mail query.
*************************************************

7.   DPRK ACCUSES JAPAN OF SUPPRESSING KOREANS
     Edith M. Lederer, Associated Press, 8 March 2007

North Korea accused Japan of suppressing Koreans who support Pyongyang 
and urged UN members not to support Tokyo's campaign for a seat on the 
UN Security Council. In a letter to Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon 
circulated Wednesday, North Korea's UN Ambassador Pak Gil Yon said 
Tokyo's treatment of Chongryon, an umbrella group of pro-North 
organizations, was creating "a horrific atmosphere of terror and 
plunging the human rights issues of Koreans in Japan into a grave 
situation."

North Korea frequently resorts to harsh language when criticizing its 
foes and Japan's Foreign Ministry had no immediate comment. The two 
countries have no diplomatic relations and Chongryon acts as a de 
facto embassy for tens of thousands of ethnic Koreans who live in 
Asia's richest capitalist society yet see the communist North as home.

Pak's letter and a North Korean Foreign Ministry statement, both dated 
Feb. 26, were issued as Japan and North Korea resumed talks Thursday 
on normalizing ties in the Vietnamese capital, Hanoi. The session 
broke up after just 45 minutes, with the two sides only agreeing to 
meet again, Japan's delegation said. No further discussions were 
planned in Hanoi and no date was immediately announced for future 
talks. The first day of talks Wednesday also ended abruptly over North 
Korea's history of abducting Japanese citizens to train its spies in 
the Japanese culture. Tokyo believes Pyongyang is still holding some 
Japanese and insists on resolving the issue before relations can 
improve.

"It is regrettable that we could not achieve any concrete progress on 
issues including the abductions toward mending Japan-North Korea 
relations," Japan's top envoy Koichi Haraguchi told a news conference 
to wrap up the rocky two-day talks. "It became obvious that positions 
of Japan and North Korea are still wide apart." (...)

North Koreans in Japan have long been vilified, a sentiment that 
intensified following Pyongyang's Oct. 9 nuclear test that led to UN 
sanctions. Japan sees North Korea, where political repression is a 
hallmark of the secretive Stalinist regime, as a threat to its 
security. Japan is home to 600,000 ethnic Koreans, most of them 
descendants of people who moved here during Japan's 1910-1945 colonial 
rule of the Korean peninsula. About 200,000 are affiliated with the 
North. All Koreans were stripped of their Japanese citizenship after 
World War II and face discrimination from a society that often looks 
down on them as former colonial subjects. Given the long-standing 
animosity between Tokyo and Pyongyang, North Koreans face especially 
limited economic opportunities, confined to tight-knit community-run 
businesses.

The North Korean Foreign Ministry statement criticized the search of 
Chongryon's headquarters in Tokyo and another office in November and 
said the crackdown "has gotten more brutal since the outset of the 
year." It cited searches of at least 30 Chongryon-related facilities 
by Japanese public security authorities by early February. "Chongryon 
is a legitimate organization of overseas citizens of the Democratic 
People's Republic of Korea," Pak said, using North Korea's official 
name, "and Japanese brutal oppression on it and Koreans in Japan 
constitutes the criminal act of infringing upon the sovereignty of a 
dignified member state of the United Nations."

Japan is the second-largest financial contributor to the United 
Nations and has been campaigning, so far unsuccessfully, for a 
permanent seat on the Security Council, the UN's most powerful body. 
There are currently five veto-wielding permanent council members --  
the United States, Russia, China, Britain and France.
*************************************************

8.   UN DEVELOPMENT AGENCY SUSPENDS WORK IN DPRK
     Colum Lynch, Washington Post, 6 March 2007

The UN Development Program has suspended its operations in North 
Korea, saying it cannot carry them out under guidelines that prohibit 
payments in foreign currency and the employment of local workers 
handpicked by the North Korean government. The decision to halt the 
$3.7 million-a-year program represented an awkward situation for the 
North Korean government as it prepared for its highest-level talks 
with the United States on American soil since 2000. Vice Foreign 
Minister Kim Gye Gwan arrived in New York on Monday, and he and 
Assistant Secretary of State Christopher R. Hill began two days of 
talks at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel about implementing a recent 
agreement for North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons program. 
(...)

It remained unclear how the UN Development Program's decision to 
suspend North Korean operations, posted Friday evening on the agency's 
Web site but never otherwise announced, might affect this week's 
talks. North Korean officials have accused the United States of 
provoking the UNDP to change its operating practices after more than 
25 years in the country. The program is one of four UN agencies, 
including the World Food Program and UNICEF, that carry out 
development and relief work in North Korea. They are required to hire 
government-appointed workers and pay salaries through state-controlled 
offices.

The UNDP's decision followed complaints from senior US officials that 
the program was channeling hard currency to the North Korean 
government. Mark D. Wallace, the US representative to the United 
Nations for management and reform, voiced concern in January that the 
UNDP had "systematically perverted" its own rules by pouring millions 
of Euros into the North Korean economy each year. In response to such 
concerns, the UNDP executive board decided Jan. 25 to restrict 
payments to local staff and businesses to North Korean currency, the 
won, and to halt its practice of hiring local aid workers from a 
government-controlled roster. Pyongyang has a seat on the agency's 
executive board but did not have the power to block its decision.

