[Napsnet] SPECIAL REPORT: Building Multi-Party Capacity for a WMD-Free Korean Peninsula

[napsnet at nautilus.org]

NORTHEAST ASIA PEACE AND SECURITY NETWORK
***** SPECIAL REPORT *****

-"Building Multi-Party Capacity for a WMD-Free Korean Peninsula"
By the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA)

July 14th, 2005

Read the report at:
http://www.nautilus.org/napsnet/sr/2005/0558IFPA.pdf

Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA): http://www.ifpa.org

Nautilus invites your contributions to this forum, including any responses 
to this essay.

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CONTENTS
I.  Introduction
II.  Report by the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA)
III.  Nautilus invites your responses

I.  Introduction

The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA) released this final report 
from their Multilateral Workshop, held in Shanghai and cosponsored by the 
Shanghai Institute for International Studies (SIIS), part of IFPA's 
Building Six-Party Capacity Project 
(<http://www.ifpa.org/projects/carnrok.htm>http://www.ifpa.org/projects/carnrok.htm). 
The report states: "Ultimately, it matters less exactly what form the 
capacity-building effort assumes. Instead the most important factor is that 
collective discussion be initiated and expanded among a wider range of 
functional activities, and preferably away from media attention and with 
minimal political interference."

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not 
necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Nautilus 
Institute.  Readers should note that Nautilus seeks a diversity of views 
and opinions on contentious topics in order to identify common ground.

II. Report by the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA)

-"Building Multi-Party Capacity for a WMD-Free Korean Peninsula"
By Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA)

The primary objective of the workshop was to test different approaches to 
six-party capacity building in a multilateral setting and to identify 
certain core principles upon which the current negotiating process can be 
strengthened, possibly by establishing a separate dialogue focused on the 
back-end issues of implementing North Korea's denuclearization. The group 
of officials and experts gathered in Shanghai provided an extremely 
well-informed and broad range of views that are representative of the 
debates in their capitals surrounding the efforts to end North Korea's 
nuclear programs. Though workshop participants did not reach a clear 
consensus on a number of issues, some general trends of agreement were 
established.

The group enthusiastically endorsed the idea that the region would benefit 
from a new track of dialogue running parallel to the current six-party 
talks, which would address the key implementation challenges related to 
North Korea's nuclear disarmament. There was a broad consensus that the 
six-party process should continue beyond the conclusion of a front-end 
deal, that it was not just a forum for reaching an agreement, but that it 
could also play a critical role in  implementing that agreement and 
mediating subsequent disputes. In addition, many participants expressed a 
hope that such a dialogue could grow over time to deal with a broader range 
of regional security issues.

Nonetheless, most workshop participants believed that even an extended 
series of discussions would not significantly raise the likelihood of an 
agreement if neither North Korea nor the United States is willing to make 
the political and strategic concessions needed to reach a definitive and 
peaceful end to the current crisis. In some ways, the North Korean 
negotiating position has steadily weakened in the past year, as the other 
five parties increasingly doubt Pyongyang's sincerity when it declares a 
willingness to dismantle its nuclear programs under the right 
circumstances. But the United States has not been able capitalize on this 
situation, as it has sown its own seeds of doubt in China and South Korea 
that Washington would deliver completely (and relatively quickly) on 
promises of non-interference and normalization.

The perception among the other four countries of U.S. and DPRK sincerity 
and their commitment to the process, therefore, is proving almost as 
important as the U.S. and North Korean perceptions of each other. Though 
significant compromise might not be expected from either Washington or 
Pyongyang, it could perhaps be induced if the six-party process truly took 
on a five-versus-one dynamic. Here the United States has an advantage, 
since it is much more likely to line up the other four on its side, even 
though creating such a dynamic might still require some compromise by 
Washington if it hopes to truly isolate Pyongyang. Extended discussions, 
therefore, could be a vehicle not only for building multi-party capacity 
for the future, but also for developing a workable consensus among the five 
regarding management of the North Korean nuclear problem. Without some 
compromise and a five-versus-one situation, the six-party process, as 
currently configured, may be nearing its end.