UN officials warned that it was unlikely that they would be able to 
recruit local labor, and on Thursday, North Korea's UN ambassador, Pak 
Gil Yon, rejected the board's terms in a meeting with UNDP Associate 
Administrator Ad Melkert.

"Under the circumstances, UNDP has no choice but to suspend its 
operation in" North Korea, UNDP Administrator Kemal Dervis said in a 
confidential letter sent Friday to Pak. "Should circumstances change 
at a later date, we would be willing to reconsider this position."

The decision will immediately shutter 20 UNDP operations, but eight 
international workers who manage the program will remain in Pyongyang 
for a few days to see whether the government backs down. The UNDP's 
action will have no impact on other UN humanitarian operations in 
North Korea, senior UN officials said.
*************************************************

9.   EUROPEAN UNION TROIKA IN PYONGYANG FOR TALKS
     EU Presidency Press Release, 8 March 2007

The EU Troika at Asian Affairs Commissioner level visited Pyongyang 
from 6 to 8 March. The delegation was welcomed by Kung Sok Ung, Acting 
Foreign Minister, and Yang Hyong Sop, Vice-Chairman of the Presidium 
of the Supreme People's Assembly. Detailed talks took place in the 
North Korean Foreign Ministry, followed by an exchange of opinions at 
the Institute for Disarmament and Peace. The consultations were held 
in a frank atmosphere.

The EU Troika called on the North Korean side to rapidly implement the 
agreement of 13 February on "Initial Actions" regarding the 
denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. North Korea was also urged 
to take concrete steps towards disarmament and to fulfill its 
obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. North Korea expressed 
its determination to implement in full the 13 February agreement and 
declared its commitment to the elements of a solution included in the 
Joint Declaration issued during the Six-Party Talks on 19 September 
2005.

The talks also touched upon the human rights and socio-economic 
situation in North Korea. The North Korean side expressed its desire 
for more intensive contacts and increased dialogue with the EU. The 
Troika made it clear that, should there be positive developments, the 
EU would examine concrete measures aimed at a gradual improvement in 
relations.

The Troika delegation comprised the current German EU presidency as 
well as representatives of the European Commission and the 
Secretariat-General of the European Union. Portugal, which will take 
over the EU presidency after Germany, also participated.
*************************************************

RESOURCES

*************************************************

10.  AGREEMENT OF 20TH NORTH-SOUTH MINISTERIAL TALKS
     Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), 2 March 2007

The 20th North-South Ministerial Talks, which were opened in Pyongyang 
on Feb. 27, closed Friday. At the talks both sides demonstrated 
internally and externally their will to develop the inter-Korean 
relations on a new higher stage and reached an agreement on a series 
of issues. A joint press release on the talks was adopted at the talks 
held Friday.

The press release said:

At the talks both sides have agreed on the following points on the 
basis of the shared understanding that the north-south relations 
should be brought back on track as early as possible and put on a new 
higher stage in the basic spirit of the June 15 joint declaration: The 
north and the south agreed to settle all the issues concerning the 
inter-Korean relations in the idea common to the nation and in its 
interests through discussion at talks between the authorities of both 
sides.

The north and the south agreed to make concerted efforts for the 
satisfactory implementation of all the agreements reached at the third 
session of the fifth round of the six-party talks to denuclearize the 
Korean Peninsula and ensure peace there.

The north and the south agreed to take positive practical measures to 
achieve national reconciliation and unity. In this regard they agreed 
to take an active part in grand festivals for national reunification 
slated to take place in Pyongyang and in a place of the south side on 
the occasions of June 15 and August 15.

The north and the south agreed to resume cooperation undertakings in 
the humanitarian field and exert efforts for the substantial 
settlement of the issue of separated families and relatives. Both 
sides agreed to hold the fifth video meeting of separated families and 
relatives from March 27 to 29 and the 15th reunion of separated 
families and relatives at Mt. Kumgang Resort early in May. They agreed 
to push ahead with the construction of reunion centers of separated 
families and relatives as early as possible. In this regard they 
agreed to arrange a working contact between the Red Cross 
organizations of both sides at Mt. Kumgang Resort on March 9.

Both sides agreed to hold the 8th North-South Red Cross Talks at Mt. 
Kumgang Resort from April 10 to 12 to discuss and settle issues of 
mutual concern including the issue of those who went missing during 
the war and the persons whose whereabouts are unknown since the war.

The north and the south agreed to boost economic cooperation for the 
progress and prosperity common to the nation. Both sides agreed to 
hold the 13th meeting of the North-South Committee for the Promotion 
of Economic Cooperation in Pyongyang from April 18 to 21 for the 
purpose of seeking a negotiated solution to all the issues arising in 
the field.