As mentioned earlier, the close linkage between front-end and potential 
back-end discussions on these issues can be useful, since low-profile, 
working- level talks might help improve the front-end environment. The 
linkage runs both ways, however, and it can be difficult (at times, 
impossible) to design an implementing organization without understanding 
the nature of the front-end agreement. Still, the workshop demonstrated 
that there are likely many productive avenues of dialogue that can improve 
the chances for later success and enhance regional security. Given the 
amount of work that can be done now, there is no need to wait, and IFPA has 
derived from the workshop a rough proposal for moving forward in the near 
term and has identified certain basic principles of multi-party capacity 
building. This proposal for a separate track of dialogue will only become 
more important if the current six-party talks cannot be resumed.

Whether or not the six-party talks continue, it might be useful to separate 
out a multilateral dialogue on mutual security assurances and isolate it 
from other issues of economic engagement or WMD disarmament. The fact is 
that North Korea is not the only country with security concerns. The 
potential threat to the United States from North Korean nuclear 
proliferation is real, and it is just as legitimate as Pyongyang's 
concerns. The purpose of this separated discussion would be to develop 
policies, in conjunction with the North Koreans, whose purpose would be the 
reduction of proliferation risk and increasing the transparency of North 
Korea's nuclear weapons program. The other four parties also worry about 
DPRK proliferation to varying degrees, and Japan's unique threat 
perceptions regarding North Korean missiles and nuclear weapons must also 
be considered. CVID is Washington's preferred form of security assurance 
against proliferation, but if that cannot be achieved in the short term, 
the group will need to address the five parties' proliferation concerns 
directly, and a dialogue on reciprocal security assurances might be the 
best way to deal with the issue (while work continues separately on a 
formula for denuclearization). If such a dialogue does not result in 
enhancing the transparency of the North's nuclear programs (i.e. if 
Pyongyang keeps stalling), it may then at least help engender a 
five-versus-one dynamic, in response to continued DPRK resistance to 
commonsense precautions against nuclear proliferation.

Of course, all participants agreed that a nuclear- free Korean Peninsula is 
the ultimate objective, and another "basket" for working-level, capacity- 
building dialogue is nuclear dismantlement and verification. Workshop 
participants generally thought that a six-party organization could play an 
important role in implementing, or at least overseeing, a dismantlement and 
verification regime for North Korea, in some form of partnership with the 
IAEA. There are a number of potential topics for discussion, such as 
determining the overall design of a new dismantlement and verification 
regime, and developing an appropriate division of responsibilities among 
the six parties, the IAEA, and possibly the UN Security Council's five 
permanent members. In addition, talks could commence on the outline of a 
dispute resolution mechanism, as well as potential funding options or 
formulae.

On the economic front, the results of the workshop suggest that a 
two-tiered approach to managing economic engagement with North Korea might 
be the most appropriate means of implementing an economic aid package for 
the DPRK. Tier-one assistance would be explicitly linked to progress made 
in verifying North Korea's dismantlement of its nuclear programs, and it 
would also seek to maintain some degree of North Korean dependence upon the 
outside world. Workshop participants generally agreed that KEDO should be 
maintained, but there was also a belief that tier-one aid should not focus 
solely on large, state-led symbolic projects (and there was little 
enthusiasm for building nuclear power plants). An obvious topic for 
working-level discussion, therefore, could be how to integrate or at least 
learn from the KEDO experience (and the more recent experience in the 
Gaesong SEZ) with regard to large-scale project implementation. Moreover, 
the group could begin planning for (and carrying out) feasibility studies 
and assessments regarding economic and public health infrastructure 
development in North Korea, perhaps in collaboration with the World Bank. 
Some meetings dealing with energy issues have already taken place in 
bilateral and trilateral formats, which, while helpful, only underscore the 
ad hoc nature of these discussions and the potential value of further 
institutionalizing the process.