Both sides agreed to have the trial operation of a train within the 
first half of this year depending on the provision of a military 
guarantee. They agreed to hold a contact between members of the 
above-said committee in Kaesong from March 14 to 15. Both sides agreed 
to reenergize the construction of the Kaesong Industrial Zone and take 
necessary measures.

The north and the south agreed to hold the 21st North-South 
Ministerial Talks in Seoul from May 29 to June 1.
*************************************************

OPINION

*************************************************

11.  CANADA COULD HELP KEEP SIX-PARTY PROCESS ON TRACK
     Wade L. Huntley, The Toronto Star, 15 February 2007

[Wade L. Huntley is director of the Simons Centre for Disarmament and 
Non-Proliferation Research at the Liu Institute for Global Issues, 
University of British Columbia.]

The new agreement to begin elimination of North Korea's nuclear 
weapons capabilities feels a lot like finally finding the car keys: 
It's great to at last get going, but the unneeded anxiety and lost 
time still grate. The deal is a welcome start, but in a wider sense 
its terms merely consummate the tragic handling of North Korea's 
nuclear ambitions over the past four years.

The terms reached at the current round of the Six-Party Talks in 
Beijing would shut down a research reactor at the Yongbyon site that 
produces the plutonium North Korea uses for its weapons program. In 
exchange, North Korea would receive immediate shipments of fuel oil to 
prop up its energy-strapped economy. Eventually North Korea would 
verifiably dismantle all nuclear weapons capabilities, receiving 
further energy aid, release from economic sanctions and normalization 
of political relations.

But the deal doesn't replace the 1994 Agreed Framework, which mapped a 
never-completed course to complete denuclearization of North Korea, 
then thought to have one or two untested devices. When that 
arrangement collapsed at the end of 2002, it also allowed North Korea 
to withdraw from the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and generate 
enough plutonium for six to ten more nuclear weapons. The new deal 
leaves those developments to future -- and undoubtedly difficult --  
negotiations. So we're not even yet back to where we were in 2002.

Since then, more has been lost than gained.

The previous agreement collapsed, in part, over US accusations that 
North Korea had a second nuclear program based on uranium enrichment 
that would produce usable fissile material in a few years. The Bush 
administration insisted elimination of this program was a prerequisite 
to new negotiations. Today, those intelligence reports have lost their 
lustre (sound familiar?) and this issue, too, awaits future 
negotiations.

The new deal puts in motion the September 2005 "Statement of 
Principles," an equally heralded achievement.

But US actions to freeze overseas assets linked to North Korean 
illicit activities helped obstruct its implementation. The latest deal 
emerged only after the USA expressed willingness to relax the 
financial restraints. Meanwhile, North Korea attempted a long-range 
missile test and conducted its nuclear test.

Indeed, the emergence of a new deal only a few months after the 
nuclear test seems to validate North Korea's strategy to provoke the 
USA into compromise. North Korea's first long-range missile test in 
1998 led to a near agreement for elimination of its missile program 
and then-secretary of state Madeleine Albright's visit to Pyongyang in 
2000. The strategy appears to have worked even more quickly this time.

Does all this mean that a new deal is capitulation? Hard-line Bush 
administration factions have long preferred to squeeze North Korea 
with containment and sanctions until its ruling regime capitulates or 
collapses. But that approach led to the breakdown of the Agreed 
Framework in the first place, and by alienating China and South Korea 
(they oppose coerced regime change in Pyongyang) it then allowed North 
Korea to avoid serious negotiation and advance its nuclear weapons 
program.

China and South Korea's own reactions to North Korea's recent 
belligerence may have done more to bring the north back to the table 
than US pressure.

Herein resides the tragedy.

Washington's former UN ambassador John Bolton is nearly right to claim 
this deal could have been done six years ago. Actually, a better one 
was already in place. It wasn't perfect. But the Bush administration's 
confrontational alternative -- more ideological and reflexive then 
strategic or forward looking -- was worse.

Kim Jong Il may have been, for the first year or two, intimidated by 
President George W. Bush's bellicosity. But by 2003, with US 
attentions and resources committed to Iraq, Pyongyang was increasingly 
prepared to call Washington's bluff.

Today, it's clearer than ever that the only route to a peaceful 
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula lies down the road of 
engagement and negotiation. Misbegotten dalliances with cowboy 
confrontation have simply made that road longer and rougher: No state 
has ever given up a publicly tested nuclear weapons capability.

Canada's stakes are significant.

North Korea's nuclear ambitions are a critical challenge to the global 
non-proliferation regime and help evoke US postures on terrorism, 
missile defence and military pre-emption.

The humanitarian crisis in North Korea should be at the top of 
anyone's human rights and development agendas. Opportunity is also 
considerable: Canada can utilize unique relationships with both North 
Korea and the USA to enhance the dialogues that make progress at the 
Six-Party Talks possible. The current accord renews North Korea's 
commitment to abandon its nuclear weapons capabilities and indicates 
that the existing Six-Party Talks process still has legs.

We've taken a first step down the long road. Canada can help the 
process stay on track -- and reach the destination in time.
*************************************************

End CanKor # 275

*************************************************

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