A multi-party capacity-building effort might also deal with the management 
of a separate, depoliticized category of aid that is not linked to progress 
on the nuclear issue. Food aid could initially represent a significant 
percentage of tier-two aid, which might continue to be managed by the WFP. 
But workshop participants also favored moving North Korea from food aid to 
developmental aid and technical assistance in order to build economic 
capacity within the DPRK. The majority of these projects would likely be 
initiated and carried out by state, sub-state, and non-state actors, which 
would not be subject to any formal six-party jurisdiction. A multi-party 
organization, however, could provide an overarching framework to help 
coordinate (or at least keep track of) the contributions from different 
organizations and countries. The Consultative Group for Indonesia, an 
annual meeting that gathers the Indonesian government with its donors, was 
suggested as a potential organizational model for a six-party organization, 
with respect to providing economic aid to North Korea.

In addition to specific ideas regarding how building multi-party capacity 
might contribute to progress in certain issue areas of the six-party talks, 
there emerged from the workshop some basic principles to keep in mind when 
thinking about the broader institutionalization of this process. One of the 
important principles seems to be starting small and modestly, both in terms 
of near-term expectations and work load. Tangible institutionalization, in 
the form of staff, budgets, a secretariat, permanent committees, and the 
like, were generally discouraged. This is consistent with some of this 
project's earlier findings, which emphasized a loose (but politically 
strong) organizing approach, similar to that used by the G-8 members for 
their annual meetings and affiliated working groups and task forces.

Participants also expressed the belief that DPRK involvement in the 
capacity-building process was important, despite the fact that North Korea 
has considerably less experience with building these types of institutions 
than the other five parties. In particular, North Korea could play an 
active role in a working group, established within a six-party 
organization, whose purpose would be to prioritize and implement a tier-one 
economic assistance package, and it could also play an active role in a 
dismantlement and verification oversight committee. Ultimately, the 
potential delays and difficulties stemming from DPRK inclusion were 
believed to be outweighed by the likely benefit of building North Korean 
trust in, and a sense of ownership of, the process. As a result, this 
project will seek to involve North Korean scholars and government officials 
at the next workshop, in 2006.

Additionally, workshop participants agreed that at times it would be wise 
for a six-party organization to encourage a division of labor among the 
parties on various issues. Procedurally, they did not think that every 
country needed to be directly involved in every issue. While they did 
believe that all countries should deliberate and have a say on key 
strategic issues, such as whether North Korea's uranium program should be 
included within a freeze, only those countries most affected, or who 
possess needed capabilities, should participate on less significant, 
tactical issues. Over time, therefore, the group would have to identify 
what activities and decisions fall into the category requiring agreement by 
consensus.

Furthermore, there was a general view that countries with specific 
expertise should assume a leading role on key niche issues. For instance, 
China is an expert on rural energy, and it could lead projects that focus 
on building energy-generating capacity in the North Korean countryside. 
Furthermore, Russia and the United States have the most experience with 
securing fissile material, while Japan and South Korea bring needed 
economic and infrastructure development expertise.

Overall, the workshop demonstrated a strong interest in the potential value 
of pursuing multiparty capacity building as a way to increase regional 
dialogue on a variety of issues, including those related to North Korea's 
nuclear and WMD programs, its economic plight, and the resulting regional 
security concerns. Ultimately, it matters less exactly what form the 
capacity-building effort assumes. Instead the most important factor is that 
collective discussion be initiated and expanded among a wider range of 
functional activities, and preferably away from media attention and with 
minimal political interference. A capacity-building dialogue by itself will 
not fundamentally change the dynamics of the current dispute, as there are 
larger political and geostrategic factors at play in the region that will 
require tough decisions within each capital. Any form of expansion and 
institutionalization of the dialogue, however, can only serve to improve 
the chances for success when negotiating opportunities do present 
themselves to the parties in the future, and IFPA and its research partners 
will continue to work on how such a regional dialogue can be most 
effectively structured.

Read the entire report at: http://www.nautilus.org/napsnet/sr/2005/0558IFPA.pdf

III. Nautilus Invites Your Responses

The Northeast Asia Peace and Security Network invites your responses to 
this essay. Please send responses to: bscott at nautilus.org. Responses will 
be considered for redistribution to the network only if they include the 
author's name, affiliation, and explicit consent.